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6 <title>Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail
7 - GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title>
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14 <h2>Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail</h2>
15
16 <address class="byline">by <a href="https://www.stallman.org/">Richard
17 Stallman</a>&#8239;<a href="#ft1"><sup>[1]</sup></a></address>
18
19 <p>The legal world is aware that digital information technology poses
20 &ldquo;problems for copyright,&rdquo; but has not traced these
21 problems to their root cause: a fundamental conflict between
22 publishers of copyrighted works and the users of these works. The
23 publishers, understanding their own interest, have set forth a
24 proposal through the Clinton Administration to fix the
25 &ldquo;problems&rdquo; by deciding the conflict in their favor. This
26 proposal, the Lehman White Paper,<a href="#ft2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> was the
27 principal focus of the <cite>Innovation and the Information
28 Environment</cite> conference at the University of Oregon (November
29 1995).</p>
30
31 <p>John Perry Barlow,<a href="#ft3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> the keynote speaker,
32 began the conference by telling us how the Greatful Dead recognized
33 and dealt with this conflict. They decided it would be wrong to
34 interfere with copying of their performances on tapes, or with
35 distribution on the Internet, but saw nothing wrong in enforcing
36 copyright for CD recordings of their music.</p>
37
38 <p>Barlow did not analyze the reasons for treating these media
39 differently, and later Gary Glisson&#8239;<a href="#ft4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> criticized
40 Barlow's idea that the Internet is inexplicably unique and unlike
41 anything else in the world. He argued that we should be able to
42 determine the implications of the Internet for copyright policy by the
43 same kind of analysis that we apply to other technologies. This paper
44 attempts to do just that.</p>
45
46 <p>Barlow suggested that our intuitions based on physical objects as
47 property do not transfer to information as property because
48 information is &ldquo;abstract.&rdquo; As Steven
49 Winter&#8239;<a href="#ft5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> remarked, abstract property has existed
50 for centuries. Shares in a company, commodity futures, and even paper
51 money, are forms of property that are more or less abstract. Barlow
52 and others who argue that information should be free do not reject
53 these other kinds of abstract property. Clearly, the crucial
54 difference between information and acceptable kinds of property is not
55 abstractness per se. So what is it? I propose a simple and practical
56 explanation.</p>
57
58 <p>United States copyright law considers copyright a bargain between
59 the public and &ldquo;authors&rdquo; (although in practice, usually
60 publishers take over the authors' part of the bargain). The public
61 trades certain freedoms in exchange for more published works to
62 enjoy. Until the White Paper, our government had never proposed that
63 the public should trade <b>all</b> of its freedom to use published
64 works. Copyright involves giving up specific freedoms and retaining
65 others. This means that there are many alternative bargains that the
66 public could offer to publishers. So which bargain is the best one for
67 the public? Which freedoms are worth while for the public to trade,
68 and for what length of time? The answers depend on two things: how
69 much additional publication the public will get for trading a given
70 freedom, and how much the public benefits from keeping that
71 freedom.</p>
72
73 <p>This shows why making <a href="#later-1">intellectual property
74 decisions</a> by analogy to physical object property, or even to older
75 intellectual property policies, is a mistake. Winter argued
76 persuasively that it is possible to make such analogies, to stretch
77 our old concepts and apply them to new decisions.<a href=
78 "#ft6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Surely this will reach some answer&mdash;but not a
79 good answer. Analogy is not a useful way of deciding what to buy or at
80 what price.</p>
81
82 <p>For example, we do not decide whether to build a highway in New
83 York City by analogy with a previous decision about a proposed highway
84 in Iowa. In each highway construction decision, the same factors apply
85 (cost, amount of traffic, taking of land or houses); if we made
86 highway decisions by analogy to previous highway decisions, we would
87 either build every proposed highway or none of them. Instead we judge
88 each proposed highway based on the pros and cons, whose magnitudes
89 vary from case to case. In copyright issues, too, we must weigh the
90 cost and benefits for today's situation and today's media, not as they
91 have applied to other media in the past.</p>
92
93 <p>This also shows why Laurence Tribe's principle, that rights
94 concerning speech should not depend on the choice of
95 medium,<a href="#ft7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> is not applicable to copyright
96 decisions. Copyright is a bargain with the public, not a natural
97 right. Copyright policy issues are about which bargains benefit the
98 public, not about what rights publishers or readers are entitled
99 to.</p>
100
101 <p>The copyright system developed along with the printing press. In
102 the age of the printing press, it was unfeasible for an ordinary
103 reader to copy a book. Copying a book required a printing press, and
104 ordinary readers did not have one. What's more, copying in this way
105 was absurdly expensive unless many copies were made&mdash;which means,
106 in effect, that only a publisher could copy a book economically.</p>
107
108 <p>So when the public traded to publishers the freedom to copy books,
109 they were selling something which they <b>could not use</b>. Trading
110 something you cannot use for something useful and helpful is always
111 good deal. Therefore, copyright was uncontroversial in the age of the
112 printing press, precisely because it did not restrict anything the
113 reading public might commonly do.</p>
114
115 <p>But the age of the printing press is gradually ending. The xerox
116 machine and the audio and video tape began the change; digital
117 information technology brings it to fruition. These advances make it
118 possible for ordinary people, not just publishers with specialized
119 equipment, to copy. And they do!</p>
120
121 <p>Once copying is a useful and practical activity for ordinary
122 people, they are no longer so willing to give up the freedom to do
123 it. They want to keep this freedom and exercise it instead of trading
124 it away. The copyright bargain that we have is no longer a good deal
125 for the public, and it is time to revise it&mdash;time for the law to
126 recognize the public benefit that comes from making and sharing
127 copies.</p>
128
129 <p>With this analysis, we see why rejection of the old copyright
130 bargain is not based on supposing that the Internet is ineffably
131 unique. The Internet is relevant because it facilitates copying and
132 sharing of writings by ordinary readers. The easier it is to copy and
133 share, the more useful it becomes, and the more copyright as it stands
134 now becomes a bad deal.</p>
135
136 <p>This analysis also explains why it makes sense for the Grateful
137 Dead to insist on copyright for CD manufacturing but not for
138 individual copying. CD production works like the printing press; it is
139 not feasible today for ordinary people, even computer owners, to copy
140 a CD into another CD. Thus, copyright for publishing CDs of music
141 remains painless for music listeners, just as all copyright was
142 painless in the age of the printing press. To restrict copying the
143 same music onto a digital audio tape does hurt the listeners, however,
144 and they are entitled to reject this restriction. (1999 note: the
145 practical situation for CDs has changed, in that many ordinary
146 computer users can now copy CDs. This means that we should now
147 consider CDs more like tapes. 2007 clarification: notwithstanding the
148 improvement in CD technology, it still makes sense to apply copyright
149 to commercial distribution while letting individuals copy freely.)</p>
150
151 <p>We can also see why the abstractness
152 of <a href="#later-1">intellectual property</a> is not the crucial
153 factor. Other forms of abstract property represent shares of
154 something. Copying any kind of share is intrinsically a zero-sum
155 activity; the person who copies benefits only by taking wealth away
156 from everyone else. Copying a dollar bill in a color copier is
157 effectively equivalent to shaving a small fraction off of every other
158 dollar and adding these fractions together to make one
159 dollar. Naturally, we consider this wrong.</p>
160
161 <p>By contrast, copying useful, enlightening or entertaining
162 information for a friend makes the world happier and better off; it
163 benefits the friend, and inherently hurts no one. It is a constructive
164 activity that strengthens social bonds.</p>
165
166 <p>Some readers may question this statement because they know
167 publishers claim that illegal copying causes them &ldquo;loss.&rdquo;
168 This claim is mostly inaccurate and partly misleading. More
169 importantly, it is begging the question.</p>
170
171 <ul>
172 <li>The claim is mostly inaccurate because it presupposes that the
173 friend would otherwise have bought a copy from the publisher. That
174 is occasionally true, but more often false; and when it is false,
175 the claimed loss does not occur.</li>
176
177 <li>The claim is partly misleading because the word
178 &ldquo;loss&rdquo; suggests events of a very different
179 nature&mdash;events in which something they have is taken away from
180 them. For example, if the bookstore's stock of books were burned, or
181 if the money in the register got torn up, that would really be a
182 &ldquo;loss.&rdquo; We generally agree it is wrong to do these
183 things to other people.
184
185 <p>But when your friend avoids the need to buy a copy of a book,
186 the bookstore and the publisher do not lose anything they had. A
187 more fitting description would be that the bookstore and publisher
188 get less income than they might have got. The same consequence can
189 result if your friend decides to play bridge instead of reading a
190 book. In a free market system, no business is entitled to cry
191 &ldquo;foul&rdquo; just because a potential customer chooses not
192 to deal with them.</p>
193 </li>
194
195 <li>The claim is begging the question because the idea of
196 &ldquo;loss&rdquo; is based on the assumption that the publisher
197 &ldquo;should have&rdquo; got paid. That is based on the assumption
198 that copyright exists and prohibits individual copying. But that is
199 just the issue at hand: what should copyright cover? If the public
200 decides it can share copies, then the publisher is not entitled to
201 expect to be paid for each copy, and so cannot claim there is a
202 &ldquo;loss&rdquo; when it is not.
203
204 <p>In other words, the &ldquo;loss&rdquo; comes from the copyright
205 system; it is not an inherent part of copying. Copying in itself
206 hurts no one.</p>
207 </li>
208 </ul>
209
210 <p>The most widely opposed provision of the White Paper is the system
211 of collective responsibility, whereby a computer owner is required to
212 monitor and control the activities of all users, on pain of being
213 punished for actions in which he was not a participant but merely
214 failed to actively prevent. Tim Sloan&#8239;<a href="#ft8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> pointed
215 out that this gives copyright owners a privileged status not accorded
216 to anyone else who might claim to be damaged by a computer user; for
217 example, no one proposes to punish the computer owner if he fails
218 actively to prevent a user from defaming someone. It is natural for a
219 government to turn to collective responsibility for enforcing a law
220 that many citizens do not believe in obeying. The more digital
221 technology helps citizens share information, the more the government
222 will need draconian methods to enforce copyright against ordinary
223 citizens.</p>
224
225 <p>When the United States Constitution was drafted, the idea that
226 authors were entitled to a copyright monopoly was proposed&mdash;and
227 rejected.<a href="#ft9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Instead, the founders of our country
228 adopted a different idea of copyright, one which places the public
229 first.<a href="#ft10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> Copyright in the United States is
230 supposed to exist for the sake of users; benefits for publishers and
231 even for authors are not given for the sake of those parties, but only
232 as an inducement to change their behavior. As the Supreme Court said
233 in <cite>Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal</cite>: &ldquo;The sole interest of the United
234 States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly
235 lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
236 authors.&rdquo;<a href="#ft11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></p>
237
238 <p>Under the Constitution's view of copyright, if the public prefers
239 to be able to make copies in certain cases even if that means somewhat
240 fewer works are published, the public's choice is decisive. There is
241 no possible justification for prohibiting the public from copying what
242 it wants to copy.</p>
243
244 <p>Ever since the constitutional decision was made, publishers have
245 tried to reverse it by misinforming the public. They do this by
246 repeating arguments which presuppose that copyright is a natural right
247 of authors (not mentioning that authors almost always cede it to
248 publishers). People who hear these arguments, unless they have a firm
249 awareness that this presupposition is contrary to the basic premises
250 of our legal system, take for granted that it is the basis of that
251 system.</p>
252
253 <p>This error is so ingrained today that people who oppose new
254 copyright powers feel the need to do so by arguing that even authors
255 and publishers may be hurt by them. Thus, James
256 Boyle&#8239;<a href="#ft12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> explains how a
257 strict <a href="#later-2">intellectual property system</a> can
258 interfere with writing new works. Jessica
259 Litman&#8239;<a href="#ft13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> cites the copyright shelters which
260 historically allowed many new media to become popular. Pamela
261 Samuelson&#8239;<a href="#ft14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> warns that the White Paper may
262 block the development of &ldquo;third-wave&rdquo; information
263 industries by locking the world into the &ldquo;second-wave&rdquo;
264 economic model that fit the age of the printing press.</p>
265
266 <p>These arguments can be very effective on those issues where they
267 are available, especially with a Congress and Administration dominated
268 by the idea that &ldquo;What's good for General Media is good for the
269 USA.&rdquo; But they fail to expose the fundamental falsehood on which
270 this domination is based; as a result, they are ineffective in the
271 long term. When these arguments win one battle, they do so without
272 building a general understanding that helps win the next battle. If we
273 turn to these arguments too much and too often, the danger is that we
274 may allow the publishers to replace the Constitution uncontested.</p>
275
276 <p>For example, the recently published position statement of the
277 Digital Future Coalition, an umbrella organization, lists many reasons
278 to oppose the White Paper, for the sake of authors, libraries,
279 education, poor Americans, technological progress, economic
280 flexibility, and privacy concerns&mdash;all valid arguments, but
281 concerned with side issues.<a href="#ft15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> Conspicuously
282 absent from the list is the most important reason of all: that many
283 Americans (perhaps most) want to continue making copies. The DFC fails
284 to criticize the core goal of the White Paper, which is to give more
285 power to publishers, and its central decision, to reject the
286 Constitution and place the publishers above the users. This silence
287 may be taken for consent.</p>
288
289 <p>Resisting the pressure for additional power for publishers depends
290 on widespread awareness that the reading and listening public are
291 paramount; that copyright exists for users and not vice versa. If the
292 public is unwilling to accept certain copyright powers, that is ipso
293 facto justification for not offering them. Only by reminding the
294 public and the legislature of the purpose of copyright and the
295 opportunity for the open flow of information can we ensure that the
296 public prevails.</p>
297
298 <h3 class="footnote">Later Notes</h3>
299 <ul>
300 <li id="later-1"><em>Intellectual property:</em>&nbsp;
301 This article was part of the
302 path that led me to recognize the <a href="/philosophy/not-ipr.html">
303 bias and confusion in the term &ldquo;intellectual
304 property&rdquo;</a>. Today I believe that term should never be used
305 under any circumstances.</li>
306
307 <li id="later-2"><em>Intellectual property system:</em>&nbsp;
308 Here I fell into the
309 fashionable error of writing &ldquo;intellectual property&rdquo; when
310 what I meant was just &ldquo;copyright.&rdquo; This is like writing
311 &ldquo;Europe&rdquo; when you mean &ldquo;France&rdquo;&mdash;it
312 causes confusion that is easy to avoid.</li>
313 </ul>
314
315 <div class="infobox">
316 <hr />
317 <ol>
318 <li id="ft1">Published in <cite>Oregon Law Review</cite>, Spring 1996.</li>
319
320 <li id="ft2">Informational Infrastructure Task
321 Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information
322 Infrastructure: <cite>The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
323 Property Rights</cite> (1995).</li>
324
325 <li id="ft3">John Perry Barlow, Remarks at the
326 <cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov.
327 1995). Mr. Barlow is one of the founders of the Electronic Frontier
328 Foundation, an organization which promotes freedom of expression in
329 digital media, and is also a former lyricist for the Grateful
330 Dead.</li>
331
332 <li id="ft4">Gary Glisson, Remarks at the
333 <cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. 1995);
334 see also Gary Glisson, &ldquo;A Practitioner's Defense of the NII White
335 Paper,&rdquo; 75 <cite>Or. L. Rev.</cite> (1996), supporting the White Paper.
336 Mr. Glisson is a partner and chair of the Intellectual Property Group
337 at Lane Powell Spears Lubersky in Portland, Oregon.</li>
338
339 <li id="ft5">Steven Winter, Remarks at the
340 <cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov.
341 1995). Mr. Winter is a professor at the University of Miami School of
342 Law.</li>
343
344 <li id="ft6">Winter, supra note 5.</li>
345
346 <li id="ft7">See Laurence H. Tribe, &ldquo;The
347 Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic
348 Frontier,&rdquo; <cite>Humanist</cite>, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 15.</li>
349
350 <li id="ft8">Tim Sloan, Remarks at the <cite>Innovation
351 and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. 1995). Mr. Sloan is
352 a member of the National Telecommunication and Information
353 Administration.</li>
354
355 <li id="ft9">See Jane C. Ginsburg, &ldquo;A Tale of Two
356 Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America,&rdquo; in
357 <cite>Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law</cite> 131, 137-38 (Brad
358 Sherman &amp; Alain Strowel, eds., 1994), stating that the
359 Constitution's framers either meant to &ldquo;subordinate[] the
360 author's interests to the public benefit,&rdquo; or to &ldquo;treat
361 the private and public interests &hellip; even-handedly.&rdquo;</li>
362
363 <li id="ft10"><cite>U.S. Const.</cite>, art. I, p. 8, cl. 8
364 (&ldquo;Congress shall have Power&hellip;to promote the Progress of
365 Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
366 Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
367 Discoveries.&rdquo;)</li>
368
369 <li id="ft11"><cite>286 U.S. 123</cite>, 127 (1932).</li>
370
371 <li id="ft12">James Boyle, Remarks at the
372 <cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov.
373 1995). Mr. Boyle is a Professor of Law at American University in
374 Washington, D.C.</li>
375
376 <li id="ft13">Jessica Litman, Remarks at the
377 <cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov.
378 1995). Ms. Litman is a Professor at Wayne State University Law School
379 in Detroit, Michigan.</li>
380
381 <li id="ft14">Pamela Samuelson, &ldquo;The Copyright
382 Grab,&rdquo; <cite>Wired</cite>, Jan. 1996. Ms. Samuelson is a Professor at Cornell Law
383 School.</li>
384
385 <li id="ft15">Digital Future Coalition,
386 &ldquo;Broad-Based Coalition Expresses Concern Over Intellectual Property
387 Proposals,&rdquo; Nov. 15, 1995<!-- (available at URL:
388 home.worldweb.net/dfc/press.html</a>)-->.</li>
389 </ol>
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