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<title>Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail |
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- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title> |
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<div class="article reduced-width"> |
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<h2>Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail</h2> |
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|
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<address class="byline">by <a href="https://www.stallman.org/">Richard |
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Stallman</a> <a href="#ft1"><sup>[1]</sup></a></address> |
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|
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<p>The legal world is aware that digital information technology poses |
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“problems for copyright,” but has not traced these |
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problems to their root cause: a fundamental conflict between |
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publishers of copyrighted works and the users of these works. The |
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publishers, understanding their own interest, have set forth a |
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proposal through the Clinton Administration to fix the |
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“problems” by deciding the conflict in their favor. This |
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proposal, the Lehman White Paper,<a href="#ft2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> was the |
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principal focus of the <cite>Innovation and the Information |
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Environment</cite> conference at the University of Oregon (November |
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1995).</p> |
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|
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<p>John Perry Barlow,<a href="#ft3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> the keynote speaker, |
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began the conference by telling us how the Greatful Dead recognized |
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and dealt with this conflict. They decided it would be wrong to |
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interfere with copying of their performances on tapes, or with |
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distribution on the Internet, but saw nothing wrong in enforcing |
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copyright for CD recordings of their music.</p> |
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|
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<p>Barlow did not analyze the reasons for treating these media |
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differently, and later Gary Glisson <a href="#ft4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> criticized |
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Barlow's idea that the Internet is inexplicably unique and unlike |
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anything else in the world. He argued that we should be able to |
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determine the implications of the Internet for copyright policy by the |
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same kind of analysis that we apply to other technologies. This paper |
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attempts to do just that.</p> |
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|
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<p>Barlow suggested that our intuitions based on physical objects as |
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property do not transfer to information as property because |
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information is “abstract.” As Steven |
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Winter <a href="#ft5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> remarked, abstract property has existed |
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for centuries. Shares in a company, commodity futures, and even paper |
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money, are forms of property that are more or less abstract. Barlow |
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and others who argue that information should be free do not reject |
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these other kinds of abstract property. Clearly, the crucial |
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difference between information and acceptable kinds of property is not |
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abstractness per se. So what is it? I propose a simple and practical |
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explanation.</p> |
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|
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<p>United States copyright law considers copyright a bargain between |
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the public and “authors” (although in practice, usually |
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publishers take over the authors' part of the bargain). The public |
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trades certain freedoms in exchange for more published works to |
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enjoy. Until the White Paper, our government had never proposed that |
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the public should trade <b>all</b> of its freedom to use published |
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works. Copyright involves giving up specific freedoms and retaining |
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others. This means that there are many alternative bargains that the |
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public could offer to publishers. So which bargain is the best one for |
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the public? Which freedoms are worth while for the public to trade, |
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and for what length of time? The answers depend on two things: how |
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much additional publication the public will get for trading a given |
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freedom, and how much the public benefits from keeping that |
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freedom.</p> |
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|
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<p>This shows why making <a href="#later-1">intellectual property |
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decisions</a> by analogy to physical object property, or even to older |
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intellectual property policies, is a mistake. Winter argued |
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persuasively that it is possible to make such analogies, to stretch |
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our old concepts and apply them to new decisions.<a href= |
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"#ft6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Surely this will reach some answer—but not a |
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good answer. Analogy is not a useful way of deciding what to buy or at |
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what price.</p> |
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|
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<p>For example, we do not decide whether to build a highway in New |
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York City by analogy with a previous decision about a proposed highway |
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in Iowa. In each highway construction decision, the same factors apply |
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(cost, amount of traffic, taking of land or houses); if we made |
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highway decisions by analogy to previous highway decisions, we would |
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either build every proposed highway or none of them. Instead we judge |
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each proposed highway based on the pros and cons, whose magnitudes |
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vary from case to case. In copyright issues, too, we must weigh the |
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cost and benefits for today's situation and today's media, not as they |
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have applied to other media in the past.</p> |
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|
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<p>This also shows why Laurence Tribe's principle, that rights |
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concerning speech should not depend on the choice of |
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medium,<a href="#ft7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> is not applicable to copyright |
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decisions. Copyright is a bargain with the public, not a natural |
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right. Copyright policy issues are about which bargains benefit the |
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public, not about what rights publishers or readers are entitled |
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to.</p> |
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|
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<p>The copyright system developed along with the printing press. In |
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the age of the printing press, it was unfeasible for an ordinary |
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reader to copy a book. Copying a book required a printing press, and |
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ordinary readers did not have one. What's more, copying in this way |
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was absurdly expensive unless many copies were made—which means, |
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in effect, that only a publisher could copy a book economically.</p> |
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|
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<p>So when the public traded to publishers the freedom to copy books, |
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they were selling something which they <b>could not use</b>. Trading |
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something you cannot use for something useful and helpful is always |
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good deal. Therefore, copyright was uncontroversial in the age of the |
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printing press, precisely because it did not restrict anything the |
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reading public might commonly do.</p> |
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|
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<p>But the age of the printing press is gradually ending. The xerox |
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machine and the audio and video tape began the change; digital |
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information technology brings it to fruition. These advances make it |
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possible for ordinary people, not just publishers with specialized |
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equipment, to copy. And they do!</p> |
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|
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<p>Once copying is a useful and practical activity for ordinary |
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people, they are no longer so willing to give up the freedom to do |
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it. They want to keep this freedom and exercise it instead of trading |
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it away. The copyright bargain that we have is no longer a good deal |
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for the public, and it is time to revise it—time for the law to |
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recognize the public benefit that comes from making and sharing |
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copies.</p> |
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|
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<p>With this analysis, we see why rejection of the old copyright |
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bargain is not based on supposing that the Internet is ineffably |
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unique. The Internet is relevant because it facilitates copying and |
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sharing of writings by ordinary readers. The easier it is to copy and |
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share, the more useful it becomes, and the more copyright as it stands |
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now becomes a bad deal.</p> |
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|
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<p>This analysis also explains why it makes sense for the Grateful |
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Dead to insist on copyright for CD manufacturing but not for |
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individual copying. CD production works like the printing press; it is |
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not feasible today for ordinary people, even computer owners, to copy |
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a CD into another CD. Thus, copyright for publishing CDs of music |
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remains painless for music listeners, just as all copyright was |
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painless in the age of the printing press. To restrict copying the |
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same music onto a digital audio tape does hurt the listeners, however, |
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and they are entitled to reject this restriction. (1999 note: the |
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practical situation for CDs has changed, in that many ordinary |
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computer users can now copy CDs. This means that we should now |
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consider CDs more like tapes. 2007 clarification: notwithstanding the |
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improvement in CD technology, it still makes sense to apply copyright |
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to commercial distribution while letting individuals copy freely.)</p> |
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|
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<p>We can also see why the abstractness |
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of <a href="#later-1">intellectual property</a> is not the crucial |
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factor. Other forms of abstract property represent shares of |
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something. Copying any kind of share is intrinsically a zero-sum |
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activity; the person who copies benefits only by taking wealth away |
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from everyone else. Copying a dollar bill in a color copier is |
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effectively equivalent to shaving a small fraction off of every other |
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dollar and adding these fractions together to make one |
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dollar. Naturally, we consider this wrong.</p> |
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|
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<p>By contrast, copying useful, enlightening or entertaining |
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information for a friend makes the world happier and better off; it |
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benefits the friend, and inherently hurts no one. It is a constructive |
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activity that strengthens social bonds.</p> |
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|
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<p>Some readers may question this statement because they know |
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publishers claim that illegal copying causes them “loss.” |
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This claim is mostly inaccurate and partly misleading. More |
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importantly, it is begging the question.</p> |
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|
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<ul> |
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<li>The claim is mostly inaccurate because it presupposes that the |
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friend would otherwise have bought a copy from the publisher. That |
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is occasionally true, but more often false; and when it is false, |
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the claimed loss does not occur.</li> |
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|
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<li>The claim is partly misleading because the word |
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“loss” suggests events of a very different |
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nature—events in which something they have is taken away from |
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them. For example, if the bookstore's stock of books were burned, or |
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if the money in the register got torn up, that would really be a |
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“loss.” We generally agree it is wrong to do these |
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things to other people. |
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|
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<p>But when your friend avoids the need to buy a copy of a book, |
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the bookstore and the publisher do not lose anything they had. A |
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more fitting description would be that the bookstore and publisher |
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get less income than they might have got. The same consequence can |
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result if your friend decides to play bridge instead of reading a |
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book. In a free market system, no business is entitled to cry |
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“foul” just because a potential customer chooses not |
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to deal with them.</p> |
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</li> |
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|
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<li>The claim is begging the question because the idea of |
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“loss” is based on the assumption that the publisher |
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“should have” got paid. That is based on the assumption |
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that copyright exists and prohibits individual copying. But that is |
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just the issue at hand: what should copyright cover? If the public |
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decides it can share copies, then the publisher is not entitled to |
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expect to be paid for each copy, and so cannot claim there is a |
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“loss” when it is not. |
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|
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<p>In other words, the “loss” comes from the copyright |
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system; it is not an inherent part of copying. Copying in itself |
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hurts no one.</p> |
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</li> |
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</ul> |
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|
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<p>The most widely opposed provision of the White Paper is the system |
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of collective responsibility, whereby a computer owner is required to |
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monitor and control the activities of all users, on pain of being |
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punished for actions in which he was not a participant but merely |
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failed to actively prevent. Tim Sloan <a href="#ft8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> pointed |
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out that this gives copyright owners a privileged status not accorded |
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to anyone else who might claim to be damaged by a computer user; for |
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example, no one proposes to punish the computer owner if he fails |
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actively to prevent a user from defaming someone. It is natural for a |
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government to turn to collective responsibility for enforcing a law |
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that many citizens do not believe in obeying. The more digital |
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technology helps citizens share information, the more the government |
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will need draconian methods to enforce copyright against ordinary |
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citizens.</p> |
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|
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<p>When the United States Constitution was drafted, the idea that |
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authors were entitled to a copyright monopoly was proposed—and |
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rejected.<a href="#ft9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Instead, the founders of our country |
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adopted a different idea of copyright, one which places the public |
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first.<a href="#ft10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> Copyright in the United States is |
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supposed to exist for the sake of users; benefits for publishers and |
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even for authors are not given for the sake of those parties, but only |
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as an inducement to change their behavior. As the Supreme Court said |
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in <cite>Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal</cite>: “The sole interest of the United |
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States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly |
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lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of |
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authors.”<a href="#ft11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></p> |
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|
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<p>Under the Constitution's view of copyright, if the public prefers |
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to be able to make copies in certain cases even if that means somewhat |
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fewer works are published, the public's choice is decisive. There is |
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no possible justification for prohibiting the public from copying what |
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it wants to copy.</p> |
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|
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<p>Ever since the constitutional decision was made, publishers have |
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tried to reverse it by misinforming the public. They do this by |
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repeating arguments which presuppose that copyright is a natural right |
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of authors (not mentioning that authors almost always cede it to |
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publishers). People who hear these arguments, unless they have a firm |
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awareness that this presupposition is contrary to the basic premises |
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of our legal system, take for granted that it is the basis of that |
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system.</p> |
252 |
|
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<p>This error is so ingrained today that people who oppose new |
254 |
copyright powers feel the need to do so by arguing that even authors |
255 |
and publishers may be hurt by them. Thus, James |
256 |
Boyle <a href="#ft12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> explains how a |
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strict <a href="#later-2">intellectual property system</a> can |
258 |
interfere with writing new works. Jessica |
259 |
Litman <a href="#ft13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> cites the copyright shelters which |
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historically allowed many new media to become popular. Pamela |
261 |
Samuelson <a href="#ft14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> warns that the White Paper may |
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block the development of “third-wave” information |
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industries by locking the world into the “second-wave” |
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economic model that fit the age of the printing press.</p> |
265 |
|
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<p>These arguments can be very effective on those issues where they |
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are available, especially with a Congress and Administration dominated |
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by the idea that “What's good for General Media is good for the |
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USA.” But they fail to expose the fundamental falsehood on which |
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this domination is based; as a result, they are ineffective in the |
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long term. When these arguments win one battle, they do so without |
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building a general understanding that helps win the next battle. If we |
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turn to these arguments too much and too often, the danger is that we |
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may allow the publishers to replace the Constitution uncontested.</p> |
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|
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<p>For example, the recently published position statement of the |
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Digital Future Coalition, an umbrella organization, lists many reasons |
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to oppose the White Paper, for the sake of authors, libraries, |
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education, poor Americans, technological progress, economic |
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flexibility, and privacy concerns—all valid arguments, but |
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concerned with side issues.<a href="#ft15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> Conspicuously |
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absent from the list is the most important reason of all: that many |
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Americans (perhaps most) want to continue making copies. The DFC fails |
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to criticize the core goal of the White Paper, which is to give more |
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power to publishers, and its central decision, to reject the |
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Constitution and place the publishers above the users. This silence |
287 |
may be taken for consent.</p> |
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|
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<p>Resisting the pressure for additional power for publishers depends |
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on widespread awareness that the reading and listening public are |
291 |
paramount; that copyright exists for users and not vice versa. If the |
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public is unwilling to accept certain copyright powers, that is ipso |
293 |
facto justification for not offering them. Only by reminding the |
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public and the legislature of the purpose of copyright and the |
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opportunity for the open flow of information can we ensure that the |
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public prevails.</p> |
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|
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<h3 class="footnote">Later Notes</h3> |
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<ul> |
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<li id="later-1"><em>Intellectual property:</em> |
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This article was part of the |
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path that led me to recognize the <a href="/philosophy/not-ipr.html"> |
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bias and confusion in the term “intellectual |
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property”</a>. Today I believe that term should never be used |
305 |
under any circumstances.</li> |
306 |
|
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<li id="later-2"><em>Intellectual property system:</em> |
308 |
Here I fell into the |
309 |
fashionable error of writing “intellectual property” when |
310 |
what I meant was just “copyright.” This is like writing |
311 |
“Europe” when you mean “France”—it |
312 |
causes confusion that is easy to avoid.</li> |
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</ul> |
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|
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<div class="infobox"> |
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<hr /> |
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<ol> |
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<li id="ft1">Published in <cite>Oregon Law Review</cite>, Spring 1996.</li> |
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|
320 |
<li id="ft2">Informational Infrastructure Task |
321 |
Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information |
322 |
Infrastructure: <cite>The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual |
323 |
Property Rights</cite> (1995).</li> |
324 |
|
325 |
<li id="ft3">John Perry Barlow, Remarks at the |
326 |
<cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. |
327 |
1995). Mr. Barlow is one of the founders of the Electronic Frontier |
328 |
Foundation, an organization which promotes freedom of expression in |
329 |
digital media, and is also a former lyricist for the Grateful |
330 |
Dead.</li> |
331 |
|
332 |
<li id="ft4">Gary Glisson, Remarks at the |
333 |
<cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. 1995); |
334 |
see also Gary Glisson, “A Practitioner's Defense of the NII White |
335 |
Paper,” 75 <cite>Or. L. Rev.</cite> (1996), supporting the White Paper. |
336 |
Mr. Glisson is a partner and chair of the Intellectual Property Group |
337 |
at Lane Powell Spears Lubersky in Portland, Oregon.</li> |
338 |
|
339 |
<li id="ft5">Steven Winter, Remarks at the |
340 |
<cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. |
341 |
1995). Mr. Winter is a professor at the University of Miami School of |
342 |
Law.</li> |
343 |
|
344 |
<li id="ft6">Winter, supra note 5.</li> |
345 |
|
346 |
<li id="ft7">See Laurence H. Tribe, “The |
347 |
Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic |
348 |
Frontier,” <cite>Humanist</cite>, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 15.</li> |
349 |
|
350 |
<li id="ft8">Tim Sloan, Remarks at the <cite>Innovation |
351 |
and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. 1995). Mr. Sloan is |
352 |
a member of the National Telecommunication and Information |
353 |
Administration.</li> |
354 |
|
355 |
<li id="ft9">See Jane C. Ginsburg, “A Tale of Two |
356 |
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America,” in |
357 |
<cite>Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law</cite> 131, 137-38 (Brad |
358 |
Sherman & Alain Strowel, eds., 1994), stating that the |
359 |
Constitution's framers either meant to “subordinate[] the |
360 |
author's interests to the public benefit,” or to “treat |
361 |
the private and public interests … even-handedly.”</li> |
362 |
|
363 |
<li id="ft10"><cite>U.S. Const.</cite>, art. I, p. 8, cl. 8 |
364 |
(“Congress shall have Power…to promote the Progress of |
365 |
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and |
366 |
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and |
367 |
Discoveries.”)</li> |
368 |
|
369 |
<li id="ft11"><cite>286 U.S. 123</cite>, 127 (1932).</li> |
370 |
|
371 |
<li id="ft12">James Boyle, Remarks at the |
372 |
<cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. |
373 |
1995). Mr. Boyle is a Professor of Law at American University in |
374 |
Washington, D.C.</li> |
375 |
|
376 |
<li id="ft13">Jessica Litman, Remarks at the |
377 |
<cite>Innovation and the Information Environment Conference</cite> (Nov. |
378 |
1995). Ms. Litman is a Professor at Wayne State University Law School |
379 |
in Detroit, Michigan.</li> |
380 |
|
381 |
<li id="ft14">Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright |
382 |
Grab,” <cite>Wired</cite>, Jan. 1996. Ms. Samuelson is a Professor at Cornell Law |
383 |
School.</li> |
384 |
|
385 |
<li id="ft15">Digital Future Coalition, |
386 |
“Broad-Based Coalition Expresses Concern Over Intellectual Property |
387 |
Proposals,” Nov. 15, 1995<!-- (available at URL: |
388 |
home.worldweb.net/dfc/press.html</a>)-->.</li> |
389 |
</ol> |
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</div> |
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</div> |
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href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative |
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Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a>.</p> |
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<p class="unprintable">Updated: |
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$Date: 2021/10/02 08:40:06 $ |
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</p> |
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</div> |
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</body> |
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