Seeking to find a te reo word to describe the unfamiliar concept of property rights has made for a disastrous confusion

"Article Two of Te Tiriti promises to preserve tino rangatiratanga; courts have interpreted this in various ways to mean that chiefs (Rangatira) retain some kind of chiefly power. But Te Tiriti itself fails to fully clarify of what that power consists. Lawyers since have taken full advantage of this imprecision ... 

"In seeking to find a te reo word to describe the unfamiliar concept of property rights, [Te Tiriti's authors have] unfortunately conflated a legitimate recognition of an individual right to property with an analogy to feudalism and a non-existent claim to a collective right. But feudalism is a busted flush. And "the expression 'collective rights' is a contradiction in terms.”

"This then makes for a disastrous confusion. Confusion, because the intent of Article Two is to impart property rights, an individual right. But the reference to "chieftainship" makes the promise about collective tribal rights over land with the tribes' rights embodied in a chief.  Disastrous because Te Tiriti should have treated all Maori as individuals instead of as members of a tribe. But it really does nothing of the sort except by implication.

"Instead, as written, it cemented in and buttressed the tribal leadership and communal structures that already existed here —encouraging the survival of this wreck of a system until morphing, as it has today, into this mongrelised sub-group of pseudo-aristocracy: of Neotribal Cronyism. 

"This is not what was aimed at, but it is what was written. But the law cannot protect a non-existent right. As [former Chief Justice] William Martin wrote in 1860, in seeking to understand the intent of the authors,

'This tribal right is clearly a right of property… To themselves they retained what they understood full well, the "tino Rangatiratanga,""full Chiefship," in respect of all their lands…"'

"This is not trivial. This is why sovereignty, was ceded. This is what we must understand. Tino rangatiratanga ('a right of property') under kāwanatanga katoa (the 'complete Government') of the British Queen.

“'EVEN THE 'TINO' OF the Māori version is better understood in this context,' argues [Ewen] McQueen. 'It does not mean that the chiefs’ authority is unqualified in a government sense. Rather it is Henry Williams’s translation of how the chiefs would retain possession of the lands, forests and fisheries. The English version emphasised such possession would continue ‘full exclusive and undisturbed.’ Williams has rendered this concept as ‘tino’ rangatiratanga. It is about Māori retaining full agency over their land and resources. It is not a statement about unqualified political sovereignty.' [Emphasis mine.]

"So 'rangatiratanga' relates to ownership. 'Tino' gives force to this relationship, giving it the force of a property right."

~ Yours Truly from my post 'Rangatiratanga means "Ownership"'

"In New Zealand, moving a water tank on the marae can require council consent. Meanwhile, the Squamish are building apartment towers on their own land on their own authority."

 

"Canadian First Nations have transformed their economic fortunes. They have built thousands of new homes after gaining powers for planning, zoning, tax, and infrastructure finance. 'In New Zealand, moving a water tank on the marae can require council consent. Meanwhile, the Squamish are building apartment towers on their own land on their own authority,' ...

"The report ['Building Nations: What Canada’s First Nations can teach us about devolution and development'] highlights [this] stunning turnaround story that has been decades in the making.

"The Squamish Nation’s 6,000-apartment development in downtown Vancouver is helping to solve the city’s housing crisis on its own terms. An hour away from Vancouver, near Chilliwack, the Ch’íyáqtel (Tzeachten), has built over 1,600 homes. It has reversed its economic position from 90% reliance on government funding to 90% own-source revenue. ...

"Canada’s turnaround story started small. ... The path to autonomy was gradual, starting with one First Nation rather than a nationwide approach. ...

"New Zealand could learn from this. ... provid[ing] a practical path to realising a form of tino rangatiratanga, through local devolution, while delivering real benefits for all New Zealanders."

~ Eric Crampton from his post 'Building Nations: What Canada’s First Nations can teach us about devolution and development'

Kawanatanga katoa > tino rangatiratanga

"'There’s no doubt that both Māori and Pākehā in 1840 understood tino rangatiratanga to be a bigger deal than kāwanatanga” [says an idiot called Hooton]. However whilst this is undoubtedly the modernist position on how we should interpret the Treaty, the historical evidence suggests something very different.
    "Article One of the Treaty states that the chiefs agreed to 'give absolutely to the Queen of England forever, the complete Government (Kāwanatanga katoa) over their land' ...
    "[T]hat little word katoa ... is rarely mentioned. But it means complete, all-encompassing, totally, without exception. It’s no wonder [that in 1840] it focussed the minds of the chiefs on the issue of Crown authority. ...
    "Nowhere in the historical records do we find any indication that either the chiefs or the Pākehā protagonists understood anything other than that Kāwanatanga katoa meant the Crown was being established as the pre-eminent governing authority in the land. ...
    "'Te Kawenata Hou' (the 'Māori New Testament') ... would have had significant influence on how the chiefs understood the Treaty. ... In 'Te Kawenata Hou' the term rangatira is a general term for leadership. In contrast kawana is a very specific term used to denote governors who represent the authority of kings. To use [the] example of Pilate – as the kawana (governor) he represented the sovereignty of the Roman empire in Jerusalem. He had the authority to tax and to execute judgement. The local Jewish leaders who wanted Jesus crucified had to get his permission. Those leaders are described in Te Kawenata Hou as rangatira. From this the chiefs at Waitangi would have quickly understood what was being proposed in the Treaty. And it certainly did not involve them retaining 'absolute sovereignty'."

~ Ewen McQueen from his post 'Kāwanatanga katoa was the fundamental question at Waitangi'

"This is logically why confirmation of tino rangatiratanga is paired with advice on how to go about selling the land."

"[T]he Maori language of the Treaty is now routinely referenced to a world in which it did not exist. [For example] what [translator Henry] Williams might have meant in Article 2, which confirmed Maori in the tino rangatiratanga of everything they possessed. 

    "The aim of the Treaty was not to protect Maori culture; on the contrary, Williams believed that the processes of modernisation were active and sufficient agents of its transformation. It strains belief that, having transferred sovereignty to the Crown in the first article, Williams would posit a principle of omni-applicable Maori authority in the second, yet recent analysis is dependent on this being the case. The British did, of course, care about securing the colony’s land base. This is logically why confirmation of tino rangatiratanga is paired with advice on how to go about selling the land. The logic, and the crudeness of the pairing, point to tino rangatiratanga’s referring not to culture in the sense of Māoriness itself, but specifically to land and resource ownership.

    "Linguistic evidence offers support for this view. As we have seen, translators bent rangatiratanga to the expression of a variety of aspects of western ideas of authority, for which there were no existing Maori terms. Authority over land therefore fits easily in this category. As for evidence offered by context, one example must suffice here. It cannot be overstressed that anxiety about their future authority over the land was the most common theme of chiefs’ speeches at the Treaty hui. There was, therefore, good reason for the Pakeha to make a strong affirming statement not only of Maori ownership of the land, but of their continuing power of decision over its alienation.
    "It needs to be said that confining rangatiratanga to land ownership does not diminish the contemporary importance of Article 2. Land was the Maori stake in the colony. First, it was the commodity with which modernity was purchased. Second, by owning the land, Maori also controlled the most important bound­ary to state power. Nothing, therefore, was of greater importance than the confirmation of ownership. However, a crucial difference between current and historical meanings remains. In 1840 tino rangatiratanga did not distance Maori from the state, but fulfilled the logic of the Treaty’s concern with land.
    "In sum, Henry Williams translated the Treaty of Waitangi for his day, not for posterity. If the task was too lightly and amateurishly approached, this does not seem to require a paranoiac analysis. Within the narrow confines of the trans­lators’ perceptions, word choices in the Maori texts of both the ‘Declaration’ and the Treaty suggest only a striving for precision."

~ Lyndsay Head, from her article 'The Pursuit of Modernity in Māori Society', pp. 107-108

Why are some Māori protesting the new government? And what can we learn from it? [UPDATED]

 

SO LET'S FISK WHAT one of the Te Pati Māori (TPM) protest leaders said this morning, about why they've been out there trying to block traffic, because I think it's helpful to understand the protestors' objections to the new government's policies. And particularly revealing about a key difference on Te Tiriti.

Tureiti Moxon runs primary health provider Te Kōhao Health in Hamilton which is taxpayer-funded by Whānau Ora. She is against any rearrangement of Whānau Ora. She was also on the establishment board of the Māori Health Authority (Te Aka Whai Ora). Unsurprisingly, she is also against the new government's plan to bring Te Aka Whai Ora back into the mainstream health system. Before joining Te Kōhao Health, she worked for several years as a lawyer, working on Treaty claims. He has stood several times for Te Pāti Māori, and been their electoral chair for the Tainui electorate.

She is articulate, and seems representative both of those who've risen in protest against the policies of this government -- and those who've benefited from those of past governments. She told Corin Dann on Morning Report that the new government's policies are "anti-Māori" -- a "sweeping suite of policies" that are just, she says, "archaic."

THE "SUITE," SUMMARISED BY by interviewer Corin Dann, is what she claims to be an attack on Te Tiriti, on the Maori language, on the Maori health authority, and on a "smokefree" New Zealand. [her points are in italics]:

"[The new government] has been given sovereignty ... but what it doesn't have is the support of the people to whom a lot of those policies are aimed at."

Since her claim in about numbers: The number voting for TPM was in the thousands. The number out there this morning was in the hundreds. The number voting for the new governing parties is in the hundreds of thousands. But since Luxon has said he's going to govern for everyone, she has that point.

"In many ways we just feeling as if we're being attacked, every which way" she said, attacking the new government, "simply because a lot of their policies are ... anti-Māori policies."

Are they? Let's hear her argument.

"The worst of it is [the suite of policies is] taking us back a hundred years. It is taking us back to colonisation."

Really? Big claim. Still no argument.

"What we're saying is: No, we've ... worked too hard on our race relations [not just in] our organisations but in this country ... to bring about a better partnership in terms of Te Tiriti with the government and all those partners that we now have good relationships with."

The principle of partnership here is her key point. Which doesn't go back to colonisation, but only to Geoffrey Palmer and Richard Prebble -- and to Lord Cooke of Thorndon, whose Court of Appeal found, when asked by Palmer and Prebble to define (without offering any guidance from Parliament, as you'd expect from decenty-written law) what the principles of the Treaty might be, that it is "akin to a partnership." And which is, in fairness, what the new government says it will question via new legislation taken to a first reading in Parliament.

"They've decided to take back the power and control unto themselves" she says of that fairly tepid promise. "For a very long time ... iwi have been working very closely to bring about a partnership that actually has meaning, and is not just on paper.

But it's not even on paper. Cooke's Court only found something "akin" to a partnership, inviting further definition from lawmakers. 

In the meantime, "akin" is not "is."

Nonetheless, there's been significant momentum in the 36 years since to ignore that word "akin' and to cement in this idea of a full partnership -- as if that principle had been there since 1840, or had been enunciated in 1987 by the Court of Appeal.

And we might also ask: a partnership between whom exactly? That is to say, between the Crown (which Moxon acknowledges as one of the parties) and which particular individuals? Because, notice that she seems to be talking about a collective effort here, as if Māori as a collective should be co-governors, with some special class of rangatira acting as power-brokers on their behalf.  This is important in understanding her objections. 

"... [that] includes Maori in decision making ..."

Individual Maori make decisions every day about their own work and wellbeing. They're perfectly capable people. Why do they need the patronisation of a government? There was nothing in Te Tiriti requiring that. Nothing requiring they be in government -- even though many are, on their own merits.

"... and in co-governance ..."

Why? Te Tiriti never called for co-governance (see below). And the previous government's covert push to implement it was only partially successful. (Which suggests her main objection is to the break in momentum that she thinks this government represents.)

"... and with a swipe of the pen they decide, 'Nah, we're not having that any more'...."

And yet that's what governments (in whom she seems to put her faith) do all the time. And she does agree that this one has sovereignty. So we're back to her simply saying "I don't support it."

"... without even thinking about the consequences of what that actually means in terms of Te Tiriti O Waitangi, which has the guarantee of tino rangatiratanga; and there's no guarantee of tino rangatiratanga in the policies [inaudible]."

She's implying here that tino rangatiratanga must equal respect for Te Tiriti and the Maori language, for the existence of a Maori health authority and "smokefree" legislation, and support for widespread co-governance. Big claims! Respect for the first two can be agreed with -- even as we can debate what form that takes. The next two have no basis therefrom -- and in any case the majority of the "smokefree" legislation remains in place, unfortunately. 

Her last point, really, is the point in question here, and the one from which everything else would flow, if the last half-century's momentum (which she celebrates) were to continue.

"The Waitangi Tribunal has been around for about fifty years, and they have been the ones who have been the experts in Te Tiriti ..."

Not exactly. The Tribunal is only asked to hear and to advise the government of the day on alleged breaches of the Treaty, its hearings being adversarial (rather than any kind of partnership, or investigation), its historians being funded largely to seek out and highlight these alleged breaches, their reports on these breaches becoming (by their sheer volume) becoming the locus of modern-day historical research. And so if  they as historians and it as an institution have become experts in anything, it is primarily as experts in the Treaty's alleged misapplications, rather than in its ideal.  

There is a difference,

Note too that the Tribunal's findings are not and never have been binding on the government of the day. Depite all its apparent lustre, it is an advisory body only.

"... and in the principles ..."

No, the Tribunal is not even empowered to rule on the so-called principles -- which have developed in other courts as they have struggled to make sense of what this phrase means that inserted so unthinkingly into most law since. The Tribunal is empowered only to hear and advise on breaches of promise of Te Tiriti, not on any of that other legislation.

"...and in the development of Te Tirity jurisprudence. And what we're saying is that after fifty years of all that institutional knowledge is that everybody knows more about it than them."

No, I don't think that's what the new government is saying at all. One of the coalition partners (an actual partner) is saying it was a mistake thirty-six years ago to insert into legislation the phrase "the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" without first defining it in legislation  -- a mistake, because it invited the courts to do the lawmakers' job for them, which one of the coalition partners is now trying to do.

"A lot of New Zealanders unfortunately do not know a lot about it..."

And this is very true. 

"...and they'd like it to disappear, as this government is trying to do now. To make it invisible. Well, it's not invisible, it's the founding document of this country."

It looks as if Ms Moxon knows very little about what this government is trying to do. Or at least, what one coalition partner is trying to do. Which, in this context, is to call for the undefined principles (dreamed up in 1987 and on) to be well defined. As all objective law should be. And not at all to touch what she calls the founding document.

"Whānau Ora  .... is an example of what New Zealand can look like: Maori looking after ourselves ..."

As the head of a Whānau Ora practice herself, Moxon is (like the well-heeled TPM president John Tamihere) a beneficiary of the taxpayer's funding. To be cruel, one might say it's more an example of the taxpayer looking after a Māori elite, like Tamihere, who funnel the crumbs to those they claim to represent.

"...Maori having control over our own health ..."

She's conflating two people here. Individual Maori do have control over their own health. And always have, And did just as much before the creation of the separatist health organisation that has missed all its own agreed targets. (Waikato Tainui leader Parekawhi Maclean saying (very kindly): "its inability to put in place the necessary level of capability and capacity to progress its key functions had hampered performance.") 

What she means is that some Maori have control over other the health of other Maori. Why does shared ancestry make that necessary? How does that help an individual's health outcomes?

I am hardly an advocate myself for a government health system of any kind. But a separatist system seems the worst of both worlds, particularly for individual Maori concerned with their own health, and forced into this system, for whom results have been less than stellar. Suggesting that prioritising kaupapa over medicine is perhaps not the best idea.

"...Māori having a say in what we would like to see, and what is needed, in our own communities ..."

Individual Māori, qua individuals, have a say in their community just as much as the next individual. It's becoming apparent that what she's advocating for is for some Maori (those like her and Tamihere et al) to speak on behalf of and 

"...and when they take those things away from us [that] we have worked so hard to stand up and to put into legislation and to get that real kind of partnership that we believe is necessary for us to thrive in this country as equals...."

This is the crux: Who's this "we" here?

She's not calling for all New Zealanders to be equal as individuals -- i.e., each of us enjoying equal individual rights and privileges under law per the third Treaty clause.  What she's after instead -- what she and others in her elite strata have worked so hard for, to achieve that momentum -- is for Māori as a collective to be made equal in political power to the government. With a Māori elite distributing the spoils.

That, to her and to many others, is what "partnership" truly means. Political power. 

It's a patronising collectivist vision that looks to government for power and largesse, and to individuals of every ancestry to be milch cows. It's not one envisioned by either treaty.

One-hundred and eighty-three years ago, Te Tiriti emancipated Māori slaves, and put an end to the idea that the mass of men here had been born with saddles on their back, with a few rangatira booted and spurred to ride them. That was the effect of Te Tiriti: to free taurekareka.

"... and they made it [the Māori Health System] out to be race based ..."

Isn't it?

"...in actual fact it's something that is needed in our country."

An already-failing separatist system is needed? I'm not sure she's even made an argument for that, beyond the argument that the ancestry of here and those like her should bestow upon them political power.

There was a name for that in mediaeval Europe: it was called feudalism.

"The government has to hear [this] because as long as it keeps pushing that  kind of rhetoric [?] and that kind of belief system, that's what's divisive, that's what's pulling this country apart, because we have a special place in this country, and that's [inaudible], and it's important that they get it right now." 

It is important they get it right. And I think they think they might.

Ned Fletcher argues that English and Māori texts of the Treaty
agree, and that both promise Māori self-governance.

HERE'S THE MOST IMPORTANT point she made -- and there are many. But this one stands out: that she  is talking at all times of Māori as a collective rather than of individual Māori. This helps reconcile the two apparently competing views of two persuasive recent views on the Treaty, aired in Ned Fletcher's recent book The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi (which Moxon cites approvingly), and in Ewen McQueen's 2020 book One Sun in the Sky.

 Both books argue persuasively that the English and Māori texts do reconcile (which overturns the scholarship of several decades, since Ruth Ross first raised the issue fifty years ago), and both argue that Māori did cede sovereignty (without which any "partnership" would be moot in any case). 

But Fletcher argues that Māori (as a collective, through their rangatira) were promised self-governance, leading to partnership; whereas McQueen (writing before Fletcher's book) argues this paradigm makes no sense:

Taken to its logical conclusion, this paradigm sees iwi not so much as loyal subjects of Her Majesty's Government but rather co-regents expressing their own sovereignty. Advocates of this position assert the Treaty merely granted the Crown a partial concession to exercise authority over incoming settlers, while at the same time preserving for iwi ultimate authority over all things Maori. In effect it is argued that the Treaty established a dual sovereignty in New Zealand.

However, such thinking ignores both the Treaty itself and the historical context in which it was signed.

Start with the Treaty text. Much is made of the differences between the English and Maori versions. But one thing is certain - the word partnership appears in neither. The Treaty articles do not even imply a partnership in a constitutional sense. Rather they establish the British Crown as the ultimate legal authority in return for protection of Maori interests. The latter include land and chieftainship (rangatiratanga). However, that chieftainship is guaranteed within the context of the overarching sovereignty of the Crown.

As the Waitangi Tribunal noted in its 1987 Muriwhenua report: "From the Treaty as a whole it is obvious that it does not purport to describe a continuing relationship between sovereign states. Its purpose and effect was the reverse - to provide for the relinquishment by Maori of their sovereign status and to guarantee their protection upon becoming subjects of the Crown."

The tribunal's reference to the Treaty 'as a whole' is key. The Article Two guarantee of rangatiratanga must be understood in the context of the whole document. Iwi signed up to the whole Treaty, not just the second article. Article One establishes Crown sovereignty. In it chiefs agreed to 'give absolutely to the Queen of England forever the complete government over their land.' That's Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu's translation of the Maori version. It doesn't leave much room for manoeuvre.

[Hugh] Kawharu's translation of Article Three is equally straightforward. Maori took on 'the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England.' The Court of Appeal reinforced this in a key 1987 judgment, stating 'For their part the Maori people have undertaken a duty of loyalty to the Queen, [and] full acceptance of her Government.' Ironically this judgment also introduced the Treaty partnership concept that is now so popular. Full acceptance of Crown sovereignty is less fashionable.

The key difference is that Fletcher, I think, sees the Clause Two promise or "rangatiratanga" as a collective one, to be exercised by chiefly rangatira; whereas McQueen more properly sees the promise as applying individually, as a property right that could be enjoyed individually.

Just as Magna Carta was an agreement between nobles and king that came to recognise and protect individual rights of all, even commoners, so too does the recognition and protection of rangatiranga when seen individually come to do the same thing -- protecting all individual rights equally:

The preamble to the 1840 Te Tiriti makes clear that its purpose was to create a settled form of government and to secure peace and good order.

Article One confers on the Crown sovereignty or kāwanatanga (the right to make laws and to govern).

Article Two protects property rights and is based on Magna Carta principles. Magna Carta aimed to protect the English nobilities’ property rights by limiting the Crown’s powers. It catalysed a dynamic relationship between property rights and political power that led to the emergence of the modern British democracy. It created a basis for human rights protection by linking it to property rights. Magna Carta established the principle that no one is above the law – it helped establish the rule of law.

In Te Tiriti Article Two Queen Victoria promises ‘te tino rangatiratanga’ of their properties not just for rangatira and hapū, but for ‘nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani’, that is ‘all the inhabitants of New Zealand’.

Article Three made Māori subjects of the Crown. It gave Māori equal rights with other Crown subjects, not additional or superior rights.

To use Moxon's words, but with this understanding: to thrive in this country as equals we all (as individuals) must take off our collectivist lenses...

Ewen McQueen argues that English and Māori texts of the Treaty 
agree, and that neither promise Māori self-governance.

UPDATE:

Writing back in mid-November, Moana Maniapoto confirms that Māori activists are interpreting rights to be collective, rather than individual -- the effect of equal rights being to make a Māori elite equal in political power to the government -- a clear grab for political power based on an incorrect understanding of rights.

She begins her opinion piece by quite explicitly opposing David Seymour "pushing individual rights over collective rights." So when Seymour clarify the Treaty's third clause to mean "All New Zealanders are equal under the law, with the same rights and duties," she opposes this because, she says:

Act interpret this to focus on individual rights. Not the obligation to ensure that all who share this land under the Treaty have equal enjoyment of their respective collective rights and responsibilities....

The "Tiriti-centric constitutional model" she demands would require power-sharing between collectives -- "Māori, Pākehā and tangata Tiriti, joining the dots to solving practical problems around housing, health, schools, water, environmental degradation . . .  roads."

Ayn Rand points out the flaw, and the power grab:

Since only an individual man can possess rights, the expression “individual rights” is a redundancy (which one has to use for purposes of clarification in today’s intellectual chaos). But the expression “collective rights” is a contradiction in terms.

Any group or “collective,” large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members. In a free society, the “rights” of any group are derived from the rights of its members through their voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement, and are merely the application of these individual rights to a specific undertaking. Every legitimate group undertaking is based on the participants’ right of free association and free trade. (By “legitimate,” I mean: noncriminal and freely formed, that is, a group which no one was forced to join.)

For instance, the right of an industrial concern to engage in business is derived from the right of its owners to invest their money in a productive venture—from their right to hire employees—from the right of the employees to sell their services—from the right of all those involved to produce and to sell their products—from the right of the customers to buy (or not to buy) those products. Every link of this complex chain of contractual relationships rests on individual rights, individual choices, individual agreements. Every agreement is delimited, specified and subject to certain conditions, that is, dependent upon a mutual trade to mutual benefit.

This is true of all legitimate groups or associations in a free society: partnerships, business concerns, professional associations, labour unions (voluntary ones), political parties, etc. It applies also to all agency agreements: the right of one man to act for or represent another or others is derived from the rights of those he represents and is delegated to him by their voluntary choice, for a specific, delimited purpose—as in the case of a lawyer, a business representative, a labor union delegate, etc.

A group, as such, has no rights. A man can neither acquire new rights by joining a group nor lose the rights which he does possess. The principle of individual rights is the only moral base of all groups or associations.

Any group that does not recognise this principle is not an association, but a gang or a mob.

Any doctrine of group activities that does not recognise individual rights is a doctrine of mob rule or legalised lynching.

The notion of “collective rights” (the notion that rights belong to groups, not to individuals) means that “rights” belong to some men, but not to others—that some men have the “right” to dispose of others in any manner they please—and that the criterion of such privileged position consists of numerical superiority.

Nothing can ever justify or validate such a doctrine—and no one ever has. Like the altruist morality from which it is derived, this doctrine rests on mysticism: either on the old-fashioned mysticism of faith in supernatural edicts, like “The Divine Right of Kings”—or on the social mystique of modern collectivists who see society as a super-organism, as some supernatural entity apart from and superior to the sum of its individual members.

The amorality of that collectivist mystique is particularly obvious today ...

"The top-down Māori nationalist revolution is not yet complete – but it has, most certainly, begun."

"New Zealand is currently living through another top-down revolution. Though far from complete, it has already captured control of the commanding heights of the public service, the schools and universities, the funding mechanisms of cultural production, and big chunks of the mainstream news media.
    "The ideology driving this revolution is not neoliberalism, it’s ethno-nationalism. A potent amalgam of indigenous mysticism and neo-tribal capitalism has captured the imagination of the professional and managerial class and is relying on the latter’s administrative power and influence to drive through a revolutionary transformation of New Zealand society under the battle-flags of 'indigenisation' and 'decolonisation.' The glue which holds this alliance of Māori and Non-Māori elites together is Pakeha guilt....
    "The origins of the present ethno-nationalist revolution may be traced back to the early 1980s – specifically the 1981 Springbok Tour.... The [Māori] nationalist activists ... created a movement towards 'Māori Sovereignty' in which revolutionary Māori would lead, and guilty Pakeha would follow.... The Guilty Pakeha’s 'long march through the institutions' had begun.
    "Only one more strategic victory is required to complete the Māori nationalist revolution: Pakeha pride in their past and in their culture has to be undermined. The men and women once celebrated as nation-builders have to be recast as colonial oppressors. The country famed for being 'the social laboratory of the world' has to be re-presented as just another sordid collection of white supremacist, treaty-breaking, killers and thieves.
    "Māori, too, are in need of a complete makeover: from slave-owning warrior-cannibals, to peace-loving caretakers of Te Ao Māori – a world to which they are bound by deep and mystical bonds. Inheritors of a culture that sanctioned genocidal conquest and environmental destruction, how can the Pakeha hope to lead Aotearoa towards a just future? As in the 1980s, the Twenty-First Century journey requires revolutionary Māori to lead, and guilty Pakeha to follow. And those guilty Pakeha in a position to make it happen appear only too happy to oblige.

    "Which is why, in March 2023, New Zealand has an educational curriculum dedicated to condemning colonisation and uplifting the indigenous Māori. Why Māori cultural traditions and ways of knowing are elevated above the achievements of Western culture and science. Why representatives of local iwi and hapu wield decisive influence over private and public development plans, as well as the credo and content of media reporting and university courses.
    "The Māori nationalist revolution is not yet complete – but it has, most certainly, begun."

~ Chris Trotter, from his post 'The Revolution Has Begun'

Govt still 'colonising' individuals and their property

"Colonisation happened, but New Zealand is no longer a colony. Citizens [with too-few Maori ancestors] are not 'colonisers' but people with as much right to live in the country they are born in, or admitted as immigrants in as anyone else. Inferring anything else is racist, even if it doesn't meet the definition of the post-modernists.
    "Similarly, the idea that white supremacy is somehow endemic is ludicrous and deranged. However, the New Zealand state DOES erode tino rangatiratanga, for EVERYONE, by increasing its power and diminishing the freedom of citizens and residents to live their own lives peacefully....
    "There is a LOT that can be done to liberate Maori, such as decentralising education, ending the next to peppercorn leases enforced on some Maori land, granting Iwi (and indeed all) property owners real property rights to use their property as they see fit....
    "The report [from the ill-named Human Rights Commission] wants ... Maori to determine their own lives and make decisions over their own resources. This is libertarian, it is freedom and property rights. There remain two questions though...
    "Is giving Maori this power actually power as individuals with the choice to act together, or [as part of] purely collective entities? If it is the latter, it is just another form of government; I suspect it is the latter.
    "[And the other question:] Why can this not apply to EVERYONE in New Zealand? Why shouldn't we all be able to determine our own lives and make decisions over our own resources? ...
    "Colonisation saw many atrocities committed, but it is over. The non-Maori who live in New Zealand are not 'settlers.' Liberal democracy and rule of law are not invented to benefit Pakeha, and the only human rights are individual rights, for without the freedom of the individual, everyone is at risk of violence being initiated by the state, Iwi or any other collective that thinks it should govern you.
    "Set Maori free by setting us all free."

~ Liberty Scott, from his post 'Abolish the Human Rights Commission (but give everyone Tino Rangitiratanga)'

It's still the "chieftainship" that is the problem

 

THE NEW PRIME MINISTER heads up to Waitangi this week with all his hangers-on expecting, I daresay, to see his brief honeymoon period challenged by tribalists still aiming to be bridesmaids in some kind of ongoing "co-governance" nuptials between Crown and tribal "leaders." Whatever that much-battered word might mean.

Ever wondered why, in a world that's said to be about individuals and individual achievement, we still seem to have government support of a tribal system? Any challenge to which, even in the name of simple individualism, is branded "racist."

What happened? How come these putative leaders see no future for their own various hangers on except through government handouts? What happened to genuine independence?

THOUSANDS OF YEARS AGO, while European sailors were timidly tipping about the shores of the Mediterranean, terrified to leave sight of land for fear of who-knows-what beyond the horizon, intrepid Polynesian voyagers set out across the vast blue Pacific Ocean, half a hemisphere wide, to explore and occupy its many uncharted islands. Centuries later, as the world warmed, several of the most intrepid eventually discovered and settled in New Zealand. And then for just over five-hundred years, isolated from the rest of the world, they developed their own culture. They became Māori.

So in that great migration "out of Africa," these islands down here were the world's last great land-mass to be settled by human beings. And then, after half-a-century of autarchic ingenuity, they were almost the last to be brought back into the worldwide division-of-labour.

This sort of conquest and survival should be something to celebrate, no? The tale once proudly told of the Vikings of the Sunrise. Yet if the headlines are to be believed, the descendants of these former adventurers, the so-called tribal "leaders" of the day, see their own great conquest as creeping tribal capture of the government chequebook.

What a bunch of schmucks.

Tribal life

THESE SOUTH PACIFIC 'VIKINGS,' who were these islands' first settlers, were welcomed into the worldwide division-of-labour 250 years ago by explorers, whalers, sealers, timber-traders, and assorted beachcombers, wanderers and adventurers, who offered Māori things for their labour they'd never seen before. And in return for tools, technology and new foods they offered and sold them, Māori in return sold them trees and flax and kumara, and crewed ships, built houses and travelled the world.

But life down here was still mostly tribal -- serfs, and sometimes slaves, overseen by an aristocratic caste of mostly hereditary bossyboots.

However: The treaty signed at Waitangi by tribal chiefs and a recently-arrived Royal Naval captain promised all these New Zealanders their own Emancipation Proclamation, and held out hope of liberating tribal serfs from tribalism. Instead, 180 years later, we are barrelling down a path back to tribalism. Something Elizabeth Rata has called "neo-tribalism": the intentional production of a neo-tribal elite who are busily "marching through the institutions," in which they play "a decisive and self-interested role in controlling shifts in the interpretation of the treaty of Waitangi." [1]

The result: the empowerment of a neo-tribal elite, in which tribal leaders have the upper hand again. And instead of the hope and optimism of those early adventurers, the predominant emotions now are shame and guilt -- shame as a necessary precursor to this tribal shakedown.

Something clearly went wrong.

One reason is the way that treaty was written: hastily. It was written in just a few days by folk wholly unqualified to write a thing that some erroneously call the country's "founding document." It's not that, and never has been. And nor does it contain enough to merit that description.

But what it does have is the material which the neotribalists have been able to exploit. One of which is the problem of 'chieftainship.'

The problem of chieftainship

THE PROBLEM IS THIS: that instead of the treaty being written to protect individual Māori, it promised instead to placate tribal chiefs. It's right there in the wording and in all the arguments today about rangatiratanga. It's understandable. After all, it was their signatures the British Colonial Office was after before allowing colonisation here to receive their imprimatur. "Alive to the record of native extinction that had come with settlement in Tasmania and the Caribbean, and was threatened in Australia," the treaty's aim was to "recognise the rights of the Māori as subject in the agreement, with rights and interests to protect." [2] But in placating those chiefs of the 1840s, instead of promoting individualism and recognising real individual rights, the document has helped promote the neotribalism of today.

It's been argued -- and I've been one of those doing the arguing -- that the Treaty of Waitangi liberates individual Māori. It should have done -- it surely should have treated all Māori as individuals instead of as members of a tribe. But it really does nothing of the sort except by implication.

Instead, as written, it cemented in and buttressed the tribal leadership and communal structures that already existed here -- encouraging the survival of this wreck of a system until morphing, as it has done today, into this mongrelised sub-group of pseudo-aristocracy: of Neotribal Cronyism.

The problem was there from the start. One of the trade goods most sought after in these years of first contact was the musket. And Māori were devastated by the "musket wars" so eagerly embarked up on by every tribe -- eagerly, that is, until the corpses piling up became too much even their hardy stomachs. At which stage most simply hoped for some kind of peace.

But it wasn't individual Māori who had been trading for those muskets, it was the tribal leaders; and it was their own slaves and tribal "serfs" they put to work to cut and process the flax that bought the muskets (one ton of flax was said to buy one musket). And it was their own slaves they sometimes tattooed to "process" the slave into a shrunken head or mokomokai that could also be traded for muskets. (One mokomokai/one musket was said to be the going rate.) This first contact, and the Musket Wars that followed, only served to reinforce rather than diminish the tribal control -- and when a Treaty with Queen Victoria was offered, one primary motivation of trial chiefs to sign was to have the post-war peace enforced by these pakeha outsiders. Another was to preserve their own power, their rangatiratanga as tribal leaders.

Once they recognised what was on offer, the single sheet of parchment written up by William Hobson, James Freeman, James Busby, and Henry and Edward Williams, came as a boon to most of them.

The Offer

MĀORI IN 1840 GENERALLY paid more attention to oral discussion than to written documents, and there's enough evidence to suggest those wily old chiefs knew precisely what they were being offered at Waitangi: the protection of their own power.

As I'll explain here, in three short clauses and a preamble, what they discussed and what was read to them in 1840 was this [3]:

PREAMBLE

The treaty's preamble states the "concern to protect the chiefs and the subtribes of New Zealand" and the "desire to preserve their chieftainship." Nothing in that to promote or protect individualism. Everything to preserve "chieftainship" and to protect the chiefs in their rule.

CLAUSE 1

In Clause 1 the chiefs grant the Queen complete governorship -- kawanatanga katoa -- over these islands. Non-chiefs, i.e., individual Māori, are neither asked about this nor recognised. Because they are not part of this agreement. 

CLAUSE 2

In Clause 2 the same theme is there again: ignoring the rights of individual Māori and protecting the chiefs in their land, forests and fisheries. Specifically, protecting "the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship [their tino rangatiratanga]" over all their various treasures -- while prohibiting their sale to anyone but the government. 

Yes, there's a mention there of "all the people of New Zealand" (tangata katoa o Nu Tirani). But unless you're a rangatira yourself, your own personal rangatiratanga was pretty close to zero. You didn't have any. 

So the effect of this clause (unless you're a rangatira yourself) is neither protection nor recognition of full ownership nor real property rights, except perhaps by implication. After all, Māori of 1840 had no such concept of rights, except perhaps for small personal possessions; and no words for "owner," so difficult for a translator to find one. Yes, they could express ownership for these small things at least -- the preposition na for example (or sometimes no), meaning 'belonging to.' [4] But the Williamses did not use these words. Instead, their agreement promised to protect only the unqualified exercise of chieftainship -- something not available to "all the people of New Zealand," even if they do get a mention, but only to those of that status. Only chiefs. 

So this promise of "rangatiratanga" undercuts everything else, as the chiefs themselves understood.

CLAUSE 3

Clause 3, however, appears to have something for everyone. Here we read the promise to "protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand," and to "give them" the "same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England." (Ka tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani.) Not to recognise rights, which is how it should have been written, but to give them, which makes them a political gift -- the gift of those who do exercise sovereignty by this treaty: the governor and the chiefs. 

And the translation (rendered above) is even worse. Lacking a word for "rights" -- the concept itself being only two centuries old, by then, and poorly understood even by those writing up these words -- the offer essentially reads as being to "protect all the natives of New Zealand" and to "grant them all the same conditions as she has for the people of England."

This is thin gruel indeed. 

And as any student of law or the history of feudalism or the welfare state might tell you, it's a very different thing for a government to promise to protect rights, than it is to promise to protect people. The former leads to a robust individualism; the latter to a wet mollycoddling paternalism.

And by then, with only one page of parchment, any hope of  an individualist interpretation of this Treaty is gone -- and those with "a decisive and self-interested role in controlling shifts in the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi" are now able to interpret this not as a promise of individual rights (since earlier clauses and the preamble take precedence), but instead as the chiefs essentially holding the rights of their people in trust, with the governor "being or becoming a 'father' for the Māori people." 

No surprise then that "this attitude has been held towards the person of the Crown down to the present day, shaping (according to the self-interested neotribalists who now interpret these things) "the continued expectations and commitments entailed in the Treaty." [2] 

It's evident from documents of the time that the Colonial Office in London had not intended to lock Māori up into that pre-existing tribal structure. Their intention was, as that last clause almost says, to recognise the same rights in every Māori as were enjoyed by all British citizens. 

But the treaty's wording and practice has essentially limited those rights while elevating chiefly status. It's the chieftainship, stupid. In other words: the problem is failing to properly recognise and to protect individual rights -- and instead to protect and nurture the status of those tribal leaders.

Is it any wonder today's tribal leaders favour the perpetuation of the tribal structure? Any surprise that the feudal structure continues? Or that today's neotribalists wish to continue benefiting from their feudal privileges of the past? With the government as "father" and taxpayer as today's serf ...

Poor drafting, poor treatment

WITHOUT A DOUBT, GOVERNMENT and the mostly-British settlers often treated Māori poorly in those early days. But the biggest structural harm was the failure to properly recognise them as individuals instead of as part of a tribe. By treating all Māori as part of a collective, there were few chances offered to change this trajectory -- and when they were tried, they were poorly done. The poor draftsmanship of this treaty is reflected in the poor treatment of Māori in those early days.

As a rights-respecting commentator says of the treatment of native Americans in the United States of America, "it could have been done in a more rational way, a much more rights-respecting way, and in a way that would have led to a lot less violence at the end of the day." (Later quotes are from this same source.) It could have been done here in a way that recognised Māori as individuals, with individual lives, rights and choices. But for the most part, it didn't.

Yes, colonisation here was far less violent here than in Australia, or in the Americas. And thank goodness for that. It was still not entirely peaceful here, but in the Americas and Australia it was savage -- particularly if you think of how the British treated the Aboriginals in Tasmania, or the Spaniards treated the natives of South America. And in the case of the US of A itself, "the American government made treaties with the Indians and then reneged on them whenever it was convenient to do so." [5]

Not so much here, at least. The treaty signed here was offered with the best of intentions, but the poorest of drafting. It barely lived up to the intention, and the neotribalists now exploit the drafting.

Individuals possess rights (not collectives)

But the biggest mistake, and the biggest ongoing tragedy -- there, as here -- is that the respective governments did not treat either Indians or Māori as individuals possessing rights. They treated them instead just as members of a tribe. Of a collective. Not as individuals with their own individual rights demanding recognition and protection, but as members of a tribe whose chief no longer held the power of life and death, but still held the power of property, and of making choices for them all.

And therefore [in the United States] all the deals, all the negotiations, were between the U.S. Government and a tribe -- a tribe who was fundamentally a collectivistic unit that was oppressing its individual members. And what the American government in my view should have done was in a sense annex the Indians into America, recognised their innate individual rights (the fact that every Indian like every human being on the planet has individual rights), protected those individual rights under the law, divvied up the property of the tribe among individuals (let American Indians own their own land, not just give it and have the tribes own reservations; the whole idea of reservations was a horrific idea).  They should have basically integrated Indians into American society: by treating them as individuals, by endorsing individualism among the Indians. And then, if the Indians then wanted to get together and live in a commune, then so be it.  But the American government's position should have been: "We are dealing with you as individuals. Here is your land; here is John Smith's land; here is somebody else's land... If you want to now unite those lands and do some collective-type stuff then that's your problem. But here's the benchmark: 'We're a country of individuals. That's the principle'."  And instead, they didn't do that. There was a lot of racism and there was a lot of just treating them as a collective and, as a consequence, slaughtering whole villages and so on.  Now, that is not to say that there weren't a lot of American Indians (and a lot of indigenous people around the Americas) who were very violent and needed to be dealt with violently. I'm not criticising violence when it was motivated by self-defence.      I am however criticising violence when it was not necessary for the defence of the European immigrants or settlers, and there was basically an attempt just to annihilate certain indigenous peoples.  And again that happened more in Latin America than it did in the United States of America. But it happened [in the US] as well. So, you know, it's a tragic part of history and to some extent inevitable because it seems to happen whenever a kind of a civilisation encounters barbaric tribes, barbaric peoples, that inevitably lands up in a physical violent struggle.      I think that particularly in the United States of America it could have been done in a more rational way, a much more rights-respecting way, and in a way that would have led to a lot less violence at the end of the day. [5]

Could it have been different here? Less violent? More rational? More rights-respecting? Yes. Yes, of course it could. But reinforcing tribalism today will not fix a single historic tragedy. And in any case, the guilt-ridden politics of today -- shaming today's New Zealanders by the actions of people in the past -- is not primarily about history anyway. 

The shaming of New Zealanders today is intended simply to precede and encourage their ongoing shakedown tomorrow. That's the effect of today's neotribalism: to put taxpayers on the hook for the perpetuation of this chiefly privilege.

Because, you see, in this new postmodern neo-tribal age of identity politics and cancel culture, history doesn't so much provide lessons from the past as an arsenal full of ideological weapons. The neotribalists, and their enablers, are happy to pick them up and use them. You should be ready to counter them.

* * * * * 

NOTES: 
1. Elizabeth Rata, '‘Marching through the Institutions’: The Neotribal Elite and the Treaty of Waitangi,' Sites (December 2005)
2. James Heartfield, The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909 (London, 2011) p. 126
3. Te Tiriti: Translation of the te reo Māori text by Hugh Kawharu
4. Raymond Firth, Economics of the New Zealand Maori (Wellington 1972), pp. 338-366 passim
5. Yaron Brook, 'Q: To what extent was the European treatment of the indigenous peoples of America immoral?' www. Peikoff.Com (3 August 2015)

NOTE:
Peter Winsley, for one has a different view, arguing that "Article Two transfers Magna Carta and English common law property rights to Māori. "

These tino rangitaranga rights over land and other properties (taonga) were given explicitly to individuals and whanau as well as chiefs and tribes...
Treaty of Waitangi settlements have so far focused on iwi or hapu on the assumption that these collectives will act for all their members. What is lost sight of is that individuals are specifically mentioned in Treaty Article Two, yet Treaty settlements have not been made to 
individuals. In a future post, this issue will be discussed...

By contrast, Ned Fletcher's recent book, The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi, argues along similar line to those I've argued above (but, of course, in infinitely more detail -- his book is a fine piece of work). The difference between us, apart from his elevated scholarly stature, is that he evaluates the tribalism as positive and the promises made to reinforce tribalism by treaty to be good ones. I don't.

It's the chieftainship, stupid [updated]

The Government goes to Waitangi this week expecting to be challenged on water, on Ihumatao, and on Whanau Ora. That is to say, they expect tribal leaders to challenge them on the issues of tribal control of water, the tribal control of land, and the direction of government welfare payments and welfare services through Maori tribal hands.

Ever wondered why, in a world that's said to be about individuals and individual achievement, we still seem to have government support of a tribal system?

What happened?

Thousand of years ago Polynesian voyagers set out into the vast blue seas to explore and occupy the South-eastern Pacific. Several eventually discovered and settled in New Zealand. And then for just over five-hundred years, isolated from the rest of the world, they developed their own culture. They became Maori.

So in that great migration "out of Africa," New Zealand was the world's last great land-mass to be settled by human beings. And then almost the last to be brought back into the worldwide division-of-labour.

This should be something to celebrate, no? Yet if the headlines are to be believed, the descendants of these former adventurers see their own great conquest as creeping tribal capture of the government chequebook.

Tribal life

Those early New Zealanders were welcomed into the worldwide division-of-labour by whalers, sealers, timber-traders and assorted wanderers and adventurers who offered Maori things for their labour they's never seen before. And in return for tools, technology and new foods, they sold trees and flax and kumara, and crewed ships, built houses and travelled the world.


The treaty signed at Waitangi by tribal chiefs and a recently-arrived Royal Naval captain promised all these New Zealanders their own Emancipation Proclamation, and held out hope of liberating tribal serfs from tribalism. Instead, 180 years later, here we are barrelling down a path back to tribalism. Something Elizabeth Rata has called neo-tribalism: the intentional production of a neo-tribal elite who are busily "marching through the institutions," in which they play "a decisive and self-interested role in controlling shifts in the interpretation of the treaty of Waitangi." [1]

The result: the empowerment of a neo-tribal elite, in which tribal leaders have the upper hand again. And instead of the hope and optimism of those early adventurers, the predominant emotions now are shame and guilt -- shame as a necessary precursor to this tribal shakedown.

Something clearly went wrong.

One reason is the way that treaty was written: hastily. It was written in just a few days by folk wholly unqualified to write a thing that some erroneously call the country's "founding document." It's not that, and never has been. And nor does it contain enough to merit that description.

But what it does have is the material which the neotribalists have been able to exploit. One of which is the problem of 'chieftainship.'

The problem of chieftainship

The problem is this: that instead of the treaty being written to protect individual Maori, it promised instead to placate tribal chiefs. It's right there in the wording and in all the arguments today about rangatiratanga. It's understandable. After all, it was their signatures the British Colonial Office was after before allowing colonisation here to receive their imprimatur. "Alive to the record of native extinction that had come with settlement in Tasmania and the Caribbean, and was threatened in Australia," the treaty's aim was to "recognise the rights of the Maori as subject in the agreement, with rights and interests to protect." [2] But in placating those chiefs of the 1840s, instead of promoting individualism and recognising real individual rights, the document has helped promote the neotribalism of today.

It's been argued -- and I've been one of those doing the arguing -- that the Treaty of Waitangi liberates individual Maori. It should have done -- it should have treated all Maori as individuals instead of as members of a tribe. But it really does nothing of the sort except by implication.

Instead, as written, it cemented in and buttressed the tribal leadership and communal structures that already existed here -- encouraging the survival of this wreck of a system until it morphing, as it has today, into this mongrelised sub-group of pseudo-aristocracy: of Neotribal Cronyism.

The problem was there from the start. Maori in 1840 paid more attention to oral discussion than to written documents, and there's enough evidence to suggest those wily old chiefs knew what they were talking about;  what they discussed and what was read to them in 1840 was this [3]:
The treaty's preamble states the "concern to protect the chiefs and the subtribes of New Zealand" and the "desire to preserve their chieftainship." Nothing in that to promote or protect individualism. Everything to preserve "chieftainship" and to protect the chiefs in their rule.

• In Clause 1 the chiefs grant the Queen complete governorship -- kawanatanga katoa-- over these islands. Non-chiefs, i.e., individual Maori, are neither asked nor recognised. Because they are not part of this agreement. 
• In Clause 2 it's there again: protecting chiefs in their land, forests and fisheries. Specifically, protecting "the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship [their tino rangatiratanga]" over all their various treasures -- while prohibiting their sale to anyone but the government. (Note that this does not protect or recognise full ownership or real property rights except by implication: after all, Maori of 1840 had no such concept, except perhaps for small personal possessions; no words for "owner," so difficult for a translator to find one. But they could express ownership for these small things at least -- the preposition na for example (or sometimes no), meaning 'belonging to.' [4] But this was not used. Instead, the agreement promised to protect only the unqualified exercise of chieftainship, something not available to "all the people of New Zealand," even if they do get a mention, but only to those of that status. Only chiefs. 
• Clause 3, however, does promise to "protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand," and to "give them" the "same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England." Not recognise rights, which is how it should have been written, but give them, which makes them a political gift -- the gift of those who do exercise sovereignty by this treaty: the governor and the chiefs. So by then, the damage is done -- and those with "a decisive and self-interested role in controlling shifts in the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi" are now able to interpret this not as a promise of individual rights (since earlier clauses and the preamble take precedence), but instead as the chiefs essentially holding the rights of their people in trust, with the governor "being or becoming a 'father' for the Māori people." And "this attitude has been held towards the person of the Crown down to the present day, shaping (according to the self-interested neotribalists who now interpret these things) "the continued expectations and commitments entailed in the Treaty." [2] 

It's evident from documents of the time that the Colonial Office in London had not intended to lock Maori up into that pre-existing tribal structure. Their intention was, as that last clause almost says, to recognise the same rights in every Maori as were enjoyed by all British citizens. But the treaty's wording and practice has essentially limited those rights while elevating chiefly status. It's the chieftainship, stupid. In other words: the problem is failing to properly recognise and to protect individual rights -- and instead to protect and nurture the status of those tribal leaders.

Is it any wonder today's tribal leaders favour the perpetuation of the tribal structure? Any surprise that the feudal structure continues? Or that today's neotribalists wish to continue benefiting from their feudal privileges of the past? With the government as "father" and taxpayer as today's serf ...

Poor drafting, poor treatment

Without a doubt, government and settlers often treated Maori poorly in those early days. But the biggest structural harm was the failure to properly recognise them as individuals instead of as part of a tribe. By treating all Maori as part of a collective, there were few chances offered to change this trajectory. The poor draftsmanship of this treaty is reflected in the poor treatment of Maori in those early days.

As a rights-respecting commentator says of the treatment of native Americans in the United States of America, "it could have been done in a more rational way, a much more rights-respecting way, and in a way that would have led to a lot less violence at the end of the day." (Later quotes are from this same source.) It could have been done here in a way that recognised Maori as individuals, with individual lives, rights and choices. But for the most part, it didn't.

Yes, colonisation here was far less violent here than in Australia, or in the Americas. And thank goodness for that: It was still not entirely peaceful, but in the Americas and Australia it was savage -- particularly if you think of how the British treated the Aboriginals in Tasmania, or the Spaniards treated the natives of South America. And in the case of America itself, "the American government made treaties with the Indians and then reneged on them whenever it was convenient to do so." [5]

Not so much here, at least. The treaty signed here was offered with the best of intentions, but the poorest of drafting. It barely lived up to the intention, and the neotribalists now exploit the drafting.

But the biggest mistake, the biggest ongoing tragedy -- there, as here -- is that the respective governments did not treat either Indians or Maori as individuals possessing rights. They treated them instead just as members of a tribe. Of a collective. Not as individuals with their own individual rights demanding recognition and protection, but as members of a tribe whose chief no longer held the power fo life and death, but still held the power of property, and of making choices for them all.

And therefore [in the United States] all the deals, all the negotiations, were between the U.S. Government and a tribe -- a tribe who was fundamentally a collectivistic unit that was oppressing its individual members. And what the American government in my view should have done was in a sense annex the Indians into America, recognised their innate individual rights (the fact that every Indian like every human being on the planet has individual rights), protected those individual rights under the law, divvied up the property of the tribe among individuals (let American Indians own their own land, not just give it and have the tribes own reservations; the whole idea of reservations was a horrific idea).  They should have basically integrated Indians into American society: by treating them as individuals, by endorsing individualism among the Indians. And then, if the Indians then wanted to get together and live in a commune, then so be it.  But the American government's position should have been: "We are dealing with you as individuals. Here is your land; here is John Smith's land; here is somebody else's land... If you want to now unite those lands and do some collective-type stuff then that's your problem. But here's the benchmark: 'We're a country of individuals. That's the principle'."  And instead, they didn't do that. There was a lot of racism and there was a lot of just treating them as a collective and, as a consequence, slaughtering whole villages and so on.  Now, that is not to say that there weren't a lot of American Indians (and a lot of indigenous people around the Americas) who were very violent and needed to be dealt with violently. I'm not criticizing violence when it was motivated by self-defense.     I am however criticizing violence when it was not necessary for the defense of the European immigrants or settlers, and there was basically an attempt just to you know annihilate certain indigenous peoples.  And again that happened more in Latin America than it did in the United States America. But it happened here as well. So you know it's a tragic part of history and to some extent inevitable because it seems to happen whenever a kind of a civilization encounters barbaric tribes, barbaric peoples, that inevitably lands up in a physical violent struggle.     I think that particularly in the United States of America it could have been done in a more rational way, a much more rights-respecting way, and in a way that would have led to a lot less violence at the end of the day. [5]

Same here.

Could it have been different? Yes. Yes, of course it could. But shaming today's New Zealanders by the actions of people in the past is not primarily about history -- the shaming of New Zealanders today is intended simply to precede and encourage their ongoing shakedown tomorrow. That's the effect of today's neotribalism: to put taxpayers on the hook for the perpetuation of this chiefly privilege.

In this new postmodern neo-tribal age, history doesn't provide lessons from the past so much as an arsenal full of weapons. The neotribalists, and their enablers, are happy to pick them up and use them.
NOTES: 
1. Elizabeth Rata, '‘Marching through the Institutions’: The Neotribal Elite and the Treaty of Waitangi,' Sites (December 2005)
2. James Heartfield, The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909 (London, 2011) p. 126
3. Te Tiriti: Translation of the te reo Māori text by Hugh Kawharu
4. Raymond Firth, Economics of the New Zealand Maori (Wellington 1972), pp. 338-366 passim
5. Yaron Brook, 'Q: To what extent was the European treatment of the indigenous peoples of America immoral?' www. Peikoff.Com (3 August 2015)

UPDATE:
Peter Winsley has a different view, arguing that "Article Two transfers Magna Carta and English common law property rights to Māori. "

These tino rangitaranga rights over land and other properties (taonga) were given explicitly to individuals and whanau as well as chiefs and tribes...
Treaty of Waitangi settlements have so far focused on iwi or hapu on the assumption that these collectives will act for all their members. What is lost sight of is that individuals are specifically mentioned in Treaty Article Two, yet Treaty settlements have not been made to individuals. In a future post, this issue will be discussed...

.

Fitzsimons’ Values Party: They won the nuclear war!

“Credit cards and a Maserati,
Don't go to films
‘Less he knows they're arty
Likes Womens’ Lib
And the Values Party,
He’s a Rasta, he’s New Wave,
Don’t do nothing
Less he’s told exactly how to behave . . . ”
- ‘Rebel,’ by Toy Love / Chris Knox(1978)

LAST NIGHT JEANETTE FITZSIMONS brought down the hemp curtain on her thirteen-year Parliamentary career. When an MP gives their valedictory speech, all their colleagues and the whole commentariat comes out in force to review their career.

But I’m not going to do that now.  No more than I did last week.  Instead, what I want to review (just briefly) is the ‘career’ of the Party with whom she was first associated.

Back in the early seventies there was a political party called the Values Party. (“She likes Women’s Lib and the Values Party. . . ”)  Non-threatening, non-violent and never any hope of winning a Parliamentary seat, they ran a programme based around saving the whales and the Tangata Whenua; around multiculturalism and mediocrity; promoting state support of everything except the production that would pay for it; attacking the “obsessions” with competition, money and personal gratification and promoting instead the spiritualism of sacrifice and “sustainability”—long, long  before any of these ideas were politically fashionable.  They were the original politically correct “rebels.” And they made them fashionable.

Tripping over their sandals, banging their head on their wind chimes, reeking of patchouli and clad in the inevitable tie-died macrame, at the the time they only appeared to be a threat to themselves, but a careful review of the Values Party programme would show that the Values Party have been one of the most successful parties of the last four decades. They never got an MP within a hippie’s roar of Parliament, but just take a look at the core Values programme (conveniently laid out for us by Claire Browning). and review for a moment how the ideas they brought to the fringes of the political table four decades ago are now front and centre in so much of what passes for political debate today:

Politics -- MMP, and open government, including freedom of information, now given effect by the Official Information Act.
International relations -- an independent foreign affairs stance (eg, ANZUS withdrawal), an anti-nuclear, nuclear-free stance, anti-apartheid in sport.
Law -- New Zealand’s highest court should be a New Zealand court not the Privy Council, Fair Trading and Consumer Guarantees policies.
Race relations and status of Maori -- strengthening Maori cultural identity and tino rangatiratanga, a Maori Minister of Maori Affairs.
Status of women -- a suite of policies to remove discrimination and gender bias against women in employment, healthcare, public participation (eg, jury service), and in the home (eg, deploring gender stereotypes, and proposing matrimonial property reform).
Individual responsibility for moral behaviour -- eg, homosexual law reform.
Immigration -- a cautious multi-racial population-replacement immigration policy (as opposed to Eurocentric).

The foundation planks of the Values’ manifesto gave birth to the nostrums of ecological collapse due to climate change; to the soft fascism of political correctness and the collectivism of failure; to the mush of multiculturalism and the mainstreaming of “minorities”; to the “politics of enough” and a  “redistributive philosophy” in which the state would recover and share around the wealth of “the excessively greedy or fortunate”; to anti-capitalist assaults on consumerism and industry; to the greening of socialism and the throttling of capitalism--and they brought these all to the mainstream.  They didn’t just gave birth to the Greens, they gave birth (almost unobserved by the mainstream) to the political agenda of the last forty years.

What was wildly “way out, man” then is just mainstream and taken for granted today.  That’s the extent of their victory.

THE VALUES PARTY PROGRAMME was so wildly successful because their members, and many former members, all  understood they were involved in a battle of ideas—at a time when most of their opponents would barely be said to have an original idea between them.  And they had patience. They knew that to capture the mainstream they had to capture the young—and that to capture the young they had to capture the education system, so they could tell those youngsters how to behave.

And so they did.  And then those youngsters grew up, and took with them those ideas they’d imbibed when their brains were still tender.  It was always a battle of ideas—a battle in which they still give no quarter.

As Ayn Rand put it, “a political battle is merely a skirmish fought with muskets; whereas a philosophical battle is a nuclear war." I very much doubt whether Ms Fitzsimons would ever put it quite like that, but she would be one of the few in the present Parliament who would understand.

Because, you see, you could always smell the ideological uranium on Fitzsimons’ breath. You could always smell it on her colleagues.  Which is why the Values Party won the nuclear war. 

They won it because, for the most part, while their opponents  were fussing about with the tactical weapons of pragmatism and politics—by refusing to confront the fact that bad ideas can only be fought by better ideas—the strategic nuclear weapons launched by the Values alumni were already having their victories.   While their opponents were figuring out the tactics of political musketry, the Values’ troops were (in the words of Chris Knox’s song) preparing everyone to be “told exactly how to behave.” Not for them fussing about with poll numbers, seats and cabinet rankings. They always knew that in the end it didn’t really matter how many MPs you sent to parliament, but how many ideas.

And that’s why the Values Party won.

The lesson, for most of us, should be obvious.