Showing posts with label Macroeconomics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Macroeconomics. Show all posts

Sunday, 17 March 2024

The Economics of the AI Revolution



In part two of this three-part series on so-called Artificial Intelligence (AI), our guest poster Per Bylynd acknowledges that even though AI is arguably not an intelligence—at least not in the sci-fi sense—it does not mean that it is unimportant or lacks implications. The technological advance that it represents is nothing short of revolutionary and will have far-reaching implications for both the economy and society.

The Economics of the AI Revolution

by Per Bylund

In a recent article, we briefly summarised what it is that we today call artificial intelligence (AI). Whereas these technologies are certainly impressive and may even pass the Turing test, they are not beings and have no consciousness. Thus, this is neither the time nor the place to discuss philosophical issues of how to define a true or full AI—an artificial general intelligence—and whether we should recognize AI software legally as a person (after all, corporations are).

Economically speaking, AI as technology, whether it is used for entertainment or in production, is a good. As Carl Menger taught, what makes something a good is that it (whatever it may be) has the ability to satisfy a human need, that it must be recognised as such, and that a person—the consumer—has or can gain command over it to satisfy those actual needs. In other words, it must be scarce (there is less of it than we can use to satisfy wants) and understood as valuable (because we believe it can satisfy wants). AI certainly fits the criteria.

The economic system's stages of production form a 'production structure':
increasingly higher order of capital goods producing consumer goods, over time ...

AI as a Consumption Good


When people entertain themselves by “discussing” with AI (try, for example, Windows Copilot) or generating quirky images using DALL-E (try it here), it is a good of the lowest order—a consumption good. As such, the economic consequences are limited to the effect this has on consumer behavior. But this may in turn have a significant impact on production.

Some consumption goods revolutionise the economy and society. Examples of such goods include the automobile (from the introduction of Ford’s Model-T) and the smartphone (starting with Apple’s iPhone). The former disrupted transportation and infrastructure and facilitated just-in-time manufacturing and urban sprawl, just to mention a few effects. The latter changed everything from how we bank to how we travel.

The point here is that as consumer behaviour changes, the production structure follows along. For example, with the broad adoption of the smartphone, paper map production has all but disappeared; whereas, digital location services and intelligent logistics have seen enormous growth and development. And change leads to more change because entrepreneurs build on, add to, and challenge the new discoveries.

AI has the potential to change consumer behaviour well beyond its designed functionality. Exactly how and in what ways remains to be seen. But it is safe to say that it has potential. (On the other hand, many goods have had potential to disrupt but didn’t leave a mark.) For example, we may see people produce their own stories, songs, images, and even movies. So perhaps, instead of relying on television or Netflix and Hollywood producers, we’ll make movie night into a make-a-movie night where we watch content we have generated and that fits us perfectly.

AI as a Higher-Order Good


As a tool and thus a good of a higher order, AI has already had an effect and promises to disrupt several trades. Because it is very effective at producing and presenting content, including translating and editing texts, content-related professions are threatened by AI. This includes journalists and copyeditors, as AI programs can write and edit faster than humans. After all, anyone can ask AI to produce or edit a text. Students already use AI to spice up or improve their papers—or let AI write them from scratch.

AI is similarly affecting photographers and illustrators. It only takes a minute to have DALL-E produce a new image exactly as directed, or to have an AI algorithm remove or add things in a picture you snapped. Whereas, having an illustrator create something takes much longer (not to mention the cost).

Programmers and system developers are also seeing the effects of AI, which has no problem both generating new code (without bugs!) or checking already written code. Legacy software written in dated and ineffective programming languages can be run through an AI to make the coding more efficient—and converted into a modern language.

AI is also affecting academia. Why have an instructor tell students about some subject matter instead of letting AI do it? After all, the AI can easily present content in a way that the student prefers. For example, make a movie to explain, say, biology or chemistry in an entertaining way. And it can answer all kinds of questions without ever getting bothered or cranky—and it has nowhere else to be. In research, AI can analyse data more effectively and run thousands of different regressions on data to find something that is significant and important (so-called HARKing, which is very poor research practice—but who will know?). It can write up the paper too, with citations and everything, in just seconds.

AI as Production Capital


All of this means AI can and will be used in production. In fact, it already is and we have only started to see the effects.

AI is best categorised as capital, which is used to make labor more productive (more value output per hour of labor invested) through facilitating more roundabout (but more effective) production structures. Capital goods in general have one (or both) of two functions: it makes existing production processes more effective by increasing productivity, or it makes possible types of production that were not previously possible. AI checks both boxes.

We have already seen how people working in several types of content-based professions can easily be made more productive or replaced entirely by AI. It can also do things that people may have been unable to do—or never thought of doing. This of course can cause so-called technological unemployment as people lose their jobs because AI can do them better (and cheaper). But this is a dystopian way of describing something quite normal and highly useful: that we relieve people, with all their ingenuity, from comparatively simple tasks so that they can create much more value elsewhere.

It is of course problematic for any person losing their source of income, but it is highly beneficial to consumers (and therefore society at large) that these (and other) professions are “creatively destroyed.” The economic point of employment is not to provide people with an income so they can pay taxes (although politicians seem to think so) but to produce goods that can satisfy consumer wants—to make our lives better. Just like there are very few stable boys or buggy-whip producers since the automobile revolution, the future will see fewer people doing news reporting, copyediting, or coding.

Note also that this revolution is not nearly as sudden and disruptive as it may at first seem: the news media, for example, have for many years reduced the number of journalists doing reporting (most outlets nowadays merely republishing standard articles from AP or Reuters). And software development already uses increasingly effective development environments that correct and predict commands, allow for WYSIWYG and drag-and-drop development, and can debug code and suggest solutions to bugs.

AI is only another step in this process. But the threat is greatly exaggerated. We tend to overestimate the impact of technology in the short term but underestimate it in the long term.

Limitations to Overcome


There is a problem, however, and it has to do with how large language models work and what responses they generate. When used in a setting that is strictly rules-based, such as in computer programming, the AI “understanding” of code can greatly improve the productivity of coders (or replace them). AI will not introduce bugs in software unless the specifications are incomplete or contradictory, and it will not make errors.

The same is true for AI’s language generation: it draws from large troves of text data and has a good “understanding” for how humans use language. But there are no rules-based ways by which it can distinguish fact from fiction. Instead, AI draws from what statistically is more likely to be a human-sounding response. For this reason, it produces content that can be entirely wrong.

For example, I asked AI to summarise the content of my 2022 economics primer, How to Think about the Economy. [A highly recommended free book - Ed.] Since it has access to the text, it did a pretty good job summarising what is in the book. But it also added comments on content that is typically in economics books but that is not in the primer (such as equilibrium theory, perfect competition, and mathematical equations). The AI is correct that economics books typically discuss such things and thus it is statistically probable that my primer would do the same. But it doesn’t.

There is a difference between statistical probability and truth. We will look at this problem and the potential threat that AI poses to human society in the next article.

=> CONTINUED IN PART THREE: 'Separating Information from Disinformation'
PART ONE: 'Understanding the AI Revolution'
Per Bylund is the Associate Professor of Entrepreneurship and Johnny D. Pope Chair in the School of Entrepreneurship in the Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University.
He is the author of three full-length books: How to Think about the Economy: A PrimerThe Seen, the Unseen, and the Unrealized: How Regulations Affect our Everyday Lives; and The Problem of Production: A New Theory of the Firm. He has edited The Modern Guide to Austrian Economics and The Next Generation of Austrian Economics: Essays In Honor of Joseph T. Salerno.
His article first appeared at the Mises Institute blog.


Thursday, 13 July 2023

Says Law explains why we don't need a recession to kill price inflation


Image Source: Unsplash


We need to engineer a good recession, say central bankers, to kill the inflation engineered by those same central bankers. But as Alasdair Macleod explains in this guest post, policy makers who believe a recession will kill price inflation, and therefore allow central banks to reduce interest rates, are simply wrong. This is simply mad macroeconomic dogma.

Updating Say’s Law For Modern Times

by Alasdair Macleod

It was Keynes’ offhand dismissal of Say’s law, or the Law of the Markets, in 1936 which is leading us into an economic and monetary crisis.

It was dismissed by him to invent a role for the state.

That is why Keynes is so popular in the mainstream establishment. By dismissing market reality, he invented a whole new branch of economics. Macroeconomics exchanged statistics and mathematics for human action, the prospect of centralised management substituted for ambiguity.

In this article I look at the flaws in macroeconomics, the state theory of money (an old recurring theme from John Law onwards), misleading statistics measured in unhinged fiat currencies, and why Keynesian fears of a general glut are misplaced — all of which stem from the error of dismissing Say’s law.

Importantly, Say’s law ties the volume of production to demand, so policy makers who believe a recession will kill price inflation, and therefore allow central banks to reduce interest rates, are simply wrong.

The state-educated mainstream is so sold on macroeconomic theories and the state management of economic outcomes that reasoned debate gets no traction. The only solution is for a final economic and monetary crisis to bring an end to all macroeconomic dogmas.

The origin of macroeconomics


Jean-Baptiste Say wrote his ground-breaking book on economics in 1803, revising subsequent editions. His Traité D’économie Politique, as it is known in French in short form, described the division of labour and the role of money as the agent for turning specialised production into general consumption. It became known as Say’s law or the law of the markets, and was the first commandment of classical economics, until Keynes persuaded us otherwise in his General Theory published in 1936.

Keynes denial of Say’s law was in the spirit of Humpty Dumpty — ″’When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.” He rewrote economic definitions to suit his thesis. Humpty Keynes redefined economics to exclude the inconvenient reality of Say’s law, along with many others that logically followed from it. It was necessary for Keynes to deny it in order to ease in a role for the state, allowing governments to intervene in the relationship between production and consumption. 

The invention of macroeconomics, which played down the unpredictable human element expressed in markets, in favour of statistics and mathematical analysis, can be traced to Chapter 3 in his General Theory, where he wrote:
“If, however, this is not the true law relating the aggregate demand and supply functions, there is a vitally important chapter of economic theory which remains to be written and without which all discussions concerning the volume of aggregate employment are futile.”
Say’s law was summarily dismissed, hardly mentioned again in his seminal work. The whole basis of Keynes’s new macroeconomics, that vitally important chapter of economic theory which remains to be written, boils down to that one little word, “If” heading the quote above. “If” is a supposition and certainly not evidence leading to the discovery of an entirely new branch of economic science. It was a simple trick, dismissing the inconvenient truth early in his thesis so that he could proceed to construct a fantasy. 

Keynes should have been dismissed as a quack, like John Law who propounded similar theories and ruined France in 1720. And like Georg Knapp, a German economist of the Historical school, who published his state theory of money in 1905, arguably encouraging the Kaiser’s government to build up armaments before the First World War at no visible cost to the people, and to continue to finance itself by inflationary means after Germany’s defeat.

Yet with Keynes’s little “if”, here we are nearly ninety years later still travelling along his intellectual rails full tilt into the buffers of economic destruction. The reasons why Law, Knapp, and now Keynes and their theories rose from obscurity to fame are that their theories appeal to governments, seemingly conferring on them an economic role, enhancing their control over their citizens, and therefore the justification for increased power and revenues. The last thing they will consider is that these theories are flawed, until the evidence of a final crisis forces them to face up to their fallacies.

Despite Keynes’s intellectual fraud, the division of labour and the role of money cannot be denied. But the world has moved on from the simpler world of J.B. Say. At the time of the French Revolution when he was observing the economic activities of people, tradesmen probably refused to take credit for payment, accepting only gold and silver coin because paper assignats followed by mandats territoriaux were successively descending into worthlessness.

The more things change...


Plus ça change, plus c’est le même chose! Today, under neo-Keynesian policies directed by the state, it is only forms of credit that intermediate between our production and consumption, and coins are only tokens. Over two centuries ago in rural France, consumption for most was more a question of survival than access to the luxuries we are familiar with today and reckon to be our right. Production was basically local, whereas today it is global. And we now have factories, when few existed in the predominantly agricultural economies of Say’s time because the industrial revolution in France had barely started.

Yet, despite all these differences Say’s central proposition still holds -- Say's Law, the Law of Markets, still links production to consumption; and it still rules out a general glut of goods due to a collapse in consumption. It still holds -- and as long as reality is what it is, it always will. No employment: no demand. No demand: no employment.

However, rehabilitating Say’s Law into modern economics must take account of today’s economic and monetary conditions. Neo-Keynesians ignore the consequences of credit’s loss of purchasing power in their static models. This may confuse the issue for them, but Say’s law still holds whether transactions are in money or credit. (Here, we are defining legal money as a medium of exchange without counterparty risk — gold and gold coin.) Now that we have only fiat currencies whose values in terms of goods are continually deteriorating, statistical evidence is worthless — despite macroeconomists treating long runs of price and related data as if the purchasing power of a fiat currency is constant over time. I have more to say on this below.

In the days of sound money and the credit which took its value from it, we could see the consequences of economic progress and regression on both individual prices and also their general level. Today, we labour under the delusion that what we knew to be true under sound money still applies to unsound fiat currencies and their dependent credit. In all our statistical comparisons we therefore believe that all price changes still come from the values of goods and services. And by dismissing Say’s law, we dismiss the certainty that the purchasing power of unanchored credit will continue to decline even in a recession. So, what are the true consequences of a deteriorating economic condition for prices in a modern economy?

It is far from a simple matter, but as a starting point we can sensibly argue three points. 
  • First, just as Keynes dismissed Say’s Law in order to create an economic role for the state, its rehabilitation must reject his supposition entirely and everything that flowed from this error. 
  • Second, that with the dismissal of the state from economic functions, macroeconomic statistics-gathering can only have restricted validity, and economic modelling must be dismissed entirely. 
  • And third, in economic conditions leading to unemployment not only does consumption decline but production will as well because the unemployed are no longer producing. In other words, there is no such thing as a Malthusian glut, and the hope in some quarters that price inflation will diminish in a recession as demand contracts will be disappointed.
The rest of this article looks at the major issues arising from the Keynesian dismissal of Say’s Law — the law of the markets.

The errors in modern socialism


Perhaps the starkest example of the difference today between a state-controlled economy and a relatively free capitalist one is found in the contrast between the two Koreas. In the North, they are starving. In the south, people of the same ethnicity are prospering. This is not just a fluke. In the late 1940s, China was descending into communism and abject poverty while Hong Kong rose from the ashes of Japanese occupation and the collapse of the military yen into capitalist prosperity with no natural resources of its own. Concurrently with China and Hong Kong, East and West Germany exhibited the same phenomenon until freedom of movement between the two returned.

The empirical evidence of these failures and success are put down to communist extremism by historians and today’s politicians in the western alliance, and they say are different from democratic socialism. But apologists for state intervention and control can argue as much as they like that communism is different from democratic socialism, but they cannot explain away the fact that communism is simply socialism in extremis sharing the same basic flaws as socialising democracy.

Understanding why this is the case is hampered by the superficial attraction of organisational planning applied to spontaneous markets. The former appeals to a surface form of logic, while the latter lacks a ready explanation. This riddle was laid bare by the great economist of the Austrian school, Ludwig von Mises in his 1922 book Socialism: An economic and sociological analysis. The essence of the argument was contained in a further essay, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, written in 1920 and a hot topic for decades thereafter. 

In that essay, Mises laid down the reasons why economic management and intervention by the state would always fail. As the Russian economist, Yuri Maltsev put it, “Mises exposed socialism as a utopian scheme that is illogical, uneconomic, and unworkable at its core.” Maltsev confirmed this from his personal experience as an economist in the Soviet Union.

The difference between communism and democratic socialism can be likened to the fate of a lobster plunged into boiling water compared with that of a frog, who in the modern cliché is cooked from cold. The relative level of authoritarianism is different from the outset but ends up being similar in its final outcome. The demonstrable failures of democratic socialism have led to ever-increasing restrictions on markets, inching it ever closer to communism. The common denial of capitalism and the profit motive as being somehow immoral is part of the pro-state and anti-market propaganda.

The reason the state always fails in its attempt to manage the economy is partly due to its objectives being political in nature rather than economic, and partly due to the impossibility of it entering into economic calculation. It was the latter point which Mises explained so well in his 1920 essay. Irrespective of the politics, it is impossible for a state which owns the means of production in its central planning to know in advance whether its output will be demanded by consumers. Some of it might well be, but assessing the level of demand in the planning of production is impossible. And the state cannot assess the evolution in a product to ensure it will be freely demanded in future. The state therefore resorts to monopolistic behaviour to enforce consumption.

By way of contrast, the capitalist in a free market will use his specialist knowledge to assess demand and seek to respond by supplying his product to consumers profitably. For him, the customer is king. If he fails, he either cuts his losses, or adapts the product to satisfy consumer demands. Production methods and output evolve to satisfy demand, which together define progress. While the state is unable to evolve its production satisfactorily and therefore lacks the fundamental ability to foster economic progress, capitalists seeking profits in free markets improve economic conditions and standards of living wholly in accordance with Say’s Law. In other words, through specialisation the entire cohort of independent manufacturers and service providers together satisfy the general and evolving demands of the markets.

As a matter of reluctant practicality, social democracy permits capitalism to exist. In common with the early fascist policies of Mussolini, capitalism is tolerated so long as it can be controlled by the state. This control is achieved through extensive product regulation, by partial nationalisation of the economy, and by virtue of the fact that state spending is the largest single element in a social democratic economy. This spending is not funded out of production, but by taxes imposed on producers and consumers. A socialising state is promoted as a benefit for society as a whole, but the reality is that is an economic burden in proportion to its size.

Under the aegis of social democracy, the economy becomes increasingly directed away from market freedoms, and it performs progressively less than its potential to improve the living conditions of the population. The economy’s underperformance is invariably blamed upon the private sector by the state when it is the consequence of the state’s own interventionalist policies.

How statistics mislead us all


The social division of labour means that it is always the individual who deploys his or her skills in order to consume — consumption which is personal to the needs and desires of the individual. While there are needs common to each individual, the consumption of which goods and services an individual actually desires cannot be forecast by any observer. Much of tomorrow’s demand is spontaneous and is not even known in advance to individual consumers. 

Even if they are accurate, the gathering of statistics measuring this demand can only be of its past history. It is a gross error to think that demand statistics valid in the past can be projected into the future and retain any true relevance. We see this in the continual failure of economic modelling and econometric forecasts. It is one thing for an economist to further his understanding of a branch of human science, as a branch of psychology, and another to assume it is a natural science, such as physics or biology. The former cannot be averaged and predicted, while the latter can be statistically quantified. No wonder Keynes, whose primary discipline was mathematics, preferred to dismiss Say’s law in favour of mathematical and statistical analysis.

Mention has already been made above of the mistake in comparing prices of goods and services over time valued in fiat currencies. The chart below of WTI oil, a basic unit of energy upon which almost the entire global population depends, illustrates the enormity of this mistake.



The two prices are in legal money, which is gold, and in fiat dollars, which is currency. Since 1950, when the price of WTI oil was $2.57 per barrel and in gold grammes it was 2.28, in dollar terms the price has soared to around $70 today, a multiple of over 27 times. Yet in gold, it is 1.14 grammes, having exactly halved. In legal money the price has been considerably less volatile than in dollars. The riddle posed to us by this chart is which price should be used for valuing oil — a depreciating and volatile dollar, or a relatively stable legal and sound money?

Clearly, it is long-term dollar price comparisons which are badly flawed. Yet market traders, proud to call themselves macroeconomists without understanding the implications of the term, maintain their long-term charts of oil and other commodities in dollars wholly unaware of their falsity. Furthermore, everything which can be traded is valued in fiat dollars and other currencies, from financial assets to housing. The next chart is of residential property in London, priced in pounds and gold.


Anyone who observes the residential property market in the UK will tell you what an excellent 'investment' it has been, nowhere more so than in London. But this statement only holds for a fiat pound, which since 1968 has lost over 99% of its purchasing power measured in real legal money, which is still the gold sovereign coin. Today, the value of London residential property in gold has risen by a paltry 14% since 1968, compared with 116 times in depreciating pounds. Yet, the plain facts are met with widespread disbelief.

Under the fiat currency regime, values of everything are a flawed concept, reflecting not changes in subjective values so much as that of declining fiat currencies. But this statistical legerdemain which fools everyone extends to other areas of the statistical universe. Labour productivity analysis is a nonsense because of the underlying assumptions, and the lack of consideration of the costs to an employer of employment and other labour taxes. The approach is always from the statist viewpoint, whereby politicians wish to see higher output per worker promoting higher tax returns. It is never that of an employing businessman who is the only true assessor of the costs and benefits of employing the various forms of labour in his enterprise profitably.

GDP and government spending


To confuse gross domestic product with economic growth, itself a meaningless term when economic progress is implied, is a further error. Governments are fixated on GDP, which must always grow. GDP is not economic growth, but growth in the total currency value of transactions, usually over the course of a year or annualised.

If the currency is debased by its inflationary issuance, nominal GDP increases to the extent that debasement feeds into the GDP statistic. Inflation of the currency is particularly associated with increased government spending, so virtually all the increase in it fuels GDP. In the past, governments have regularly outperformed market expectations of GDP growth by the simple expedient of increasing government spending. Investors failing to understand this trick see it as positive, and stock markets rise on the news. GDP is only good for allowing a government to estimate prospective tax income. Otherwise, it is a useless and misleading statistic.

As stated above, GDP is routinely and unconsciously confused with economic progress. But a moment’s reflection will show that progress cannot be statistically measured. Progress is a concept which at its fundamental level is an improvement in a person’s living standard. There is no doubt that entertainment technology, in the form of televisions, gaming computers, and other electronic equipment all of which have fallen in price have improved many people’s enjoyment immensely. GDP incorporating declining prices for these products is bound to undervalue these benefits, and by classifying their prices as deflationary might even claim they detract from economic growth. Yet, government spending which is funded by removing purchasing power from producers and consumers and is therefore a brake on progress is classified as positive due to its inclusion in GDP.

During the covid crisis, when much of the productive economy shut down UK government spending rose to about 50% of GDP, though since then it has declined to an estimated 43% in the last fiscal year (to April 5th, 2023). Similar increases occurred in other nations. In Europe, French government spending peaked at 61.3% of its economy in 2020, declining to 58.1% last year. In Italy it was 57% and 56.7% respectively, and in Spain, 52% and 47.8%. With these levels of state spending, when analysing GDP it is extremely important to decide how to treat it.

Government economists are bound to argue that government spending is important in economic terms, and that GDP growth must include it. Furthermore, on a consumption basis it is argued that spending by government employees must be included, as well as government demand for goods and services. While this might appear to be a valid point, it misses the bigger picture.

While it is true that state employees’ and departmental spending are part of the total economy, the state’s taxes which fund them reduces income available for consumption for those not employed by the state. Government spending as a whole replaces it with the provision of services not freely demanded, which is fundamental to the benefits which flow from Say’s law — the law of the markets.

You don’t have to look far for examples of how state spending is a burden on overall economic activity, and that the successful economic approach is to free up the private sector, eliminating government and its intervention as much as possible. It is this approach which led to the remarkable success of Hong Kong in the post-war decades, compared with the poverty inflicted on the same ethnic people on the mainland under Mao Zedong where government was 100% of the economy.

Convincing the establishment that inflating GDP ends up suppressing economic progress is an uphill struggle. Instead of accepting the empirical evidence, governments routinely use their tax-raising powers to increase economic intervention, spending as a proportion of the whole, and debasing the currency by deliberately running budget deficits.

This leads to a conflict between politicians seeking to represent the electorate’s interests and the state itself. Politicians on the right vying for office are usually free marketeers with ambitions to reduce the state’s presence as a proportion of the total economy. They are appointed with a zeal to take an axe on spending and bureaucracy, but there are good reasons why they never achieve it. When they gain ministerial responsibility, their priority changes to protecting their budgets from being reduced, because cuts in departmental spending amount to a loss of power. Therefore, to the extent that any savings on spending are achieved, ministers always want to come up with other plans to maintain or increase funding levels. The negative economic consequences simply rack up, and the government’s share of GDP inexorably tends to increase.

This is the true legacy of confusing GDP with economic progress. While the transactions that together make up a GDP total can be measured, their true value in terms of the satisfaction and the progress in the quality of life they provide cannot. The only way in which they can be measured is by each individual in a community and nation, and not by those who claim to represent them.
Why there cannot be a general glut

The Keynesian error of believing that a recession leads to a general glut, and therefore a fall in the general level of prices, has its origin in the 1930s depression. But it is obvious that under the conditions of the division of labour, whereby people are employed to produce so that they can consume, this cannot be true in a general sense, because production must decline as well as consumption when unemployment rises. In other words, a general glut of unsold produce cannot arise, because the unemployed are no longer producing.

Nevertheless, Keynesian fears of a glut when a recession occurs and unemployment rises leads modern governments to create demand in a recession by increasing welfare benefits. According to the Keynesian playbook, this funding is stimulative by means of inflationary deficits, intended to help stabilise prices as demand weakens. But without a general glut and a stable currency the overall level of prices is unlikely to change significantly in real terms when there is no government intervention because of Say’s law.

Modern governments intervene by deficit spending without contributing to production. Instead of a recession leading to surplus production, government spending leads to surplus demand. This explains how the inflationary effects of Keynesian stimulation can lead to significantly higher prices, even in a slump, as was seen in Britain’s inflationary crisis in the mid-1970s. It is also entirely consistent with the factors driving an economy into a slump during a currency’s collapse, such as witnessed in the European inflations in the early 1920s.

So, what happened in the 1930s, disproving Say’s law in the minds of the neo-Keynesians?


The first error in their analysis was not understanding the consequences of the inflationary 1920s. They were fuelled by the Fed’s expansionary monetary policies under the leadership of Benjamin Strong, and President Hoover’s anti-capitalist, interventionist policies at the peak of the credit cycle. The inevitable consequences were a speculative bubble followed by a financial crisis between late-1929 and 1932 which wiped out thousands of banks and their credit, which were the backbone to maintaining economic activity. And this was followed by Hoover’s heavy handed interventionism.

Hoover also raised income taxes significantly to fund his interventions. Despite these increases, during Hoover’s tenure the Federal Government’s deficit to GDP soared from a 0.7% surplus to a 6.4% deficit and these deficits continued under Roosevelt, though they lessened as the banking crisis passed.

Not only did banks go bust in their thousands, but there were other factors. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which built in higher tariffs on top of those of the Ford McCumber tariffs of 1922, was signed into law by President Hoover in 1930. So, not only was bank credit in the economy imploding, but including tariffs the prices of imported goods and therefore the production costs of most American manufactured products were raised to uneconomic levels. It was a fatal combination, because little could be produced profitably at a time when there was little or no bank credit available. Consequently, US GDP contracted from $103.6bn in 1929 to $56.3bn in 1933. This was not the same thing as a general glut, because demonstrably both production and consumption contracted. Primarily, it reflected a collapse in bank credit.

While credit had become freely available in the previous decade, the introduction of tractors and other farm machinery had led to a massive expansion of agricultural output. Prices of agricultural produce, which were already declining due to oversupply, were bound to fall even more when credit was withdrawn by failing local banks in America. The farming community was forced to sell its output at anything they could get for it, because of the lack of credit.

This was a specific market adjustment at a time when worldwide cereal and other agricultural output prices were falling due to overproduction. The slump in prices attributable to the banking crisis hit farmers particularly hard, not just in America but worldwide through values reflected on the commodity exchanges.

Because American farmers were forced sellers of their agricultural output, it was later assumed by Keynes and other economists that there was a glut and that Say’s law was therefore flawed. But the mistake was to miss the links between the collapse in bank credit from bank failures, the pressure on farmers to dump their product at any price, and the coincidence of global overproduction due to the rapid advances made in mechanisation in the previous decade.

The causes of the 1930s depression and its longevity were clear — you need look no further than empirical evidence. Long before Keynes traduced Say’s law, both Hoover and Roosevelt with his New Deal made the depression considerably worse than it would otherwise have been, acting as proto-Keynesians. It was the first time that the Federal Government had intervened in what would otherwise have been two or three years of economic and credit hiatus, which had been the experience of previous episodes. The previous depression in 1920—1921 lasted only eighteen months without statist intervention. Before President Hoover’s tenure, it was generally acknowledged that intervention only made things worse, and that left alone, a slump in business activity would correct itself.

Economists subsequently formulating statist policies badly misread the causes of a slump. They still fail to appreciate that there is a cycle of bank credit, identified by economists of the Austrian school as a business cycle. It is caused by bankers acting as a cohort increasing the quantity of credit to a point when their balance sheet exposure becomes excessive relative to the bankers’ own capital, and they then try to reign in their balance sheets. This is not a conspiracy between bankers, but reflects their human behaviour, and is cyclical in nature. It can be traced for so far as reasonable records exist, in the UK as far back as the end of the Napoleonic wars. And it is a cycle of credit expansion and contraction averaging roughly ten years.

Even for economists, it is always easier to observe the evidence of an economic downturn than its underlying cause. In all the voluminous analysis of the great depression, the cycle of bank credit is hardly mentioned. Only economists of the Austrian school have pointed out that the depression was the natural consequence of excessive credit expansion in the previous decade. And Keynes’s followers with their mathematical and statistical macroeconomics are still blind to the role of bank credit underlying booms and slumps. They think they can model the economy, steering it from one objective to another by supressing free markets. But they cannot model human bankers’ balance of greed for profit and fear of losses.

Economic and monetary policies ignore Say’s law — the law of the markets — persisting in their failed interventions. The response to failure is usually to claim that the error was to not intervene enough. A feature of these failures is for policy makers to seek solace with their international counterparts, doubling down in a group-thinking effort to achieve statist objectives.
The errors in currency management

This week, the persistence of consumer price inflation in the UK has even led a member of the Monetary Policy Committee to say that interest rates will have to be raised to the extent that the UK economy enters a recession. But with broad money supply, no longer expanding, we can see that there’s something wrong with his analysis. At the same time, all commentary on stubborn price inflation is about too much demand for too few goods. Changes in the purchasing power of the currency are never mentioned. While individual prices fluctuate, when the general level of prices increases it can only be because of changes in a currency’s purchasing power.

There is only one reason why the purchasing power of a fiat currency changes, and that is in the behaviour of its users. By adjusting the relationship of their immediate liquidity to their spending, collectively they can have a profound impact on its purchasing power. This is why the state theory of money fails, and the monetary authorities always fail to control the purchasing power of their fiat currency. A currency must be anchored to real money, which is gold coin.

When banknotes were fully exchangeable for gold coin, their purchasing power remained constant irrespective of the quantity in circulation. But banknotes are typically less than a tenth of the circulating medium, the balance being bank credit. The relationship between bank credit and banknotes is almost parity. Therefore, so long as counterparty risk between a bank’s depositors and the bank is not an issue, bank credit will always take its value from the currency. It is the currency which must be credible.

In the first of the two charts above of WTI oil priced in dollars and gold, we can see that the price of oil in dollars was stable between 1950 and 1970, when the dollar price increased from $2.57 per barrel to an average of $3.35. At that time, the dollar was loosely tied to gold through the Bretton Woods agreement, with only national central banks and organisations such as the IMF able to exchange dollars for gold. During that time, M3 money supply increased from $172bn to $750bn, an increase of 336%.

This was not the only example. Between 1844 (the time of the Bank Charter Act) and 1900, the wholesale price index was unchanged, and it was also remarkably stable over that time fluctuating little. But between 1844 and 1900, the sum of Bank of England banknotes in circulation and commercial bank deposit obligations increased eleven times —almost entirely bank credit with the Bank of England’s note issue being little changed — and there was a material increase in the quantity of short-term, commercial bills funding foreign trade as well. Monetarist theory would suggest that the expansion of credit on such a scale would undermine the purchasing power of the currency, but plainly it did not.

The reason the expansion of bank credit need not undermine a currency’s purchasing power is that so long as the level of credit is genuinely demanded by economic activity instead of financing excess consumption, its expansion does not drive up prices. The source of excess consumption is to be found in government deficit spending because individuals always have to settle their debts while a government does not. As mentioned above, governments can always resort to deficit spending.

From this we know that government fiscal and monetary policies coupled with its fiat currency are the sole reasons behind a deteriorating purchasing power for its currency. Indeed, the Keynesians deliberately target a continual rate of debasement reflected in a CPI inflation rate of 2% by using monetary policy in an attempt to regulate credit demand.

The solution: leave markets alone and bring back sound money


If monetary stability is to return, all attempts by governments to manage private sector outcomes which have always failed and will continue to do so must be abandoned. And sound money, that is to say a gold coin standard freely available to ordinary people at their choice must be re-established. Interest rates would then stabilise at risk-free annual rates of just a few per cent set by markets in the context of demand for investment capital and the availability of savings. Market stability will automatically follow. The diversion of human activity into speculation will diminish, benefiting the economy from its redeployment into more productive pursuits. No longer would we have governments attempting to chase monetary objectives which bankrupt homeowners with mortgages as a result of misguided Keynesian policies.

A return to sound money clips the wings of high spending politicians, but other specific changes must also be introduced, reversing Keynesian macroeconomic policies entirely:
  • Government spending must be reduced substantially, with an initial target for it to be no more than 20% of the economy. This will reduce the tax burden on productive businesses and workers for the benefit of non-inflationary progress. It will require extensive legislation to be passed eliminating mandated spending commitments.
  • The policy of regulating goods and services must be abandoned, and responsibility for judging product suitability handed back to individuals.
  • All taxation must be removed from savings, interest earned, and capital gained: savings will have already been taxed when earned. Savings are the necessary source of investment funding for economic progress. And citizens must be encouraged to save for their future, because the state must withdraw from providing widespread welfare, restricting it to a bare minimum for genuine need.
  • Inheritance taxes and death duties must be rescinded. Families should be allowed to accumulate and pass on wealth which is otherwise destroyed the moment it is acquired by government. 
  • Protectionist trade policies must be abandoned in favour of free trade. The benefit to an economy from the comparative advantage of buying the best suited products from anywhere are enormous, as the evidence from entrepôt economies, such as Hong Kong, confirms.
  • Government ministers must not be permitted to accept lobbying by pressure groups and businesses, because their democratic responsibility is to the entire electorate.
  • All central bank activities must cease and replaced by a note issuing authority regulating the relationship between gold coin held in reserve and the face value of notes in circulation. The relationship should be laid down by law, funded by government, and for the gold coin to note relationship to be maintained at a 40% minimum at all times. It must be coin and not bullion in order to be available to the entire population. A bullion standard risks foreign arbitrage in potentially destabilising quantities.
  • Foreign policy must be amended to not interfere in other nation’s politics, except where national interests are demonstrably affected.
  • Government spending must be fully accountable. All revenue received by the Treasury must be hypothecated — no more robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Clearly, these reforms will not happen before an existential crisis serious enough to force a complete policy overhaul. Even then, it depends on government ministers and bureaucrats correctly diagnosing the reasons for the crisis, which with all of them in thrall to neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and the realisation and admission of their own roles in creating a final crisis is extremely unlikely to happen in a Damascene fashion. Instead, a period of policy vacillation is likely, leading to a danger of political instability and a retreat into yet more socialism.

The final crisis brought upon us by Keynesian policies will almost certainly not mark the end of all our troubles.
* * * * 
Alasdair Macleod is Head of Research for Goldmoney. He has been a celebrated stockbroker and member of the London Stock Exchange for over four decades. His experience encompasses equity and bond markets, fund management, corporate finance and investment strategy.
Follow him on Twitter.
His article previously appeared at the Cobden Centre, UK.



Tuesday, 21 March 2023

INFLATION: "We are] still at risk of really bad macro forecasting errors, and central banks unable to live up to their rhetoric."


"[F]inance minister Grant] Robertson has been both an active and passive party in the serious decline in the quality of our central bank over recent years, and ... only the Minister of Finance – current or future – can make a start on fixing the institution. Institutional decline – and it isn’t just the Reserve Bank – has been a growing problem in New Zealand, and the current government’s indifference has only seen the situation worsen...
    "But, for better or worse, when most people think of a 'monetary mess' at present they probably primarily have in mind inflation.... [and] there simply isn’t any compelling evidence ... that any or all of the many things one can criticise Robertson for really go anywhere towards explaining how badly things have gone with inflation ...
    "[T]o me the evidence very strongly suggests that what happened over the last two to three years was that (a) central banks badly misunderstood what was going on around the macroeconomics of Covid, (b) so did almost all other forecasters, here and abroad, and (c) there isn’t much sign that central banks with better qualified more focused people or more open and contested policy processes did even slightly discernibly better than the others. I wish it wasn’t so.... 

The Survey of Professional Forecasters , published by the Philadelphia Fed, shows a clear 'hedgehog' – one that systematically overestimates the Fed’s willingness to hike interest rates, up until the time of the first hike in 2015, at which point SPFs estimations have underestimated the speed of hikes.

    "[I]t is remarkable how the [central banks'] forecasting errors are so uniformly wrong in one direction at a time. But they make for pretty hedgehogs.... If hedgehogging is unintentional, as Jonathan Newman observed on Mises.org a few years ago, 'their models are junk.' If the tendency is intentional, they are just trying to project unwarranted optimism – which is indeed the suggested explanation among those who’ve studied the Fed’s forecasting failures.
    "[W]e – and other countries – [are] still ... at risk of really bad macro forecasting errors, and central banks unable to live up to their rhetoric."
~ composite quote from Michael Reddell, from his post 'New Zealand’s monetary policy mess,' and Jokaim Book, from his post 'Central Banks' Forecasts Are Basically Garbage'

Wednesday, 24 August 2022

INFLATION: A Critique of the 'Inflation-Psychology' Doctrine

"As used by its supporters, the term 'inflation psychology' is supposed to refer to an uncaused primary. That is, people allegedly have an inflation psychology ... they simply have it, and because they have it, they spend more rapidly. Of course, there is such a thing as inflation psychology, but it is not a primary. It is based on the fact of inflation. It comes into existence only after many years of inflation.
    "Properly understood, what the term 'inflation psychology' really refers to is the various ways in which a rapidly expanding quantity of money reduces the desire of people to hold money... [having] an effect on prices only by way of raising aggregate monetary demand.* 
    "Inflation psychology also has an influence on prices from the side of supply, because it influences the expectations of sellers. ... These [expectations] cause a rise in prices beyond the levels appropriate to the current size of monetary demand—they make the rise in prices outrun the rise in demand by gearing this year’s prices, in effect, to the expected demand of next year and beyond. These price increases operate as a kind of 'cost push,' but, of course, one that is entirely induced by the expansion in the quantity of money and consequent rise in aggregate monetary demand...
    "Now sometimes, when the government makes an effort to cut back on inflation, and really does reduce the rate at which it expands the money supply for a while, some observers, who are familiar with the quantity theory of money, are surprised to see that prices continue to rise at a substantial rate.... In order [however] to convince people that it is serious in its determination to end inflation, the government must restrict its increase in the quantity of money for a protracted period. In the meanwhile, however, because people have had no reason to believe that the government will continue to limit itself, they will probably have placed themselves in even more overextended positions.... In this context, stopping the inflation or significantly restricting it must precipitate a crisis. And then the government must either allow the crisis to occur or, to avoid it, give in and fulfil people’s expectation that inflation will resume....
    "This type of situation illustrates an inherent flaw of paper money. The fact that paper money can be inflated, and over time is inflated, causes expectations about future inflation. The existence of these expectations then makes it impossible to stop inflating without a crisis, while the threat of the crisis induces the government to resume and accelerate the inflation. Inflation psychology is an inevitable consequence of paper money and is a critical step in its ultimate downfall."
~ George Reisman, from pages 916-17 of his book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. Read it online here, or buy it here (currently at half-price!)

* The essential explanation for general and persistent across-the-board rising prices is an expanding quantity of money allowing these prices to be paid. See formula here from pages 505 and 897 of Reisman's book:



Tuesday, 16 August 2022

INFLATION: "Under such a system, the increase in the quantity of money is limited only by the self-restraint of government officials."


"A system of fiat paper money, that is, a system in which the monetary unit is a mere piece of paper stamped as such by government officials—a system in which pieces of paper are not a claim to anything beyond themselves and thus themselves possess ultimate debt-paying power—such a system virtually guarantees that prices will rise. Under such a system, the increase in the quantity of money is limited only by the self-restraint of government officials. As will be shown, these officials have great incentives to increase the quantity of money and are under constant pressure to increase it. Hence, the quantity of money increases at a rate sufficient to increase aggregate demand more rapidly than aggregate supply, with the result that prices rise."
~ George Reisman, from page 506 of his book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. Read it online here, or buy it here (currently at half-price!)

SEE ALSO:

Wednesday, 10 August 2022

INFLATION: Critique of the "Cost-Push" Explanation in General

See earlier posts in this series about what doesn't cause inflation:

"The supporters of the various cost-push doctrines recognise the validity of the formula for the general consumer price level*. However, they perceive the role of rising demand in a different way than do the supporters of the quantity theory of money. While the supporters of the quantity theory of money see more monetary demand as the cause of higher prices, the supporters of the cost-push doctrines see it as the cause of greater production and supply. In their view, more demand causes correspondingly more production and supply and therefore does not raise prices. The reason the supporters of the cost-push doctrines believe this is because they see the existence of unemployed labour and idle plant-capacity, and they assume that so long as unemployment and idle capacity exist, the effect of more demand is simply to enable more people to be employed and therefore for production to be increased. 

    "The supporters of the cost-push doctrines are willing to concede that more demand is potentially capable of raising prices. But that, they say, could happen only in the context of an economy operating at full employment and in which, therefore, supply could not be further increased in response to more demand. At that point, they are willing to admit, more demand would not be accompanied by more supply and would thus drive up prices. The expression they use to describe this situation of more demand raising prices at the point of full employment is, of course, 'demand-pull inflation.' At the point of full employment, they say, more demand 'pulls up' prices. This so-called demand-pull inflation is the only potential influence of more demand on prices that they recognise. To them, more demand as a cause of inflation means 'demand-pull inflation.'

    "Observe how the supporters of the cost-push doctrines think. They have decided that more demand is capable of raising prices only at the point of full employment. They have decided that short of full employment, the effect of more demand is not higher prices, but more supply.... The reason rising costs are taken as the explanation is because, in fact, the prices of many [mass-produced] goods are determined in the first instance on the basis of their cost of production, as I showed in Chapter 6 of this book.

    "Of course, I also showed that all prices determined by cost of production are still ultimately determined by supply and demand... Cost of production—and this point is relevant now—is always based on prices, including wages, which are the price of labour....

    "The fact that cost of production is not an ultimate explanation of prices constitutes a major logical deficiency of the cost-push doctrine. Because what the cost-push doctrine is actually claiming is that some prices rise because other prices rise, and it is content to leave matters at that. For example, the supporters of the cost-push doctrine blame inflation on such things as the rise in the price of steel or the rise in wages achieved by various unions. They do not offer any explanation of what makes possible the higher price of steel or the higher wages obtained by the unions. 

    "In fact, as already shown, what the cost-push doctrine boils down to is the claim that certain key prices, and this includes wages, rise arbitrarily, without any explanation other than the greed of those who raise them. The cost-push doctrine, in the last analysis, is a doctrine that tries to blame price increases on some form of arbitrary power. It tells us, in effect, that prices rise simply because some powerful people are making them rise.

    "Now it is true that in our present economic system, that is heavily overlaid with government regulations and controls—i.e., the so-called mixed economy—arbitrary [politically-protected monopoly] power does exist.... But this much can be said right now: The basic reason why arbitrary power on the part of sellers is not a sufficient explanation of rising prices is that such higher prices as it might bring about always cause reductions in the quantity of the good or service that can be sold and, therefore, act as a brake on any further such price increases. This is closely related to an even more fundamental objection, namely, that the cost-push doctrines are equivalent to an attempt to blame inflation on falling supply, which we have already seen is invalid. 

Friday, 22 July 2022

INFLATION: A Critique of the “Profit-Push” Explanation


See earlier posts in this series about what doesn't cause inflation:
"According to the 'profit-push' doctrine [which we've heard most recently from politicians, union economists, and self-serving central bankers], prices rise primarily not because wages are rising but in order to increase the profits of 'powerful monopolists' and 'greedy big businessmen.' It is the push for ever higher profits, say the supporters of this doctrine, that initiates the so-called 'wage-price spiral'...
    "All things considered, it is probably by far the most popular explanation of inflation ... [but like all the other popular explanations] it ignores the fact that in the absence of rising [monetary] demand, rising prices reduce sales volume—that is, they reduce the quantity of goods that can be sold. The prospective loss of sales volume makes even a government-protected monopolist limit his price at some point....
    "This [is because] a rise in demand for [for the monopolist's products] is accompanied by an equivalent drop in the demand for other things. The effect of the drop in demand for other things is either to reduce the prices of other things or the supply of other things that is sold. In either event, the problem of inflation again does not come up—because we either have no rise in the general price level or one that can only be associated with a decrease in supply. 
    "In order for the [monopolist]’s rate increase to be connected with a problem of inflation, its customers must be in a position to enlarge their spending for [their products] without having to reduce their spending for other things. But this means they must be in a position to make a larger aggregate monetary demand. Consequently, the only possible explanation of how even protected legal monopolists could raise their prices in a way that is relevant to the problem of inflation is that of a growing aggregate monetary demand. And this, of course, in turn depends on an increasing quantity of money....
    "This is what is responsible for the rise in prices expressed in terms of paper money. The situation is comparable to selecting a melting ice cube as a unit of volume and then observing that all measurements of volume persistently increase....
    "Nevertheless, ... despite the fact that it is an effect, not a cause of inflation, many people, particularly in politics and in the news media, never tire of blaming rising prices on the rise in the nominal rate of profit and implicitly or explicitly demand that government controls be imposed to limit profits."
~ George Reisman, from pages 911-13 of his book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. Read it online here, or buy it here (currently at half-price!)

Wednesday, 20 July 2022

INFLATION: The Elimination of "Less Supply" as the Cause of an Inflationary Rise in Prices


"More [monetary] demand or less supply are the necessary, indispensable connection between higher prices and any alleged other cause of higher prices. If they are absent, there simply is no connection between that alleged cause and higher prices. The quantity theory of money connects the increase in the quantity of money to the rise in prices by way of establishing a connection to more demand. As previously explained, a growing quantity of money raises the [monetary] demand for consumers’ goods through the new and additional money being spent and re-spent....
    "Decreases in supply must be eliminated from consideration as the cause of a rising price level  ... There are seven reasons for eliminating reductions in supply [including the following]:

"i. The Actual Influence of Supply [Historically] Has Been to Reduce Prices
    "In almost every year [from] World War II [to the early 90s], which is the period [previously] complained of as marked by inflation, prices [had] indeed risen in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Yet, over the same period of time, supply ... increased rather than decreased in these places, and it [did] so in practically every year. Supply ... increased enormously, as the result of a larger population, and, consequently, more people working; and, even more, as the result of technological progress and capital accumulation, which ... raised the productivity of labour and thus enabled each worker on average to produce a greater output. 
"Our formula for the general consumer price level, of course [see below], shows that the effect of increases in supply must be to reduce prices in inverse proportion. The fact that the price level [rose over this period], therefore, despite vast increases in supply, can be ascribed only to the influence of even more substantial increases in [monetary] demand. The problem of rising prices in the United States and every other leading country over [those] fifty years or more [was] clearly one of rising demand, not falling supply.

"ii. Where Falling Supply Contributed to Rising Prices, Its Role Has Been Relatively Minor
    "Of course, there are some countries in which supply has fallen, and fallen quite substantially ... [yet even at their worst] the cumulative decreases never exceeded a figure of 50 percent. If, for the sake of argument, we take this figure of 50 percent, we could account for a doubling of the price level in these countries on the basis of supply reductions. (I say a doubling, because our formula for the general price level [see below] shows that a halving of supply coupled with an unchanged demand must produce a doubled price level.) However, as is well-known, the price levels in countries like Chile and Uruguay [had] ... increased probably by a factor of fifty or more... Therefore, even where supply ... decreased, the overwhelmingly greater part of the rise in prices cannot be accounted for on the basis of reductions in supply, but must be ascribed to increases in [monetary] demand....

"v. Falling Supply Cannot Explain the Range of Price Increases that Exists Under Inflation
    "Even such supply reductions as are not themselves caused by rising [monetary] demand, and which, therefore, may legitimately be said to be an independent cause of higher prices—for example, poor crops due to bad weather—should not be described as a cause of inflation, despite the fact that they raise the general consumer price level. This is because they do not produce the range of price increases that people associate with inflation.
    "When people complain of 'inflation,' they have in mind more than a mere rise in the weighted average of consumer prices that is depicted in the consumer price-level formula. They have in mind a condition in which almost every individual price rises and hardly any individual prices fall. It is highly doubtful that they would complain of inflation if a large number of individual prices actually fell, even if, at the same time, the consumer price level, in the sense of the weighted average of consumer prices, rose. Yet precisely this phenomenon of widespread price declines would be the effect of reductions in supply that were not accompanied by increases in demand. If supply fell without being accompanied by an increase in [monetary] demand, the effect would be that a whole host of prices would actually fall, even though the weighted average of prices rose.
    "A large number of prices would fall, because the effect of a reduction in supply would be to make people poorer. As they became poorer, they would concentrate a larger and larger proportion of their limited demand on necessities and a smaller and smaller proportion on luxuries. The prices of all luxury and semi-luxury items would therefore tend to fall....
    "The principle here is that a drop in the supply of any good that comparatively speaking is a necessity causes spending to shift to it from goods that comparatively speaking are luxuries.... For example, a drop in the supply of gasoline causes a sharp jump in the price of gasoline and, at the same time, acts to reduce the demand for automobiles, motel rooms, and so on. The prices of such things, therefore, tend to fall, and actually would fall if the quantity of money and demand in the aggregate did not rise and thus hold up or even increase the demand for them at the same time that people concentrated their expenditures more heavily on the goods in reduced supply. 
    "The phenomenon of large numbers of prices actually falling as the result of declining supplies would be a continuing one as supply fell and the weighted average of prices rose from year to year.... From year to year the rise in prices would outweigh the fall in prices, because of the overall reduction in supply. At the same time, however, numerous cases would always exist in which prices fell. On the basis of this discussion, it should be clear that if not accompanied by an increasing aggregate [monetary] demand, a reduction in supply would be accompanied by widespread declines in individual prices, even while the weighted average of prices rose. It would therefore not qualify as a cause of what most people have in mind when they complain of inflation. In order for practically every price to rise, there must be rising aggregate [monetary] demand. That is the only way that the demand for some goods can increase without reducing the demand for other goods....
    
    "This means that we have narrowed the problem of inflation down exclusively to one of rising aggregate demand, which our formula for the general consumer price level [see below] shows to be the only conceivable remaining explanation."
~ George Reisman, from pages 897-907 of his book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. Read it online here, or buy it here (currently at half-price!) 

NOTE: Formula for the general consumer price level:




Tuesday, 19 July 2022

INFLATION: A critique of the “crisis-push” doctrine


Image: Getty/Anna Oberska
 

"The 'crisis-push' doctrine [of inflation] is the attempt to blame rising prices on some sudden event, such as the [Russian invasion of Ukraine, or Covid] ... that reduces the supply and increases the price of some important good or group of goods. The doctrine rests on two basic errors. The first is the assumption that because a crisis can explain a large increase in the price of a particular good, it can explain a correspondingly large increase in the general price level.
    "A crisis can explain a dramatic increase in the price of the particular good in whose supply it takes place, if the good is a necessity. This is undisputed. For example, a few percent reduction in the supply of wheat or oil can cause a dramatic increase in the price of wheat or oil ... The inference drawn from this fact by the supporters of the crisis-push doctrine, however, was that these supply reductions could somehow also explain the less dramatic but nevertheless still very substantial rise in the general consumer price level that was taking place at the same time. That inference was an error.
    "It was an error because not only does a rise in the price of a necessity not explain a rise in the price of other items, but ... it actually tends to make the prices of a whole host of other items fall. It has this effect because what makes it possible for people to pay the disproportionately higher price of the necessity undergoing the supply crisis is that they restrict their expenditure for other items. The prices of these other items, therefore, tend to drop. The result is that the overall rise in the general price level is relatively slight—because the dramatic rise in the price of the necessity suffering the supply crisis is largely offset in the average of prices by a mass of other prices that not only do not rise, but many of which actually fall. And because of the widespread declines in prices that would occur, even such rise in the general price level as a supply crisis could achieve would not qualify for description as a case of inflation ...
    "This underlies the failure to see that supply crises act to reduce the demand for and the prices of all these other goods, and therefore could simply never account for a very dramatic rise in the general price level, let alone for the phenomenon of almost universally rising prices, which people have in mind when they complain about 'inflation'."

~ George Reisman, from pages 913-15 of his book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. Read it online here, or buy it here (currently at half-price!)

Thursday, 14 July 2022

Inflation Isn't What the "Experts" Say It Is. The Confusion in Terms Is Deliberate



Inflation” isn’t what you think it is, explains Manuel Tacanho in this guest post, and the confusion about it is deliberate: it’s deliberate because those who profit from the real inflation want to keep stealing from you, and don’t want you to notice.

Inflation Isn't What the "Experts" Say It Is. The Confusion in Terms Is Deliberate

Guest post by Manuel Tacanho

Monetary inflation is highly desired by the state. This has been the case thought history and is still the case today. That is because inflation facilitates government spending beyond the revenue it takes through taxation. Government spending gives rulers, politicians, and bureaucrats greater centralised control and commanding power over people's lives (i.e., the economy and society).

Without inflation, the state finds itself shackled within the confines of what it can take via taxes. Therefore, governments will not miss a chance to gain control of the monetary system. Once the state does have control of money, inflation becomes inevitable and institutionalised. This is why, in recorded history, nearly all cases of great inflation and hyperinflationary socioeconomic collapse (e.g., Weimar Germany, Zimbabwe, and more recently Venezuela) have been a result of government (and/or its central bank) deliberate policy.

It is because of the insatiable appetite to spend more than they take through taxes that governments, through political deception and coercion, tend to undermine a sound money system and repress monetary freedom in favour of one that facilitates currency debasement (i.e., money printing). That is to say, a fiat currency regime monopolised by the state and forced on the people by legal tender laws.

As such, from the statist economics standpoint, the definition of inflation had to be distorted and the public miseducated about it —so that the process of currency debasement (i.e., monetary inflation) may go unnoticed and accepted by those whom it hurts the most, the general pupation.

Definition of inflation


The popular and textbook definition of inflation is ‘a generalised rise in the prices of goods and services.’ Commonly measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This definition is not wrong per se but it is inaccurate and grossly misleading. Deliberately so.

The original ‘classical’ (and more accurate) definition of inflation is ‘the artificial increase in the supply of money (and credit).’ By artificial, it is meant that the expansion of the supply of money is not determined by the market (i.e., the people) but rather by the government, usually through a central bank. In the classical (pre-Keynesian) world, this generally meant and artificial increase in the money supply beyond the rate of growth of the gold that backed it.

So, you can see that this one word now describes two different things - indeed, one being the cause of the other! This confusion in terms is not coincidental, it is deliberate. Given the rise of Keynesian economics and the inherently inflationary times in which we, humanity, have lived under for many decades now.

Deliberate distortion


The original definition of inflation has been distorted for two principal reasons. 

First, the government and its monetary agency—the central bank—shield themselves from any future blame for the continuing rise in prices, and the currency’s loss of purchasing power, that inevitably happens as a result of inflationist monetary policy. This enables the government and mass media outlets to divert the blame to something or to someone else. Anyone but the real culprits. Their usual scapegoats (which we’re hearing again being blamed) are “greedy businessmen” or “corporations.”

Second, the official and distorted definition of inflation—a generalised increase in prices of goods and services—conceals the truth, the true source of inflation, thus preventing the public from knowing that inflation and the currency’s loss of purchasing power is a deliberate policy of government/central bank. Not knowing this, the public will not protest against it.

For example, this report claims that most Americans believe “corporate greed, profiteering and price gouging” is the cause of the current inflation crisis in the United States, where price inflation just hit a 40-year record high.

What’s more unsettling is that the same report found that the majority of those polled also believe that the government should step in and resolve the problem. In other words, the public wants the cause of the problem to solve the problem!

Such is the depth of economic misinformation and miseducation we face. Perhaps, if the public knew that since the establishment of the current US central bank in 1913, the U.S. dollar has lost more than 95 percent of its purchasing power relative to gold (the commodity that gave the dollar its initial value, stability, and global acceptability), they wouldn't blame the inflation crisis on “corporate greed”.

Economist and social philosopher Murray Rothbard wrote:
Government is inherently inflationary because it has, over the centuries, acquired control over the monetary system. Having the power to print money (including the "printing" of bank deposits) gives it the power to tap a ready source of revenue. Inflation is a form of taxation, since the government can create new money out of thin air and use it to bid away resources from private individuals, who are barred by heavy penalty from similar "counterfeiting." Inflation therefore makes a pleasant substitute for taxation for the government officials and their favoured groups, and it is a subtle substitute which the general public can easily—and can be encouraged to—overlook.
Put simply, the cause of today’s increasingly inflationary and chaotic monetary situation is not corporate greed, speculators, free-market capitalism, Vladimir Putin, or the weather. It is governments’ monetary agencies and their current fiat-money system.

You see, under the fiat currency regime that they administer, the central bank can easily, artificially, and systematically increase the money supply, almost like a magic trick. And they do, frequently! Which makes inflation (mild or severe) the norm. And this inflationary process gradually destroys the purchasing power of the currency resulting in higher prices. This policy, while benefiting the government and associates, defrauds the people and impoverishes society, economically and morally.

Economist Hans F. Sennholz noted:
It is not money, as is sometimes said, but the depreciation of money—the cruel and crafty destruction of money—that is the root of many evils. For it destroys individual thrift and self-reliance as it gradually erodes personal savings. It benefits debtors at the expense of creditors as it silently transfers wealth and income from the latter to the former. It generates the business cycles, the stop-and-go boom-and-bust movements of business that inflict incalculable harm on millions of people.
Professor Sennholz further noted:
Monetary destruction breeds not only poverty and chaos, but also government tyranny. Few policies are more calculated to destroy the existing basis of a free society than the debauching of its currency. And few tools, if any, are more important to the champion of freedom than a sound monetary system.

Conclusion


A generalised rise in the prices of goods and services is a consequence of inflation, not inflation itself. Inflation was classically (pre-Keynesian economics) defined as an artificial increase in the supply of money and credit.

Nowadays it makes sense to use the term monetary inflation to specify the artificial increase of the money supply, on one hand. And to use price inflation to refer to a generalised rise in prices of goods and services on the other.

Irrespective of the confusion in definition, inflation stealthily distorts and debilitates the economy, steals the people's purchasing power, and impoverishes society - all while benefiting the ruling political and business elites.(Want to know one main cause of contemporary, and ill-gotten, inequality? Here you are!)

History (and common sense too) makes it clear that fiat currency regimes are unsustainable arrangements that always and inevitably fail. As such, there is no reason to believe today’s cruel and oppressive fiat currency regime will defy Natural law to stand the test of time.

Evidence suggests it is more sensible to believe the fiat dollar standard too will crumble. And when it does, we hope economic miseducation and misinformation will crumble along with it.

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Manuel Tacanho is founder of Afridom, a sound money based digital banking startup for Europe and Africa. He's also an advocate of free markets and sound money for Africa’s economic development. His post first appeared at the Mises Wire.