Showing posts with label John Maynard Keynes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Maynard Keynes. Show all posts

Thursday, 26 February 2026

What is "Neoliberalism" anyway?



A viral video by young lawyer Riana Te Ngahue is doing the rounds purporting to explain (for her aunties) something called Neoliberalism.

'A' for effort. 'F' for content. As libertarian Alberto Mingardi observes, very few who use the term have actually taken the time to define it correctly and to trace back its origins. She does take the time, but just like the folk she notes in her video (Tamitha Paul, Chloe Swarbrick, et al) Ms Te Ngahue fails to either define or understand where it came from. 

To be fair, it's not clear. Neoliberalism is like "trickle-down" in economics, or "austerity" in political economy: a term used almost exclusively by critics to characterise and critique a whole ill-defined whole cluster of policies and people, none of whom actually exist. (Take a look at Phil Magness for example explaining 'Why I Am Not a Neoliberal.') "Capitalism" of course was famously one of those words too -- used initially by French socialist Louis Blanc and anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon -- before being taken up by capitalism's supporters. A bit like "queer."

But (apart from Scott Sumner, who thinks it's "awesome") there's no sign of that happening with "neoliberalism."

As Jeffrey Tucker explained way back in 2016, "We need a fix on what this term means. Is there a founding thinker, book, or meeting?" Or, in other words:

What is "Neoliberalism" anyway?
by Jeffrey Tucker

The term “neoliberalism” is being flung around everywhere these days, usually with a haughty sense of “everyone knows what this is.” But do we really? You may think you know, but there’s very little agreement among everyone else.

Is there a founding thinker, book, or meeting? The most common search phrases on Google are these: “definition neoliberalism,” “what is neoliberalism,” and “define neoliberalism.”

The confusion is understandable. Sometimes the term is used approvingly by the mainstream press, as for example to describe France’s Emmanuel Macron. Or Javier Milei. (As if there were much in common between the two.)

More often the term is used as a pejorative by the far left and the alt-right. Here it is said with a sneer to be a synonym for capitalism, globalism, elite rule, ruling-class privilege, and the administrative state.

It's true that there's more doubt around these days about cradle-to-grave government.

What are the reasons for this change?

First, there is the rather obvious fact that government management has failed to live up to its promise. People are far more likely to dread than appreciate any real-world contact with the state. Where would you rather be: the DMV or McDonald’s? The school-district office or a local bar? A military base or a car plant? The courthouse or the shopping mall? Want to deal with a government cop or a private security guard?

Second, private enterprise has turned out to produce far more amazing improvements in our lives; health, prosperity, education, transportation, security, and all the other “commanding heights” of life have been well-served by innovation stemming from entrepreneurship and commercial exchange. Pick your example, but a favourite one is how much transportation alone has improved with ride-sharing technology.

Third, a quiet intellectual revolution has been taking place in the postwar period, with generations of outstanding scholars having rediscovered, then improved, then propagated the insights of classical economics. To be sure, it is now conventional wisdom on the Left that this “neoliberal” intellectual shift is a result of an elite conspiracy dreamed up by billionaires and pushed by well-funded institutions and public intellectuals.

But there is a simpler explanation: the ideas of classical liberalism explain the world better than any alternative. Whether the intellectual change is the prime cause of the shift or incidental to it is unknowable. But this much is true: the shift in ideas is both real and necessary for a change in the paradigm.

Still, a classical liberal is not a neoliberal. We need a firmer fix on what this term "neoliberal" means. Is there a founding thinker, book, or meeting?

Liberalism Needed a Champion

The answer is yes. The thinker is the American journalist Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). He is often called the founder of modern American journalism. Also, if any writer/thinker can be called the founding father of neoliberalism, it is he. His life and times roughly overlap with both Mises and Hayek, the twentieth century’s two most prominent proponents of the classical idea of liberalism. Unlike Lippmann, there was nothing particularly “neo” about either of them. 

In fact, Mises himself had already written the definitive book to champion liberalism in the classical form in 1929. But it was published in Austria, in German. Lippman, as a New Yorker, would never have seen it.

Lippmann was not a professor, though he had an elite education and his brilliance was unmistakable. He was one of the most famous public intellectuals of his time, and a paragon of what was called liberalism in the Progressive Era and through the New Deal. As a founding editor of the New Republic, he was a defender of civil liberties, a proponent of peace, and opponent of socialism and fascism. No one would call him a dissident intellectual but he did resist the totalitarian winds of his time.

The Ideological Crisis

In the interwar period, this class of intellectuals had a sincere concern for the preservation of all the gains of liberty in the past, and sought to find a way to protect them in the future. The situation they faced was grim both in the United States and Europe. Two main extremist factions were struggling for control: the communists/socialists and the fascists/Nazis, which, Lippman realised, were two sides of the same authoritarian coin. The New Deal seemed to be borrowing from both while trying to hold on to certain liberal ideals. It was an unstable mix.

Where was the opposition? In Europe, the U.S., and the U.K, there was also a rise of what might be generally called Toryism or conservatism (or, in the American South, agrarianism). This was not a positive program but rather a reactionary or revanchist pose, a longing for the order of days gone by. In Europe, there were waves of nostalgia for the old monarchies and, with it, the desire to roll back the legitimate gains of liberalism in the 19th century. And with this pose comes a series of demands that are absolutely incompatible with modern life and contemporary human aspirations. 

Lippman knew that some form of liberalism had to be the way forward. But not the old liberalism, which he believed had failed (it led to economic depression and social instability, in his view). His goal was a renovated liberalism. He never used the term neoliberalism (that was invented by a colleague), but that is what it came to be called.

The Good Society

Lippmann’s great book – and it truly is a great book and very much worth a read – appeared in 1937: The Good Society. The book celebrated liberalism and thus rejected socialism, fascism, and Toryism. However, it also rejected laissez faire with equal passion, although you have to get pretty deep into the book to discover this. Lippmann had very casually accepted the bulk of the Keynesian criticism of free markets. He tried to thread the needle: opposing statism, loving liberty, but innovating what he regarded as liberal ends through quasi-statist means.

The book made such an impact that it inspired the calling of a hugely important scholarly colloquium held in Paris in August 1938, in the midst of a growing conflict in Europe and the world. Six months later came the German annexation of Austria, and one year before the Nazi invasion of Poland. These were extremely volatile times, and these intellectuals believed they had a responsibility to do something about righting what was going wrong in the world.

The “Walter Lippmann Colloquium” was organized by French liberal philosopher and logical positivist Louis Rougier. It was attended by Lippmann, and included several other leading French intellectuals, including the great monetary theorist Jacques Rueff. Also in attendance Michael Polanyi from the UK, as well as Germans Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow. Most notably Friedrich Hayek came from London, and Ludwig von Mises arrived from Geneva where he was then living in sanctuary after having fled the Nazi invasion of Vienna. 

In short, this was a high-powered group, consisting of the world’s most important liberal intellectuals in the year 1938. It was at this event that Alexander Rüstow coined the term "neoliberalism" to label what they favoured. It was intended to apply only to Lippmann’s vision.

Hayek: neither neoliberal, nor conservative
Again, this was a new way of thinking about liberalism. It was democratic, tolerated a wide degree of regulation, plus welfare states, public education, and public provision of healthcare and infrastructure. But it maintained the core competitive processes of the market economy. The hope was to come up with some stable mix of policies that would lead to rising prosperity and bring about a general public contentment with the social order such that the demand for extremist ideologies like fascism and socialism would be kept at bay. The rising progress and demand for new technologies among the public would similarly outcompete revanchist and conservative sentiments in the political marketplace.

That was the hope in any case. I’m not aware of a report of precisely what took place in this Colloquium but one can imagine that both Mises and Hayek were alternatively pleased and unhappy about being pressed to agree with this view.

Hayek was emerging as the main opponent to John Maynard Keynes, while the other participants had made their peace with Keynes. For his part, Mises held the view that any mixture of state management into the market mix only diminishes the individual’s range of choice, slows economic growth, and introduces distortions that cry out for some political fix at a later date. Neither were believers in the great new Lippmann/Rüstow vision.

The Ur Text

To really understand this vision, let’s take a look at Lippmann’s treatise. It is not shabby. In fact, it is an excellent tutorial in the history of liberty. If only it had stuck with that. Still, the rhetoric is powerful and inspiring. You get a flavour from this passage:

Everywhere the movements which bid for men’s allegiance are hostile to the movements in which men struggled to be free. The programmes of reform are everywhere at odds with the liberal tradition. Men are asked to choose between security and liberty. To improve their fortunes they are told that they must renounced their rights. To escape from want they must enter a prison. To regularise their work they must be regimented. To obtain great equality they must have less freedom. To have national solidarity they must oppress the dissenters. To enhance their dignity they must lick the boots of tyrants. To realize the promise of science they must destroy free inquiry. To promote the truth they must not let it be examined. The choices are intolerable. 

Absolutely wonderful! And for the most part, the book continues in this lovely spirit, enough to feed the soul of the most radical libertarian. You have to get pretty far into the book to discover the “neo” part of neoliberalism. He believed that “liberalism must seek to change laws and greatly to modify property and contract” in a way that rejects laissez faire, a term and a system he completely counterposes to his own.

Neoliberalism includes public provision of education, health care, environmental protection, financial regulation, fiscal policy management, monetary control, and more. In fact, “the purpose of liberal reform is to accommodate the social order to the new economy; that end can be achieved only by continual and far-reaching reform of the social order.”

What Lippmann wanted was a new constitution for a “free state.” What he was rejecting was a state that is neutral to social outcomes – the “nightwatchman state” that the old liberals believed in.

Whereas the original liberals wanted law to be stable and general, pursuing only the most limited functions, the neoliberal vision is of a state that is an active part of the guarding, maintaining, and promoting liberty itself, as understood by a particular vision of what should be. It asserted that liberalism is so important that it must be the primary goal of the state to see it realised. 

In practice, there are no limits to how far this can go.

As an example of a state neutral to outcomes, consider the US Constitution. It is a framework for government and law. It specifies what various branches can do and why, and spells out what they cannot do and why. It contains no great aspiration for how society should look (well, perhaps the “general welfare” clause might apply) but mostly sticks to creating a framework and letting the people take it from there.

Neoliberalism instead wants a living state that is not only adaptive but even aspirational. It should take an active role in the lives of people with the expressed purpose of helping them live freer, flourishing, more fulfilling lives. The state must never lord it over the population but rather be the people’s partner in building prosperity and living out the promise of liberalism.

Where Lippmann Goes Wrong

All of this is interesting, but mostly fantasy. In his many chapters on the liberal state, Lippmann lays out all the ways in which his vision of an expansive state does not trend authoritarian. The official and the citizen are just people and there are no royal prerogatives. Bureaucracies aren’t issuing commands such much as behaving like publicly held corporations, always responsive to the public. There are all kind of intermediate institutions between the individual and the state. The public sector is humane, hospitable, adaptive, creative, and why? Because their power comes from the people, not the dictator or king.

All of this is interesting, but it is mostly fantasy.

Lippman, writing in 1938, was blind to important developments that took place in liberal theory, mostly in response to his vision.

The first is that crucial Hayekian point concerning epistemic humility. Lippmann writes as if he knows for sure how to achieve and judge social results that accord with his vision. It is a normal presumption of most intellectuals. Hayek’s innovation was to see that the knowledge necessary for the right ordering society is not accessible in whole to intellectuals and much less to presidents, legislators, or bureaucrats. It is deeply embedded in social processes themselves, and, in turn, in the minds of individuals making the choices that constitute the driving parts of that process.

The second point completely overlooked by Lippmann is that the players within the state itself have their own interests and designs, just as market actors do. They pursue their own interests. They seek to maximise their welfare. They look for more power, more funding, more prerogatives, and those they serve are the interest groups who can bring them more of it.

The idea that a public bureaucracy can be consistently much less permanently directly toward serving the genuine public interest is lacking in evidence. In other words, Lippman was blind to how the truths that would later be associated with the Public Choice school of economics might impact his vision of liberty.

A third problem is the one Mises identified: neoliberalism chooses the wrong means to realise its ends. Legislating higher wages does not actually raise wages; it throws people out of work. Regulating to protect the environment doesn’t end in doing so; it only devalues property which leaves it to be ravaged by irresponsible stewards. Instituting single-payer health care guts the sector of its signaling systems, its incentives for innovation, and its capacity to be rolled out to ever broader sectors of the population. And because intervention doesn’t achieve its stated ends, it becomes the pretext for ever more meddling in the market process.

These problems doom his system to be as much a fantasy as the authoritarian ideologies he opposed.

The Dangers of Neoliberalism

It was in response to Lippmann that both Hayek and Mises crafted many of their arguments over the coming years. Mises never stopped pointing out that laissez faire does not mean “let soulless forces operate,” as Lippmann seems to suggest. It means letting individuals make the choice over what kinds of lives they want to live, and let those choices drive forward the path of social evolution. Mises’s book Human Action was as much a response to Lippmann as it was to Keynes, Marx, and all the other anti-liberals.

Let’s just posit that we have a state that is determined to advance the cause of liberty – not a state neutral to outcomes but one directed at a certain end. Where will this lead us? It could lead to another form of top-down planning. It can result in practices such as social insurance schemes, heavy regulation in zoning and the environment, taxes and redistribution with the aim of bringing more effective liberty to ever more people. In an imperial state, it can lead to the imposition of planning on foreign nations: the IMF, the World Bank, the so-called Washington Consensus, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

It can be the excuse for wars for “spreading democracy” and nation building abroad.

You can say that all these policies are well intentioned. In fact, neoliberalism is the very embodiment of good intentions: we shall free all people! In the best case, neoliberalism gives us a post-war German economic miracle. But it could just easily land in Pinochet’s Chile, often cited as a neoliberal state. In foreign policy, neoliberalism can inspire beautiful reform (Japan after the war), or create a destructive terror state that seethes in resentment (see Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan).

All of which is to say: the neoliberal can quickly become the anti-liberal state. There is no institutional reason why it would not be so. A state with a social mandate is a roaming beast: you might hope for it not to do bad things but you wouldn’t want to be alone with it in a dark alley.

To be sure, the world owes a debt to neoliberalism. It was this formulation that inspired many countries to liberalise their economies, and even been a reason for many of the loosening of controls in the United States. It led to the reforms in Latin America, China, and even Eastern Europe after the collapse of socialism. Neoliberal ideology is partially responsible for the liberation of billions of people from suffering, poverty, and tyranny.

The downside is also present: the continuation of colonialism by other means, the spread of global bureaucracy, the entrenchment of the welfare state, and the rise of deep-state control over culture, society, and the economy. It is also not politically stable. These institutions feed public resentment and fuel populist extremism, which is the very opposite of what Lippmann wanted. 

At the same time, genuine liberals (often called libertarians today) absolutely need to understand: we are not neoliberals. The great part about neoliberalism is the noun not the modifier. Its primary value is not in what it innovated but what it recaptured. To the extent that it diverges from the beautiful system of liberty itself, it can be the source of the opposite.

Neoliberalism Today

That the term is strewn throughout viral videos and public discourse today is a tribute to the power of an idea. This little seed planted in 1938 has grown into a massive global presence, mostly embodied in international bodies, public bureaucracies, political establishments, media voices, and pretexts for every manner of foreign, domestic, and global action. 

And what has been the result? Some good but a vast amount of highly conspicuous bad. Huge public sectors have held back economic growth. Large bureaucracies have compromised human freedom. It gave life to what is called "crony capitalism" today. Global control has bred nationalist blowback, while corporate monopoly has fed socialist longings.

We are again faced with the same problem today that confronted Lippmann in 1938. Everywhere there are ideologies that seek to put men in chains. We do need an alternative to socialism, fascism, and Toryism. We need to get it right this time. Let’s take the neo out of liberalism and accept nothing less than the real thing.

Freedom is not the correct implementation of a public policy plan. It is not the condition of appointing high-minded and intelligent social and economic managers. It is not the result of sound intentions from a fleet of ruling class intellectuals and major economic stakeholders.

Freedom exists when a people, an economy, and a culture, undirected and unmolested by administrative elites with power, are permitted to live and evolve in peace according to the principle of human choice in all areas of life.

* * * * * 

Jeffrey Tucker is the founder and president of the Brownstone Institute, organiser of the Great Barrington Declaration, and a former Director of Content for the Foundation for Economic Education, where his post first appeared. 

Wednesday, 22 October 2025

Pay no attention to the (mad) men behind the curtain [updated]


Readers here might remember I got some stick for calling John Key a fucking moron a while back. A fucking moron, specifically, for repeated calls for the Reserve Bank to juice up house prices again, just so home-owning voters will feel better again. Feel better again, and then vote National.

"The guts of what’s wrong," explained the moron, "is that the housing market is going down, not up" — and "then you have a negative wealth effect," and voters feel bad. And when they feel bad, they vote for the other team.

Classic short-termism.  Stuff rocket fuel into the economy, and then all things will be jake for the governing political parties. This, by the way, was Key's "one simple trick" while Prime Minister: ensure massive house-price inflation, no matter the economic and social dislocation, and then sit back and watch home-owners fooled into feeling better off, and borrowing and consuming more, regardless of the economic consequences. (Consequences for which we're all still paying, by the way.)

In the US, the discredited "wealth effect" — "a gussied-up version of Keynesian stimulus, only targeted at the prosperous classes rather than the government’s client classes" — is generally felt in the stock market. Pundits there are starting to get nervous about a soaring stock market with anaemic growth in the economic system itself, with "important implications for the path of America’s stockmarket boom and its economy."
The good times could continue, at least for a bit longer [says 'The Economist']. ... [But] might a wealthier society also take a harder fall? Bears would point to the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000, when a brutal stockmarket slump pushed America into recession. ... The stockmarket might be more of the economy. It still is not all of it.
It's not. And nor is the housing market. We can't get rich just by selling each other houses. (And kudos to one National minister at least who understands that.)

Yet David Stockman is concerned that nothing has been learned from the last major crash
Roughly 15 years ago it was reasonably well understood that the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 had been case of speculation run amuck on both Wall Street and main street alike. These credit and housing bubbles, in turn, had been fuelled by the massive money-printing sprees of the Greenspan and Bernanke Fed.

It might have been presumed, therefore, that the mad money-printers [at the US central bank] would have had second thoughts about the underlying cause of these great economic disasters—that is, the dubious Greenspan policy known as the “wealth effects” doctrine. In simple terms the latter held that if people felt richer owing to soaring home prices and their stock market winnings, they would spend more freely and fulsomely, thereby goosing the Keynesian cycle of ever more spending-sales-production-income-and spending, which was to be rinsed and repeated in an endless round of rising prosperity.

At the end of the day, of course, Greenspan and his heirs and assigns at the Fed turned out to be unreconstructed Keynesians and the wealth effects doctrine a monumental economic con job. The latter did not make society richer; it just made the rich richer. Or stated more directly, main street got inflation at the grocery store, gas pump and doctor’s office—even as the asset-holding class experienced unspeakable windfalls in their brokerage accounts.
Let's not repeat the same mistake again here — especially when local interest rates are already below our trading partners, with no noticeable effect on genuine economic progress. Please: pay no attention to the mad men behind the curtain.

UPDATE:
"The advocates of annual increases in the quantity of money never mention the fact that for all those who do not get a share of the newly created additional quantity of money, the government's action means a drop in their purchasing power which forces them to restrict their consumption. It is ignorance of this fundamental fact that induces various authors of economic books and articles to suggest a yearly increase of money without realising that such a measure necessarily brings about an undesirable impoverishment of a great part, even the majority, of the population."
~ Ludwig von Mises from an interview 'On Current Monetary Problems'

Wednesday, 21 August 2024

Did Javier Milei Just Lift Argentina Out of Recession?


When libertarian economist Javier Milei was elected as Argentine president to fix the results of decades of mismanagement, he proposed a series of economic reforms dubbed by his critics as “shock therapy" – including slashing government spending, cutting bureaucracy, and devaluing the peso.

Critics warned these measures would be disastrous, and many took it for granted that the remedies would deepen Argentina’s recession. But as Jon Miltimore explains in this guest post, a year on and it's becoming clear that the reverse has happened ...


Did Javier Milei Just Lift Argentina Out of Recession? 

by Jon Miltimore

During his first year as president, Javier Milei has been waging a bitter but largely successful campaign against inflation.

Now, Argentines received more welcome news: their economy is growing again.

“Economic activity rose 1.3 percent from April, above the 0.1 percent median estimate from analysts in a Bloomberg survey and the first month of growth since Milei’s term began in December,” Bloomberg reported on July 18. “From a year ago, the proxy for gross domestic product grew 2.3 percent.”

The positive economic report, based on data from the Argentine government, is a surprise to many.

The 2.3 percent year-over-year increase defied expectations of a decline of similar magnitude, Bloomberg reported. As Semafor notes, the Argentine economy was projected to have the least economic growth of any country in the world in 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund.

A ‘Wrecking Ball’?


Argentine economists I spoke to said that the numbers are encouraging, but the country’s economy is far from being out of the woods.

As most people know, Milei inherited an economic mess decades in the making. When the self-described anarcho-capitalist assumed office in December, Argentina was suffering from the third highest inflation rate in the world—211 percent year over year. The poverty rate was north of 40 percent, and Argentina’s economy was declining.

With his country’s economy in a full tailspin from decades of Peronism, Milei proposed a series of economic reforms dubbed “shock therapy” that consisted primarily of three components: slashing government spending, cutting bureaucracy, and devaluing the peso.

Critics warned that these measures would be disastrous, and many took it for granted that the remedies would deepen Argentina’s recession.

The former head of the International Monetary Fund’s Western Hemisphere Department, Alejandro Werner, said Milei’s strategy could tame inflation, but at great cost.

“A deep recession will also take place,” Werner wrote, “as the fiscal consolidation kicks in and as the decline in household income depresses consumption and uncertainty weighs on investment.”

Felix Salmon, the chief financial correspondent at Axios, concurred, comparing Milei’s policies to “a wrecking ball.”

“Milei’s budget cuts will cause a plunge in household income, as well as a deep recession,” wrote Salmon.

Despite these warnings, Milei delivered his “shock therapy” plan in the first few months of his presidency. Tens of thousands of state workers were cut as were more than half of government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture, as well as the Ministries of Labor, Social Development, Health, and Education (which Milei dubbed “the Ministry of Indoctrination”). Numerous government subsidies were eliminated, and the value of the peso was cut in half.

Even before Milei’s policies were given a chance to succeed, many continued to attack them.

“Shock therapy is pushing more people into poverty,” journalist Lautaro Grinspan wrote in Foreign Policy in early March. “Food prices have risen by roughly 50 percent, according to official government data.”

Yet the official government data Grinspan cited was a report from December 2023, before Milei had even assumed the presidency.

Contrary to the dire predictions, the results of Milei’s policies have been better than even many of his supporters had dared hope.

During the first half of 2024, inflation cooled for five straight months in Argentina, the Associated Press reported in July. Though consumer prices were up 4.6 percent in June from the previous month, that’s down from a 25 percent month-over-month increase in December, when monthly inflation peaked in Argentina. Meanwhile, in February the government saw its first budget surplus in more than a decade. And just days ago, an economic report was published showing a massive decline in poverty in Argentina.

Many doubted that these successes were possible, and the conventional wisdom said that wringing inflation out of the economy and slashing government spending could only be achieved at great cost: a deepening recession.

Escaping Recession?


The data suggest that, contrary to what so many people predicted, Argentina may not be slipping deeper into recession following Milei’s shock therapy. Instead, its economy is healing.

“Argentina is officially out of recession after 7 months of Javier Milei’s economic reforms,” Daniel Di Martino, a University of Columbia student pursuing his PhD, tweeted. “Remember, the economy was in recession since mid-2023, half a year before he got into office.”

Others, however, warn that it’s premature to say that Argentina is out of its recession.

“I will be careful of claiming ‘out of the recession,’” Nicolás Cachanosky, a native of Argentina and Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at El Paso, told me. “Maybe the Argentine economy is getting out of a recession. Maybe not. All I’m saying is that it is too early to confirm, given these numbers.”

Cachanosky notes that interannual figures can be misleading, and that the data in question are relative values and not technically growth rates. While it’s still unclear where Argentina’s economy will go from here, it bears exploring why so many people, including many economists, doubted that its economy could be growing again already. There are two primary reasons, one of which is legitimate.

The first reason is a legitimate concern that sharp reductions in government spending will likely result in short term pain, even though it’s a necessary step toward economic healing.

“The government spends a bunch of money and keeps people employed,” one economist I spoke with told me. “When that slows down, you’re going to be able to measure the impact of that.”

This is why some free-market economists I spoke with expressed doubts that Argentina had already escaped recession. Cutting tens of thousands of jobs, even unproductive ones, and slashing hundreds of millions in subsidies is bound to have an impact on economic activity. Long term that impact will be positive because it will result in a more efficient allocation of resources, but it’s not unreasonable to assume it will first result in economic pain.

A second reason is a poor understanding of economics.

In the Keynesian school of economics, it’s taken as gospel that government spending fuels economic growth. This is why you’ll find so many Keynesians who argue that even destructive phenomena like war and hurricanes are actually good for the economy, because they stimulate government spending.

This was the argument economist Paul Krugman made several years ago when he said that an alien invasion, real or fake, would be good for the economy, since it would mobilise a massive amount of military spending, similar to World War II.

The idea is simple: government spending is good even if it’s producing goods that are unnecessary, such as weapons created for an alien invasion that is not even real.

The idea that Argentina would be slashing government spending during a recession runs counter to Keynesian orthodoxy, which teaches that recessions are precisely when “fiscal stimulus” is needed the most, since negative economic conditions often result in a predictable market failure: a decline in spending.

Broken Windows and Economic Growth


In other words, Argentina is flipping the macroeconomic script. In a world in which government spending hikes are deemed “a perfect solution in battling recessions,” Milei is providing the opposite: he’s slashing government outlays.

Yet a Mercatus Center study conducted by Tony Caporale and Marc Poitras, titled “The Trouble with Keynesian Stimulus Spending,” points out the obvious problem with such stimulus schemes:
[The Keynesian] approach fails to account for several significant sources of cost. Besides the cost of waste inherent in government spending, financing the spending requires taxation, which entails an excess burden, the reduction in output resulting from workers’ reduced incentive to work. Furthermore, the employment of even previously idle resources involves lost opportunities to invest in alternative uses of these resources.
Caporale and Poitras are talking about an elementary economic concept: opportunity costs. These costs refer to what one foregoes or gives up to purchase a good or service, an idea the economist Frédéric Bastiat explored in his famous “broken window” parable. Economist Jonathan Newman offers a tidy summary of the story, which appeared in Bastiat’s 1850 essay 'That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen.'
It goes like this: a boy throws a brick at a baker’s window and a crowd gathers to discuss the economic consequences. They console the baker by pointing out that glass-repair companies need business, too, so it isn’t all bad news. After further reflection, they conclude that total employment and spending in the community has increased because of the broken window, and that this little spark of spending by the baker to repair the window sets off a chain reaction of spending. Now the glazier has extra cash to spend on various items, and the people who sold him those things now have extra income, and so on.

The crowd draws the conclusion that destruction is beneficial for the economy because it stimulates spending and employment.
Does this sound absurd and too good to be true? Well, it is. Bastiat’s parable revealed the absurdity of Keynesian economics before Keynesian economics existed.

Bastiat was challenging readers to see the unseen. Economists shouldn’t focus solely on the glazier’s profits that resulted from the rock thrown at the baker’s window, any more than they should focus solely on the jobs created by military spending. They must also focus on the costs of these actions, too.

This is the flaw that has long plagued Keynesians, and it helps explain why so many took it as gospel that slashing government spending in Argentina would deepen its recession.

When it came to Milei’s reforms, critics and prognosticators were focusing on the seen: tens of thousands of lost jobs, and billions in reduced spending. On one hand, this is perfectly rational. These cuts will come with easily measurable costs, and are likely to reduce economic activity in the short term. On the other hand, whether they are seen immediately or not, there are countless opportunities created by Milei’s reforms, which are dismantling the least productive parts of Argentina’s economy: its bureaucracy.

Whether Argentina’s burst in economic activity in May was a blip or the beginning of a long-term trend of economic recovery is something only time will tell. (Data indicate there was a sharp increase in agricultural production, which could be explained by favourable seasonal conditions or some other factor.)

It’s certainly possible that, after decades of economic pain from Peronism and mass money-printing, Argentina has more work to do before its economic recovery arrives. Yet Adam Smith once noted that the formula for prosperity is surprisingly simple, and it doesn’t contain government “stimulus”: just “peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.”

Milei knows this, fortunately. And he is showing no signs of relenting in his campaign to crush inflation and government spending to return Argentina to prosperity.

“What [is] the alternative?” he told the BBC. “To continue to print money like the previous administration that generates inflation and ends up affecting the most vulnerable?”

* * * * 


Jonathan Miltimore is the Managing Editor of FEE.org and a Senior Writer at AIER. His writing/reporting has been the subject of articles in TIME magazine, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, Forbes, Fox News, and the Star Tribune.
His article first appeared at the FEE blog.

Tuesday, 23 April 2024

#CountdownToAnzacDay: On “the last afterglow of the most radiant cultural atmosphere in human history”

 

One-hundred and ten years ago this week, the world was still at peace.

By August of that year, 1914, the world was at war. And in less than a year, New Zealanders would be fighting, and dying, on  the hills above a beach in Turkey.

That world before the war, the one the war destroyed forever, is captured in palimpsest in the video above of Berlin and Munich in 1900, and in several memories from some who were alive at the time — who were there to witness and record, as one described it, "the last afterglow of the most radiant cultural atmosphere in human history…" — and then to record what came next. 

"I myself have lived at the time of the two greatest wars known to mankind," remembered Stefan Zweig, "Before those wars I saw individual freedom at its zenith, after them I saw liberty at its lowest point in hundreds of years." * 

"Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country for ever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit. He could buy goods from any country in the world on the same terms as he bought goods at home. 
    "For that matter, a foreigner could spend his life in this country without permit and without informing the police. Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service. An Englishman could enlist, if he chose, in the regular army, the navy, or the territorials. He could also ignore, if he chose, the demands of national defence. Substantial householders were occasionally called on for jury service. Otherwise, only those helped the state, who wished to do so. 
    "The Englishman paid taxes on a modest scale: nearly £200 million in 1913-14, or rather less than 8 per cent. of the national income. The state intervened to prevent the citizen from eating adulterated food or contracting certain infectious diseases. It imposed safety rules in factories, and prevented women, and adult males in some industries, from working excessive hours. The state saw to it that children received education up to the age of 13. Since 1 January 1909, it provided a meagre pension for the needy over the age of 70. Since 1911, it helped to insure certain classes of workers against sickness and unemployment. This tendency towards more state action was increasing. Expenditure on the social services had roughly doubled since the Liberals took office in 1905. Still, broadly speaking, the state acted only to help those who could not help themselves. It left the adult citizen alone.
    "All this was changed by the impact of the Great War. The mass of the people became, for the first time, active citizens. Their lives were shaped by orders from above; they were required to serve the state instead of pursuing exclusively their own affairs. Five million men entered the armed forces, many of them (though a minority) under compulsion. The Englishman's food was limited, and its quality changed, by government order. His freedom of movement was restricted; his conditions of work prescribed. Some industries were reduced or closed, others artificially fostered. The publication of news was fettered. Street lights were dimmed. The sacred freedom of drinking was tampered with: licensed hours were cut down, and the beer watered by order. The very time on the clocks was changed. From 1916 onwards, every Englishman got up an hour earlier in summer than he would otherwise have done, thanks to an act of parliament. The state established a hold over it citizens which, though relaxed in peacetime, was never to be removed and which the second World war was again to increase. The history of the English state and of the English people merged for the first time.
~ A. J. P. Taylor, on 'The Effects and Origins of the Great War,' from his 1965 book English History, 1914-1945
"What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914!
    "The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages.
    "The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. 
    "He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighbouring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. 
    "But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalisation of which was nearly complete in practice."
~ J.M Keynes, from his 1919 book The Economic Consequences of the Peace
"As a child, I saw a glimpse of the pre-World War One world, the last afterglow of the most radiant cultural atmosphere in human history … If one has glimpsed that kind of art—& wider: the possibility of that kind of culture—one is unable to be satisfied with anything less. 
    "I must emphasise that I am not speaking of concretes, nor of politics, nor of journalistic trivia, but of that period's 'sense of life.' Its art projected an overwhelming sense of intellectual freedom, of depth, i.e., concern with fundamental problems, of demanding standards, of inexhaustible originality, of unlimited possibilities &, above all, of profound respect for man. The existential atmosphere (which was then being destroyed by Europe's philosophical trends & political systems) still held a benevolence that would be incredible to the men of today, i.e., a smiling, confident good will of man to man, & of man to life. … 
    "It has been said and written by many commentators that the atmosphere of the Western world before World War I is incommunicable to those who have not lived in that period…It is [certainly] impossible for the young people of today to grasp the reality of man's higher potential & what scale of achievement it had reached in a rational (or semi-rational) culture. But I have seen it. I know that it was real, that it existed, that it is possible. It is that knowledge that I want to hold up to the sight of men—over the brief span of less than a century—before the barbarian curtain descends altogether (if it does) & the last memory of man's greatness vanishes in another Dark Ages."
~ Ayn Rand, from her introduction to her 1969 essay collection The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature

* From Stefan Zweig’s 1942 autobiography, which is also a biography of the collapse of Europe into barbarism, The World of Yesterday

Friday, 20 October 2023

Real Economic Growth Depends on Savings


Pic: Mises Wire

A reminder for everyone, as you all wait patiently for economic miracles from a new government, that while Keynesians claim that the source of economic growth is consumer (and government) spending, so-called Austrian economists such as our guest poster Frank Shostak know that the key to a growing economy is net savings . . .

Real Economic Growth Depends on Savings

by Frank Shostak

New Zealand's consumer confidence index is slowly climbing off the floor from its March low, but only weakly. Meanwhile in the US, their consumer sentiment index fell to 69.5 in August from 71.6 in July. 

What does this portend? A weakening consumer sentiment index is seen as indicating a potential downturn in consumer spending and -- to many economists -- of the economy in general.

Why is this? It's because most mainstream economic commentators agree with each other (and with their mentor, John Maynard Keynes) that the key to economic prosperity is individual consumption rather than saving. Saving, they believe, hinders economic growth because it coincides with weakening demand for consumer goods. In this theory, economic activity is depicted as a circular flow of money in which one individual’s spending is part of the earnings of another.

If, however, individuals become less confident about the future, they are likely to cut back on their outlays and "hoard" more money, thereby diminishing the earnings of some other individual, who in turn also spends less. A vicious circle emerges: the decline in confidence leads to less spending and more hoarding, further weakening the economy and eroding confidence in it.

To arrest the downward spiral, according to this theory, the central bank must increase the supply of money. By putting more money in people’s hands, confidence and spending will increase, and the circular flow of money will pick up again.

All this sounds very convincing, and, indeed, business surveys show that a lack of individual demand is the major factor behind poor performance during recessions. But can demand by itself generate economic growth? What about the supply of goods? Are goods always around, just waiting for demand? Is it even possible for demand itself to be scarce?

Scarcity of Means Thwarts Demand


In the real world, demand is not just desire -- it is desire backed up by wherewithal. It is necessary to produce useful goods that can be exchanged for other useful goods. Bakers who produce bread don’t produce everything for their own consumption, but exchange most of it for the goods of other producers. Through the production of bread, bakers exercise demand for other goods. According to David Ricardo:
No man produces but with a view to consume or sell, and he never sells but with an intention to purchase some other commodity, which may be immediately useful to him, or which may contribute to future production. By producing, then, he necessarily becomes either the consumer of his own goods, or the purchaser and consumer of the goods of some other person.
Tools and machinery (i.e., capital goods) raise worker productivity: they must be made, and they increase growth in the production of consumer goods.

Consumer goods must be available to those who produce capital goods, in order to sustain their life and well-being during production. This allocation of consumer goods is made possible by saving—that is, a decision by some individuals to transfer a portion of their consumer goods now, in return for a greater quantity in the future, to those who are producing capital goods now. Despite what the Keynesians assert, it is saving that enables the production of capital goods. and thereby raises individual living standards. It is  saving, therefore, that is the beating heart of economic growth.

Money and Saving—What Is the Relationship?


Money does not alter the essence of saving but does make it easier for producers to exchange their products with one another. It does not produce goods but only facilitates their exchange. According to Rothbard,
Money, per se, cannot be consumed and cannot be used directly as a producers’ good in the productive process. Money per se is therefore unproductive; it is dead stock and produces nothing.
In a money economy, payments for goods are still made with other goods—money only facilitates the payment. Thus, a baker exchanges saved bread for money and then exchanges the money for other goods, effectively paying with the saved bread. When a baker exchanges with a shoemaker saved bread for money, the shoemaker receives sustenance to continue making shoes.

Saving makes economic activity possible by means of money. We do not save money itself but employ it to channel the unconsumed consumer goods we have saved toward individuals engaged in production. An individual who hoards money is not saving money per se but rather exercising a demand for it, which is never the bad news that popular thinking believes it to be. Saving does not weaken but rather strengthens economic growth.

Money out of Thin Air and Economic Growth


When money is generated out of thin air however it sets in motion an exchange of nothing for money, followed by money for something—that is, an exchange of nothing for something. This leads to consumption not supported by production, i.e., a diversion of saved consumer goods—which are the products of wealth-generating activities—toward those who hold money made from nothing. Diminishing the flow of saved consumer goods toward producers of wealth weakens the production of goods and in turn the demand for goods, setting in motion an economic recession.

What weakens the demand for goods is not the capricious behavior of consumers but an increase in the money supply out of thin air. As long as the pool of consumer goods is expanding, the central bank and government officials can give the impression that loose monetary and fiscal policies are driving the economy. This illusion, however, is shattered once the pool becomes stagnant or declines. Without expanding the production of consumer goods, all other things being equal, economic growth is not possible.

Conclusion


Most people aspire to a good and comfortable life. Standing in the way of this goal are the means that must be produced to achieve it. Saving permits the expansion of these means. The increase in saving, which supports the increase in the production of goods, also generates an increase in demand for goods. Any illusion that demand can somehow be strengthened through the monetary presses is sooner or later shattered by the impossibility of getting something for nothing.

* * * * 

Frank Shostak's consulting firm, Applied Austrian School Economics, provides in-depth assessments of financial markets and global economies. Contact: email.
His post first appeared at the Mises Wire.


Saturday, 22 July 2023

INFLATION: If we misuse the term to mean rising prices then we misunderstand its cause




"Inflation is an increase in the quantity of money and credit. Its chief consequence is soaring prices. Therefore inflation—if we misuse the term to mean the rising prices themselves—is caused solely by printing more money. For this the government’s monetary policies are entirely responsible. (emphasis added)
        ~ Henry Hazlitt, from his essay 'Inflation in One Page'

"Before World War II, when the terms 'inflation' and 'deflation' were used in academic discourse or everyday speech, they generally meant an increase or a decrease in the stock of money, respectively. A general rise in prices was viewed as one of several consequences of inflation of the money supply; likewise, a decline in overall prices was viewed as one consequence of deflation of the money supply. Under the influence of the Keynesian Revolution of the mid-1930s, however, the meanings of these terms began to change radically. By the 1950s, the definition of inflation as a general rise in prices and of deflation as a general fall in prices became firmly entrenched in academic writings and popular speech. (emphasis added)
        ~ Joseph Salerno, from his book Money: Sound and Unsound (p.297)

Hat tip Joshua Mawhorter, from his article 'Taking Back the Meaning of Inflation'

Thursday, 13 July 2023

Says Law explains why we don't need a recession to kill price inflation


Image Source: Unsplash


We need to engineer a good recession, say central bankers, to kill the inflation engineered by those same central bankers. But as Alasdair Macleod explains in this guest post, policy makers who believe a recession will kill price inflation, and therefore allow central banks to reduce interest rates, are simply wrong. This is simply mad macroeconomic dogma.

Updating Say’s Law For Modern Times

by Alasdair Macleod

It was Keynes’ offhand dismissal of Say’s law, or the Law of the Markets, in 1936 which is leading us into an economic and monetary crisis.

It was dismissed by him to invent a role for the state.

That is why Keynes is so popular in the mainstream establishment. By dismissing market reality, he invented a whole new branch of economics. Macroeconomics exchanged statistics and mathematics for human action, the prospect of centralised management substituted for ambiguity.

In this article I look at the flaws in macroeconomics, the state theory of money (an old recurring theme from John Law onwards), misleading statistics measured in unhinged fiat currencies, and why Keynesian fears of a general glut are misplaced — all of which stem from the error of dismissing Say’s law.

Importantly, Say’s law ties the volume of production to demand, so policy makers who believe a recession will kill price inflation, and therefore allow central banks to reduce interest rates, are simply wrong.

The state-educated mainstream is so sold on macroeconomic theories and the state management of economic outcomes that reasoned debate gets no traction. The only solution is for a final economic and monetary crisis to bring an end to all macroeconomic dogmas.

The origin of macroeconomics


Jean-Baptiste Say wrote his ground-breaking book on economics in 1803, revising subsequent editions. His Traité D’économie Politique, as it is known in French in short form, described the division of labour and the role of money as the agent for turning specialised production into general consumption. It became known as Say’s law or the law of the markets, and was the first commandment of classical economics, until Keynes persuaded us otherwise in his General Theory published in 1936.

Keynes denial of Say’s law was in the spirit of Humpty Dumpty — ″’When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.” He rewrote economic definitions to suit his thesis. Humpty Keynes redefined economics to exclude the inconvenient reality of Say’s law, along with many others that logically followed from it. It was necessary for Keynes to deny it in order to ease in a role for the state, allowing governments to intervene in the relationship between production and consumption. 

The invention of macroeconomics, which played down the unpredictable human element expressed in markets, in favour of statistics and mathematical analysis, can be traced to Chapter 3 in his General Theory, where he wrote:
“If, however, this is not the true law relating the aggregate demand and supply functions, there is a vitally important chapter of economic theory which remains to be written and without which all discussions concerning the volume of aggregate employment are futile.”
Say’s law was summarily dismissed, hardly mentioned again in his seminal work. The whole basis of Keynes’s new macroeconomics, that vitally important chapter of economic theory which remains to be written, boils down to that one little word, “If” heading the quote above. “If” is a supposition and certainly not evidence leading to the discovery of an entirely new branch of economic science. It was a simple trick, dismissing the inconvenient truth early in his thesis so that he could proceed to construct a fantasy. 

Keynes should have been dismissed as a quack, like John Law who propounded similar theories and ruined France in 1720. And like Georg Knapp, a German economist of the Historical school, who published his state theory of money in 1905, arguably encouraging the Kaiser’s government to build up armaments before the First World War at no visible cost to the people, and to continue to finance itself by inflationary means after Germany’s defeat.

Yet with Keynes’s little “if”, here we are nearly ninety years later still travelling along his intellectual rails full tilt into the buffers of economic destruction. The reasons why Law, Knapp, and now Keynes and their theories rose from obscurity to fame are that their theories appeal to governments, seemingly conferring on them an economic role, enhancing their control over their citizens, and therefore the justification for increased power and revenues. The last thing they will consider is that these theories are flawed, until the evidence of a final crisis forces them to face up to their fallacies.

Despite Keynes’s intellectual fraud, the division of labour and the role of money cannot be denied. But the world has moved on from the simpler world of J.B. Say. At the time of the French Revolution when he was observing the economic activities of people, tradesmen probably refused to take credit for payment, accepting only gold and silver coin because paper assignats followed by mandats territoriaux were successively descending into worthlessness.

The more things change...


Plus ça change, plus c’est le même chose! Today, under neo-Keynesian policies directed by the state, it is only forms of credit that intermediate between our production and consumption, and coins are only tokens. Over two centuries ago in rural France, consumption for most was more a question of survival than access to the luxuries we are familiar with today and reckon to be our right. Production was basically local, whereas today it is global. And we now have factories, when few existed in the predominantly agricultural economies of Say’s time because the industrial revolution in France had barely started.

Yet, despite all these differences Say’s central proposition still holds -- Say's Law, the Law of Markets, still links production to consumption; and it still rules out a general glut of goods due to a collapse in consumption. It still holds -- and as long as reality is what it is, it always will. No employment: no demand. No demand: no employment.

However, rehabilitating Say’s Law into modern economics must take account of today’s economic and monetary conditions. Neo-Keynesians ignore the consequences of credit’s loss of purchasing power in their static models. This may confuse the issue for them, but Say’s law still holds whether transactions are in money or credit. (Here, we are defining legal money as a medium of exchange without counterparty risk — gold and gold coin.) Now that we have only fiat currencies whose values in terms of goods are continually deteriorating, statistical evidence is worthless — despite macroeconomists treating long runs of price and related data as if the purchasing power of a fiat currency is constant over time. I have more to say on this below.

In the days of sound money and the credit which took its value from it, we could see the consequences of economic progress and regression on both individual prices and also their general level. Today, we labour under the delusion that what we knew to be true under sound money still applies to unsound fiat currencies and their dependent credit. In all our statistical comparisons we therefore believe that all price changes still come from the values of goods and services. And by dismissing Say’s law, we dismiss the certainty that the purchasing power of unanchored credit will continue to decline even in a recession. So, what are the true consequences of a deteriorating economic condition for prices in a modern economy?

It is far from a simple matter, but as a starting point we can sensibly argue three points. 
  • First, just as Keynes dismissed Say’s Law in order to create an economic role for the state, its rehabilitation must reject his supposition entirely and everything that flowed from this error. 
  • Second, that with the dismissal of the state from economic functions, macroeconomic statistics-gathering can only have restricted validity, and economic modelling must be dismissed entirely. 
  • And third, in economic conditions leading to unemployment not only does consumption decline but production will as well because the unemployed are no longer producing. In other words, there is no such thing as a Malthusian glut, and the hope in some quarters that price inflation will diminish in a recession as demand contracts will be disappointed.
The rest of this article looks at the major issues arising from the Keynesian dismissal of Say’s Law — the law of the markets.

The errors in modern socialism


Perhaps the starkest example of the difference today between a state-controlled economy and a relatively free capitalist one is found in the contrast between the two Koreas. In the North, they are starving. In the south, people of the same ethnicity are prospering. This is not just a fluke. In the late 1940s, China was descending into communism and abject poverty while Hong Kong rose from the ashes of Japanese occupation and the collapse of the military yen into capitalist prosperity with no natural resources of its own. Concurrently with China and Hong Kong, East and West Germany exhibited the same phenomenon until freedom of movement between the two returned.

The empirical evidence of these failures and success are put down to communist extremism by historians and today’s politicians in the western alliance, and they say are different from democratic socialism. But apologists for state intervention and control can argue as much as they like that communism is different from democratic socialism, but they cannot explain away the fact that communism is simply socialism in extremis sharing the same basic flaws as socialising democracy.

Understanding why this is the case is hampered by the superficial attraction of organisational planning applied to spontaneous markets. The former appeals to a surface form of logic, while the latter lacks a ready explanation. This riddle was laid bare by the great economist of the Austrian school, Ludwig von Mises in his 1922 book Socialism: An economic and sociological analysis. The essence of the argument was contained in a further essay, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, written in 1920 and a hot topic for decades thereafter. 

In that essay, Mises laid down the reasons why economic management and intervention by the state would always fail. As the Russian economist, Yuri Maltsev put it, “Mises exposed socialism as a utopian scheme that is illogical, uneconomic, and unworkable at its core.” Maltsev confirmed this from his personal experience as an economist in the Soviet Union.

The difference between communism and democratic socialism can be likened to the fate of a lobster plunged into boiling water compared with that of a frog, who in the modern cliché is cooked from cold. The relative level of authoritarianism is different from the outset but ends up being similar in its final outcome. The demonstrable failures of democratic socialism have led to ever-increasing restrictions on markets, inching it ever closer to communism. The common denial of capitalism and the profit motive as being somehow immoral is part of the pro-state and anti-market propaganda.

The reason the state always fails in its attempt to manage the economy is partly due to its objectives being political in nature rather than economic, and partly due to the impossibility of it entering into economic calculation. It was the latter point which Mises explained so well in his 1920 essay. Irrespective of the politics, it is impossible for a state which owns the means of production in its central planning to know in advance whether its output will be demanded by consumers. Some of it might well be, but assessing the level of demand in the planning of production is impossible. And the state cannot assess the evolution in a product to ensure it will be freely demanded in future. The state therefore resorts to monopolistic behaviour to enforce consumption.

By way of contrast, the capitalist in a free market will use his specialist knowledge to assess demand and seek to respond by supplying his product to consumers profitably. For him, the customer is king. If he fails, he either cuts his losses, or adapts the product to satisfy consumer demands. Production methods and output evolve to satisfy demand, which together define progress. While the state is unable to evolve its production satisfactorily and therefore lacks the fundamental ability to foster economic progress, capitalists seeking profits in free markets improve economic conditions and standards of living wholly in accordance with Say’s Law. In other words, through specialisation the entire cohort of independent manufacturers and service providers together satisfy the general and evolving demands of the markets.

As a matter of reluctant practicality, social democracy permits capitalism to exist. In common with the early fascist policies of Mussolini, capitalism is tolerated so long as it can be controlled by the state. This control is achieved through extensive product regulation, by partial nationalisation of the economy, and by virtue of the fact that state spending is the largest single element in a social democratic economy. This spending is not funded out of production, but by taxes imposed on producers and consumers. A socialising state is promoted as a benefit for society as a whole, but the reality is that is an economic burden in proportion to its size.

Under the aegis of social democracy, the economy becomes increasingly directed away from market freedoms, and it performs progressively less than its potential to improve the living conditions of the population. The economy’s underperformance is invariably blamed upon the private sector by the state when it is the consequence of the state’s own interventionalist policies.

How statistics mislead us all


The social division of labour means that it is always the individual who deploys his or her skills in order to consume — consumption which is personal to the needs and desires of the individual. While there are needs common to each individual, the consumption of which goods and services an individual actually desires cannot be forecast by any observer. Much of tomorrow’s demand is spontaneous and is not even known in advance to individual consumers. 

Even if they are accurate, the gathering of statistics measuring this demand can only be of its past history. It is a gross error to think that demand statistics valid in the past can be projected into the future and retain any true relevance. We see this in the continual failure of economic modelling and econometric forecasts. It is one thing for an economist to further his understanding of a branch of human science, as a branch of psychology, and another to assume it is a natural science, such as physics or biology. The former cannot be averaged and predicted, while the latter can be statistically quantified. No wonder Keynes, whose primary discipline was mathematics, preferred to dismiss Say’s law in favour of mathematical and statistical analysis.

Mention has already been made above of the mistake in comparing prices of goods and services over time valued in fiat currencies. The chart below of WTI oil, a basic unit of energy upon which almost the entire global population depends, illustrates the enormity of this mistake.



The two prices are in legal money, which is gold, and in fiat dollars, which is currency. Since 1950, when the price of WTI oil was $2.57 per barrel and in gold grammes it was 2.28, in dollar terms the price has soared to around $70 today, a multiple of over 27 times. Yet in gold, it is 1.14 grammes, having exactly halved. In legal money the price has been considerably less volatile than in dollars. The riddle posed to us by this chart is which price should be used for valuing oil — a depreciating and volatile dollar, or a relatively stable legal and sound money?

Clearly, it is long-term dollar price comparisons which are badly flawed. Yet market traders, proud to call themselves macroeconomists without understanding the implications of the term, maintain their long-term charts of oil and other commodities in dollars wholly unaware of their falsity. Furthermore, everything which can be traded is valued in fiat dollars and other currencies, from financial assets to housing. The next chart is of residential property in London, priced in pounds and gold.


Anyone who observes the residential property market in the UK will tell you what an excellent 'investment' it has been, nowhere more so than in London. But this statement only holds for a fiat pound, which since 1968 has lost over 99% of its purchasing power measured in real legal money, which is still the gold sovereign coin. Today, the value of London residential property in gold has risen by a paltry 14% since 1968, compared with 116 times in depreciating pounds. Yet, the plain facts are met with widespread disbelief.

Under the fiat currency regime, values of everything are a flawed concept, reflecting not changes in subjective values so much as that of declining fiat currencies. But this statistical legerdemain which fools everyone extends to other areas of the statistical universe. Labour productivity analysis is a nonsense because of the underlying assumptions, and the lack of consideration of the costs to an employer of employment and other labour taxes. The approach is always from the statist viewpoint, whereby politicians wish to see higher output per worker promoting higher tax returns. It is never that of an employing businessman who is the only true assessor of the costs and benefits of employing the various forms of labour in his enterprise profitably.

GDP and government spending


To confuse gross domestic product with economic growth, itself a meaningless term when economic progress is implied, is a further error. Governments are fixated on GDP, which must always grow. GDP is not economic growth, but growth in the total currency value of transactions, usually over the course of a year or annualised.

If the currency is debased by its inflationary issuance, nominal GDP increases to the extent that debasement feeds into the GDP statistic. Inflation of the currency is particularly associated with increased government spending, so virtually all the increase in it fuels GDP. In the past, governments have regularly outperformed market expectations of GDP growth by the simple expedient of increasing government spending. Investors failing to understand this trick see it as positive, and stock markets rise on the news. GDP is only good for allowing a government to estimate prospective tax income. Otherwise, it is a useless and misleading statistic.

As stated above, GDP is routinely and unconsciously confused with economic progress. But a moment’s reflection will show that progress cannot be statistically measured. Progress is a concept which at its fundamental level is an improvement in a person’s living standard. There is no doubt that entertainment technology, in the form of televisions, gaming computers, and other electronic equipment all of which have fallen in price have improved many people’s enjoyment immensely. GDP incorporating declining prices for these products is bound to undervalue these benefits, and by classifying their prices as deflationary might even claim they detract from economic growth. Yet, government spending which is funded by removing purchasing power from producers and consumers and is therefore a brake on progress is classified as positive due to its inclusion in GDP.

During the covid crisis, when much of the productive economy shut down UK government spending rose to about 50% of GDP, though since then it has declined to an estimated 43% in the last fiscal year (to April 5th, 2023). Similar increases occurred in other nations. In Europe, French government spending peaked at 61.3% of its economy in 2020, declining to 58.1% last year. In Italy it was 57% and 56.7% respectively, and in Spain, 52% and 47.8%. With these levels of state spending, when analysing GDP it is extremely important to decide how to treat it.

Government economists are bound to argue that government spending is important in economic terms, and that GDP growth must include it. Furthermore, on a consumption basis it is argued that spending by government employees must be included, as well as government demand for goods and services. While this might appear to be a valid point, it misses the bigger picture.

While it is true that state employees’ and departmental spending are part of the total economy, the state’s taxes which fund them reduces income available for consumption for those not employed by the state. Government spending as a whole replaces it with the provision of services not freely demanded, which is fundamental to the benefits which flow from Say’s law — the law of the markets.

You don’t have to look far for examples of how state spending is a burden on overall economic activity, and that the successful economic approach is to free up the private sector, eliminating government and its intervention as much as possible. It is this approach which led to the remarkable success of Hong Kong in the post-war decades, compared with the poverty inflicted on the same ethnic people on the mainland under Mao Zedong where government was 100% of the economy.

Convincing the establishment that inflating GDP ends up suppressing economic progress is an uphill struggle. Instead of accepting the empirical evidence, governments routinely use their tax-raising powers to increase economic intervention, spending as a proportion of the whole, and debasing the currency by deliberately running budget deficits.

This leads to a conflict between politicians seeking to represent the electorate’s interests and the state itself. Politicians on the right vying for office are usually free marketeers with ambitions to reduce the state’s presence as a proportion of the total economy. They are appointed with a zeal to take an axe on spending and bureaucracy, but there are good reasons why they never achieve it. When they gain ministerial responsibility, their priority changes to protecting their budgets from being reduced, because cuts in departmental spending amount to a loss of power. Therefore, to the extent that any savings on spending are achieved, ministers always want to come up with other plans to maintain or increase funding levels. The negative economic consequences simply rack up, and the government’s share of GDP inexorably tends to increase.

This is the true legacy of confusing GDP with economic progress. While the transactions that together make up a GDP total can be measured, their true value in terms of the satisfaction and the progress in the quality of life they provide cannot. The only way in which they can be measured is by each individual in a community and nation, and not by those who claim to represent them.
Why there cannot be a general glut

The Keynesian error of believing that a recession leads to a general glut, and therefore a fall in the general level of prices, has its origin in the 1930s depression. But it is obvious that under the conditions of the division of labour, whereby people are employed to produce so that they can consume, this cannot be true in a general sense, because production must decline as well as consumption when unemployment rises. In other words, a general glut of unsold produce cannot arise, because the unemployed are no longer producing.

Nevertheless, Keynesian fears of a glut when a recession occurs and unemployment rises leads modern governments to create demand in a recession by increasing welfare benefits. According to the Keynesian playbook, this funding is stimulative by means of inflationary deficits, intended to help stabilise prices as demand weakens. But without a general glut and a stable currency the overall level of prices is unlikely to change significantly in real terms when there is no government intervention because of Say’s law.

Modern governments intervene by deficit spending without contributing to production. Instead of a recession leading to surplus production, government spending leads to surplus demand. This explains how the inflationary effects of Keynesian stimulation can lead to significantly higher prices, even in a slump, as was seen in Britain’s inflationary crisis in the mid-1970s. It is also entirely consistent with the factors driving an economy into a slump during a currency’s collapse, such as witnessed in the European inflations in the early 1920s.

So, what happened in the 1930s, disproving Say’s law in the minds of the neo-Keynesians?


The first error in their analysis was not understanding the consequences of the inflationary 1920s. They were fuelled by the Fed’s expansionary monetary policies under the leadership of Benjamin Strong, and President Hoover’s anti-capitalist, interventionist policies at the peak of the credit cycle. The inevitable consequences were a speculative bubble followed by a financial crisis between late-1929 and 1932 which wiped out thousands of banks and their credit, which were the backbone to maintaining economic activity. And this was followed by Hoover’s heavy handed interventionism.

Hoover also raised income taxes significantly to fund his interventions. Despite these increases, during Hoover’s tenure the Federal Government’s deficit to GDP soared from a 0.7% surplus to a 6.4% deficit and these deficits continued under Roosevelt, though they lessened as the banking crisis passed.

Not only did banks go bust in their thousands, but there were other factors. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which built in higher tariffs on top of those of the Ford McCumber tariffs of 1922, was signed into law by President Hoover in 1930. So, not only was bank credit in the economy imploding, but including tariffs the prices of imported goods and therefore the production costs of most American manufactured products were raised to uneconomic levels. It was a fatal combination, because little could be produced profitably at a time when there was little or no bank credit available. Consequently, US GDP contracted from $103.6bn in 1929 to $56.3bn in 1933. This was not the same thing as a general glut, because demonstrably both production and consumption contracted. Primarily, it reflected a collapse in bank credit.

While credit had become freely available in the previous decade, the introduction of tractors and other farm machinery had led to a massive expansion of agricultural output. Prices of agricultural produce, which were already declining due to oversupply, were bound to fall even more when credit was withdrawn by failing local banks in America. The farming community was forced to sell its output at anything they could get for it, because of the lack of credit.

This was a specific market adjustment at a time when worldwide cereal and other agricultural output prices were falling due to overproduction. The slump in prices attributable to the banking crisis hit farmers particularly hard, not just in America but worldwide through values reflected on the commodity exchanges.

Because American farmers were forced sellers of their agricultural output, it was later assumed by Keynes and other economists that there was a glut and that Say’s law was therefore flawed. But the mistake was to miss the links between the collapse in bank credit from bank failures, the pressure on farmers to dump their product at any price, and the coincidence of global overproduction due to the rapid advances made in mechanisation in the previous decade.

The causes of the 1930s depression and its longevity were clear — you need look no further than empirical evidence. Long before Keynes traduced Say’s law, both Hoover and Roosevelt with his New Deal made the depression considerably worse than it would otherwise have been, acting as proto-Keynesians. It was the first time that the Federal Government had intervened in what would otherwise have been two or three years of economic and credit hiatus, which had been the experience of previous episodes. The previous depression in 1920—1921 lasted only eighteen months without statist intervention. Before President Hoover’s tenure, it was generally acknowledged that intervention only made things worse, and that left alone, a slump in business activity would correct itself.

Economists subsequently formulating statist policies badly misread the causes of a slump. They still fail to appreciate that there is a cycle of bank credit, identified by economists of the Austrian school as a business cycle. It is caused by bankers acting as a cohort increasing the quantity of credit to a point when their balance sheet exposure becomes excessive relative to the bankers’ own capital, and they then try to reign in their balance sheets. This is not a conspiracy between bankers, but reflects their human behaviour, and is cyclical in nature. It can be traced for so far as reasonable records exist, in the UK as far back as the end of the Napoleonic wars. And it is a cycle of credit expansion and contraction averaging roughly ten years.

Even for economists, it is always easier to observe the evidence of an economic downturn than its underlying cause. In all the voluminous analysis of the great depression, the cycle of bank credit is hardly mentioned. Only economists of the Austrian school have pointed out that the depression was the natural consequence of excessive credit expansion in the previous decade. And Keynes’s followers with their mathematical and statistical macroeconomics are still blind to the role of bank credit underlying booms and slumps. They think they can model the economy, steering it from one objective to another by supressing free markets. But they cannot model human bankers’ balance of greed for profit and fear of losses.

Economic and monetary policies ignore Say’s law — the law of the markets — persisting in their failed interventions. The response to failure is usually to claim that the error was to not intervene enough. A feature of these failures is for policy makers to seek solace with their international counterparts, doubling down in a group-thinking effort to achieve statist objectives.
The errors in currency management

This week, the persistence of consumer price inflation in the UK has even led a member of the Monetary Policy Committee to say that interest rates will have to be raised to the extent that the UK economy enters a recession. But with broad money supply, no longer expanding, we can see that there’s something wrong with his analysis. At the same time, all commentary on stubborn price inflation is about too much demand for too few goods. Changes in the purchasing power of the currency are never mentioned. While individual prices fluctuate, when the general level of prices increases it can only be because of changes in a currency’s purchasing power.

There is only one reason why the purchasing power of a fiat currency changes, and that is in the behaviour of its users. By adjusting the relationship of their immediate liquidity to their spending, collectively they can have a profound impact on its purchasing power. This is why the state theory of money fails, and the monetary authorities always fail to control the purchasing power of their fiat currency. A currency must be anchored to real money, which is gold coin.

When banknotes were fully exchangeable for gold coin, their purchasing power remained constant irrespective of the quantity in circulation. But banknotes are typically less than a tenth of the circulating medium, the balance being bank credit. The relationship between bank credit and banknotes is almost parity. Therefore, so long as counterparty risk between a bank’s depositors and the bank is not an issue, bank credit will always take its value from the currency. It is the currency which must be credible.

In the first of the two charts above of WTI oil priced in dollars and gold, we can see that the price of oil in dollars was stable between 1950 and 1970, when the dollar price increased from $2.57 per barrel to an average of $3.35. At that time, the dollar was loosely tied to gold through the Bretton Woods agreement, with only national central banks and organisations such as the IMF able to exchange dollars for gold. During that time, M3 money supply increased from $172bn to $750bn, an increase of 336%.

This was not the only example. Between 1844 (the time of the Bank Charter Act) and 1900, the wholesale price index was unchanged, and it was also remarkably stable over that time fluctuating little. But between 1844 and 1900, the sum of Bank of England banknotes in circulation and commercial bank deposit obligations increased eleven times —almost entirely bank credit with the Bank of England’s note issue being little changed — and there was a material increase in the quantity of short-term, commercial bills funding foreign trade as well. Monetarist theory would suggest that the expansion of credit on such a scale would undermine the purchasing power of the currency, but plainly it did not.

The reason the expansion of bank credit need not undermine a currency’s purchasing power is that so long as the level of credit is genuinely demanded by economic activity instead of financing excess consumption, its expansion does not drive up prices. The source of excess consumption is to be found in government deficit spending because individuals always have to settle their debts while a government does not. As mentioned above, governments can always resort to deficit spending.

From this we know that government fiscal and monetary policies coupled with its fiat currency are the sole reasons behind a deteriorating purchasing power for its currency. Indeed, the Keynesians deliberately target a continual rate of debasement reflected in a CPI inflation rate of 2% by using monetary policy in an attempt to regulate credit demand.

The solution: leave markets alone and bring back sound money


If monetary stability is to return, all attempts by governments to manage private sector outcomes which have always failed and will continue to do so must be abandoned. And sound money, that is to say a gold coin standard freely available to ordinary people at their choice must be re-established. Interest rates would then stabilise at risk-free annual rates of just a few per cent set by markets in the context of demand for investment capital and the availability of savings. Market stability will automatically follow. The diversion of human activity into speculation will diminish, benefiting the economy from its redeployment into more productive pursuits. No longer would we have governments attempting to chase monetary objectives which bankrupt homeowners with mortgages as a result of misguided Keynesian policies.

A return to sound money clips the wings of high spending politicians, but other specific changes must also be introduced, reversing Keynesian macroeconomic policies entirely:
  • Government spending must be reduced substantially, with an initial target for it to be no more than 20% of the economy. This will reduce the tax burden on productive businesses and workers for the benefit of non-inflationary progress. It will require extensive legislation to be passed eliminating mandated spending commitments.
  • The policy of regulating goods and services must be abandoned, and responsibility for judging product suitability handed back to individuals.
  • All taxation must be removed from savings, interest earned, and capital gained: savings will have already been taxed when earned. Savings are the necessary source of investment funding for economic progress. And citizens must be encouraged to save for their future, because the state must withdraw from providing widespread welfare, restricting it to a bare minimum for genuine need.
  • Inheritance taxes and death duties must be rescinded. Families should be allowed to accumulate and pass on wealth which is otherwise destroyed the moment it is acquired by government. 
  • Protectionist trade policies must be abandoned in favour of free trade. The benefit to an economy from the comparative advantage of buying the best suited products from anywhere are enormous, as the evidence from entrepôt economies, such as Hong Kong, confirms.
  • Government ministers must not be permitted to accept lobbying by pressure groups and businesses, because their democratic responsibility is to the entire electorate.
  • All central bank activities must cease and replaced by a note issuing authority regulating the relationship between gold coin held in reserve and the face value of notes in circulation. The relationship should be laid down by law, funded by government, and for the gold coin to note relationship to be maintained at a 40% minimum at all times. It must be coin and not bullion in order to be available to the entire population. A bullion standard risks foreign arbitrage in potentially destabilising quantities.
  • Foreign policy must be amended to not interfere in other nation’s politics, except where national interests are demonstrably affected.
  • Government spending must be fully accountable. All revenue received by the Treasury must be hypothecated — no more robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Clearly, these reforms will not happen before an existential crisis serious enough to force a complete policy overhaul. Even then, it depends on government ministers and bureaucrats correctly diagnosing the reasons for the crisis, which with all of them in thrall to neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and the realisation and admission of their own roles in creating a final crisis is extremely unlikely to happen in a Damascene fashion. Instead, a period of policy vacillation is likely, leading to a danger of political instability and a retreat into yet more socialism.

The final crisis brought upon us by Keynesian policies will almost certainly not mark the end of all our troubles.
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Alasdair Macleod is Head of Research for Goldmoney. He has been a celebrated stockbroker and member of the London Stock Exchange for over four decades. His experience encompasses equity and bond markets, fund management, corporate finance and investment strategy.
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His article previously appeared at the Cobden Centre, UK.