Showing posts with label Gary Judd. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gary Judd. Show all posts

Friday, 29 May 2026

Co-Governance is still quietly bubbling away

Whether it knows it or not --whether by Coalition design or by bureaucratic subterfuge -- it appears that legal implementation for co-governance has been strengthened under this Government's term rather than diminished.

A recent post pointed out that the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights, the underpinning that creeping implementation, was a poison pill quietly smuggled in with the Indian Free Trade Agreement (FTA ). It was Gary Judd KC who spotted the clause in the signed Agreement calling on the parties to "affirm" NZ's commitment to this race-base Declaration. As Judd notes this morning, this is an escalation on previous Free Trade Agreements with the UK, which called for the parties to "note" the commitment, and with the EU to "further note." 

This is not simply harmless playing around with words. In legal terms, as Judd himself notes, it is "a significant escalation."

And it's not the only escalation towards co-governance. 

Remember that what underpinned the moves made by Ardern's Labour Government towards co-governance -- towards sharing government power with tribal leaders -- was that UN Declaration. That gave legal strength towards their quiet moves towards what Elizabeth Rata calls "re-tribalisation."

In 2007, the position of Helen Clark's Government was in opposition. Clark was many things, but she wasn't stupid.

John Key was. In 2010, his Government sent Pita Sharples to the UN to "support" it. That "support," when ratified here, underpinned the Ardern Government's support for He Puapua and for every flavour of co-governance emerging since.

And then in 2023, Hipkins's Government moved from endorsing the UN Declaration to a commitment “to upholding the rights affirmed in the Declaration.” These weren't just a small change in words. As a result, the Hipkins's Government then sought advice “to support the drafting of a plan to achieve the ends of the UN Declaration in Aotearoa New Zealand.” Those ends, of course, called for "self-determination" for so-called indigenous people. As Judd explains it, this is when "Non-binding aspirations morphed into affirmed [legal] rights." Once the NZ Government regarded self-determination as a cornerstone of the UN Declaration it then meant tribal participation in government decision making.

As the New Zealanders who claim indigenous status are Māori and governmental decisions affect all New Zealanders including Māori, this means the New Zealand position had become one where Māori should have the right to participate in all or most decision making. That is co-governance between a democratically elected government for all New Zealanders and Māori. Māori protocols ensure they are represented by an essentially self-selected elite.

Words, in politics, are so much fluff. Words, in law, do matter. 

[B]y the affirmations of the declaration and New Zealand’s position, has confirmed that the UN Declaration has binding status (for that’s the meaning of affirm in legal parlance) with a double whammy by confirming New Zealand’s position when that position at the UN and in international law is the July 2023 position.

The Minister and MFAT officials may try to justify themselves by claiming that New Zealand saying in an international agreement that it is bound by the UN Declaration and committed to upholding the rights contained in it is not the same as acknowledging that it has binding effect in New Zealand but that is sophistry which will not wash.

For reasons given in [my earlier post], there is little doubt that the courts will take the affirmations for what they plainly are: New Zealand’s acceptance that the UN Declaration is binding such that its principles may be utilised in the interpretation of legislation and as influencing the common law.

As Rata says in her own post on this, "today's politicians [should] look closely at all re-tribalisation language." Especially if it is being smuggled in through political stealth.

Tuesday, 31 March 2026

AUT's dean steps down to go away and work quietly in a corner [updated]

Legal battles can be very personal, but arguments about the law less so. Yet when barrister Gary Judd criticised the impetus from AUT's law school dean Khylee Quince to "embed tikanga" in students' first year -- to be taught that tikanga is "the first law of the country" -- her reply was that Judd, a King's Counsel (KC), should "go die quietly in a corner."

Judd is fortunately still with us. And Quince, still unapologetic, is now stepping down as dean to go away and work quietly in a corner. Her legacy however remains: that those wishing to take up law as a reasoning discipline should try to find a university with a faculty whose leadership has greater respect for that argument.

And issues remain. As Samira Taghavi says (a barrister and practice manager at Active Legal Solutions and a member of The Law Association’s council and Criminal Law committee), 
Khylee Quince’s belittlement of Judd KC raises important questions about the lessons we impart to the next generation of lawyers. Are we equipping them to confront and counter challenging viewpoints effectively? Or are we teaching them to resort to personal attacks?
So let's leave the personal and look at law. As Judd pointed out, quite simply: tikanga cannot be "first law" because tikanga is not law at all, it is a collection of beliefs; to tell students it is law is cultural indoctrination.
[T]ikanga” ... is a set of beliefs, principles of a spiritual nature, a way of life (“the right Māori way of doing things”). When beliefs result in people consistently behaving in a certain way, the behaviour may become customary. Then, in certain carefully confined circumstances, customs may attain the status of law.
    If “tikanga” were confined in its meaning to customs which had attained the status of law, there would be no problem. Introducing a regime which would impose beliefs, principles of a spiritual nature, a way of life of some of our people, on the nation as a whole is a completely different proposition. Beliefs and principles of a spiritual nature are not law. The way of life of some is not part of the law of the land. ...
Where tikanga beliefs have been acted on, they may have given rise to customary behaviour and those customs might [mature] into a species of customary law applicable for specific purposes, for example for determining who owns Māori land, but [one cannot simply declare] that tikanga [is] first law.
Calling tikanga something which patently it is not, not only offends reason but undermines the value of what it actually is. Making a falsehood a fundamental part of the description of its nature is not a good way to ensure its survival. ...
Beliefs, even if common to the entire population, are not law. However, beliefs may cause people to act in a certain way. Those actions may become customary and may even mature into customary law.
But they are not yet law, let alone first law. And hissy fits still won't change that.

UPDATE: Her time is up, literally -- her five-year term has expired. But judging by the results of last September's AUT staff survey, it looks like few of her colleagues will be mourning. Kiwiblog reported:
I have been leaked a copy of the latest staff survey from AUT Law Faculty and it is very clear that it is a very unhappy place. Here are some of their results:Would recommend AUT as a great place to work 45%
  • AUT is in a position to succeed 42%
  • Have confidence in senior leaders at AUT 35%
  • AUT has a thriving research culture 35%
  • Am comfortable reporting inappropriate behaviour 30%
  • Workloads are divided fairly 25%
  • Innovation is recognised and rewarded 20%
  • At AUT we are good at learning from our mistakes 20%
  • The right people are recognised and rewarded 20%
  • If someone is not delivering in their role we do something about it 5% ...
As you can see [in the above Powerpoint screenshot] the results for the Law Faculty are much much lower than AUT as a whole. So this would suggest the major issue is not the central administration, but the faculty management itself. I [David Farrar] am told by sources that everyone knows what the major problem is, but people are too scared to say so.

Thursday, 26 March 2026

Are human rights a gift from government?

"Roy, a commenter on my 'Lessons from Iran,' says there is no such thing as human rights: 'Human rights [he says] are given and allowed by Governments.' ...

"If Roy is right, it means that the Iranian people do not have the right to life or liberty because the government of Iran has not given and allowed them to have those rights. By way of an opposite example, it also means that New Zealanders have those rights only because the government has given them to us or allowed us to have them. ...

"John Locke (1632-1704) produced the rationale for certain rights to exist independently of any expression of them in government legislation or the common law. I go into detail below, but the essence is that human beings have certain characteristics which differentiate them from other living things, characteristics which demand of each person that they allow every other person to live their own lives without forcing them or attempting to force them to act or not to act in a particular way.

"That means each person has the right to be left alone and each person has the reciprocal obligation to leave everyone else alone.

"This is a moral imperative, and humans may occasionally or habitually refuse or fail to act in that way. That’s why we have laws proscribing certain conduct. ...

"Humans cannot sustain and live their lives in the uniquely human way unless they are free to do so. Freedom is the fundamental ‘human’ right. It subsumes the right to life because if the individual’s freedom is respected, so also his life will not be in jeopardy from others’ aggressions. It subsumes the right to pursue happiness because if the individual is free, he is free to pursue happiness so long as in doing so he does not trample on others’ freedom.

"The caveat “so long as in doing so he does not trample on others’ freedom,” is vital. It is why so many so-called rights are bogus because, for example, they involve taking from others thereby violating the others’ right to be free."

Thursday, 19 March 2026

"The Maori seats encourage people to ghettoise themselves"

"It has become starkly obvious that the Maori seats are being used by activists to [ghettoise Māori: to isolate them, separate them, cut them off, according to a cultural identity]. ...

"Ghettoisation can be done to a person or group, or people or groups can do it to themselves. ...

"Israr Kasana, a Pakistani Muslim immigrant to the Canadian city of Calgary, explains why he and his family rejected the temptation to adopt the comfortable way of establishing themselves within a Pakistani community. He says 'Ghettoisation or marginalisation of any kind is bad for society. It creates exclusion, imbalance, envy, anger, ignorance and, more importantly, distrust.' ...

"The Maori seats encourage people to ghettoise themselves according to cultural identity, whereas what we must surely want is a society in which people of all races are able to coexist together in peace and cooperation as equal citizens under the law." ...

"[Then National leader Bill] English said [in 2003] the National Party 'stands for one standard of citizenship for all.' ... 'That’s why a National-led Government will abolish the Maori seats.” Of course, it did nothing of the sort when National came back into government in 2008 under John Key. Instead, the Key government abetted the infiltration of all parts of New Zealand society by elements who would substitute authoritarian tribal rule for a free and democratic society, a process which was accelerated by the Ardern/Hipkins governments. ...

"Under pressure from ACT and New Zealand First, the coalition government has walked this back a bit but not to the extent needed to offer meaningful restraint of the authoritarian tendencies which unthinking acquiescence by most of us has unwittingly allowed. ...

"Leadership is needed. We need a Prime Minister who will say loudly and clearly what English said in 2003 ... Today, when NZ First has advanced a Bill for a referendum and ACT says get rid of the Maori seats now, the opportunity is ripe for that sort of leadership.

"Getting rid of the seats, especially by or endorsed by referendum to show it is peoples’ will, would not only remove an anti-democratic excrescence, but also be a signal that enough is enough and that henceforth we shall be a 'multiracial society [where] people of all races are able to coexist together in peace and cooperation as equal citizens under the law.'

"Yet the National Party is silent. ..."

~ Gary Judd, composite quote from his posts 'Ghettoising the mind' and 'National could signal its support for democracy'

SOME HISTORY

"[T]he Māori seats were created to bring Māori into the parliamentary system and guarantee representation, rather than exclude them.
 
"By 1867, when the Māori Representation Act 1867(1) passed, Europeans outnumbered Māori roughly four to one. ...

"The Māori seats addressed a real problem: under the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 [2] voting required individual property or household qualification. Most Māori land was communally held, leaving Māori largely unable to meet the franchise. ...

The Māori electorates solved the voting problem by granting all Māori men over 21 the right to vote, decades before universal male suffrage applied elsewhere in New Zealand [3]. Far from limiting Māori rights, the law expanded them. ...

"The seats also guaranteed meaningful participation. Four electorates—three in the North Island, one for the South—were superimposed over existing electorates. Māori with qualifying property could still vote in European electorates, giving many a dual vote. [4] Officials went to extraordinary lengths to ensure participation: in 1890, a returning officer undertook a six-day trek through dense Urewera bush to establish a polling station at Maungapōhatu. [5] Such efforts are hardly consistent with a strategy to suppress Māori voices. ...

"Seats were originally intended as temporary until Māori qualified under the general property franchise [6] ...

"While Māori were under-represented by modern proportional standards [when the Māori seats were created in 1867, each European electorate represented roughly 3,500 people, while each Māori electorate represented around 12,500 people [7]], the four seats ensured guaranteed parliamentary representation, at a time when European immigration was rapidly outpacing Māori numbers. This was enfranchisement, not suppression.' ...

"However today the original rationale for the Māori electorates has disappeared. In the current Parliament 33 MPs identify as having Māori heritage — about 27% of the House — far exceeding Māori’s roughly 17% share of the population. Even without the seven reserved seats, Māori representation would remain substantial, the historical purpose of the Māori electorates has now been fulfilled and, consistent with the 1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System and with Article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi, they should now be abolished in favour of equal representation for all voters."
NOTES
1. New Zealand History, “Setting up the Māori seats,” https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/setting-maori-seats
2. New Zealand Parliament, “History of the Electoral System,” https://www.parliament.nz/en/visit-and-learn/how-parliament-works/history/history-of-the-electoral-system/
3. New Zealand History, “Setting up the Māori seats,” https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/setting-maori-seats
4. McRobie, Alan, Electoral Atlas of New Zealand, GP Books, 1989.
5. New Zealand History, “Polling in isolated Māori communities,” https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/setting-maori-seats
6. Ibid.; New Zealand History, “Setting up the Māori seats,” https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/setting-maori-seats
7. Te Ara, “Māori representation,” https://teara.govt.nz/en/nga-mangai-maori-representation


Wednesday, 4 December 2024

"...the possibility of a constitutional crisis because of the activism of some judges of New Zealand’s senior courts."


"Bryce Edwards ... has signalled the possibility of a constitutional crisis because of the activism of some judges of New Zealand’s senior courts. ...
    "In New Zealand now, we have ... a breed of judges who are not legal activists but political activists — judges who unashamedly seek to advance political agendas. In doing so, they assume the mantle of Plato’s philosopher kings, the creed of the infallible ruling elite. ... contemptuous of the people of the country, the people they pretend they are serving. ...
    "Incredibly, a number of my King’s Counsel colleagues appear to think this is okay. As part of their calling on the Prime Minister and the National Party to breach a coalition agreement by refusing a first reading and referral to a select committee of ACT’s Treaty Principles Bill, they say that 'even if Parliament can legislate in this way (which is uncertain),' the courts may not enforce it. ...
    "They need a short lesson because Parliament’s power is not uncertain. ...
    
"All lawyers, including KCs have a fundamental obligation to uphold the rule of law. ... When the KCs say it is uncertain that Parliament may legislate in this way, they mean that the courts may refuse to apply the law. Using that as an argument implies acceptance of or even advocacy for defiance of Parliament and the law of the land. How is that consistent with a fundamental obligation to uphold the rule of law?
    "What the KCs should be saying is that judges, like everyone else, must obey the law and they have by virtue of their office a special obligation to apply it."

~ Gary Judd from his post 'KCs are not a special elite'


Monday, 26 August 2024

Lange: "The treaty itself contains no principles which can usefully guide government or courts.”

 

“It is with no disrespect for Maori feeling for the treaty that I have to say it means nothing to me. It can mean nothing to me because it has nothing to say to me. When I was in office I understood that the government had succeeded to certain legal and moral obligations of the government which signed the treaty, and that in so far as those obligations had not been met it was our responsibility to honour them. But that is the extent of it.
    "The treaty cannot be any kind of founding document, as it is sometimes said to be. It does not resolve the question of sovereignty, if only because one version of it claims one form of sovereignty and the other version claims the opposite. The court of appeal once, absurdly, described it as a partnership between races, but it obviously is not. The signatories are, on one side, a distinctive group of people, and on the other, a government which established itself in New Zealand and whose successors represent all of us, whether we are descendants of the signatories or not. The treaty cannot even resolve the argument among Maori themselves in which one side maintains that you’re a Maori if you identify as such, and the other claims that it’s your links to traditional forms of association which define you as Maori.
    "As our increasingly dismal national day continues to show, the treaty is no basis for nationhood. It doesn’t express the fundamental rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and it doesn’t have any unifying concept. The importance it has for Maori people is a constant reminder that governments in a democracy should meet their legal and moral obligations, but for the country taken as a whole, that is, and must be, the limit of its significance.
    "Here I come to the dangers posed by the increasing entrenchment of the treaty in statute.
    "The treaty itself contains no principles which can usefully guide government or courts. It is a bald agreement, anchored in its time and place, and the public interest in it is the same as the public interest in enforcing any properly-made agreement. To go further than that is to acknowledge the existence of undemocratic forms of rights, entitlements, or sovereignty.
    "The treaty is a wonderful stick for activists to beat the rest of us with, but it could never have assumed the importance it has without the complicity of others. It came to prominence in liberal thought in the seventies, when many who were concerned about the abuse of the democratic process by the government of the day began to see the treaty as a potential source of alternative authority. It’s been the basis of a self-perpetuating industry in academic and legal circles. Many on the left of politics who sympathise with Maori aspiration have identified with the cause of the treaty, either not knowing or not caring that its implications are profoundly undemocratic."
 
~ former Labour Prime Minister David Lange from his year 2000 Bruce Jesson Memorial Lecture. Quoted by Gary Judd in his post 'Treaty is a bald agreement, anchored in its time and place,' in which he concludes by reciting Lange's accurate observation that "The treaty itself contains no principles which can usefully guide government or courts.” 
"In the real world," Gary points out, "there are no principles of the Treaty. They exist only in a fantasy world created by the 1972-1975 Labour government’s Treaty of Waitangi Act. The magical possibilities of this fantasy world have expanded since then to the point where ordinary New Zealanders feel threatened by those who would claim on the basis solely of their identity, or who they identify with, that they have a superior place, and that democracy must be relegated to a subordinate position."

Monday, 19 August 2024

"These absurdities are multiplied throughout today’s New Zealand. I cannot say 'modern' New Zealand because we see here a reversion to the prehistoric."


"[T]he Northland Regional Council['s] 'draft blueprint for improving freshwater' tells its readers that .. 'the water cycle is an expression of love between the heavens and earth, and each stage is a critical component. The Atua who control these elements [says the 'blueprint'] are in charge of condensation, evaporation, collection and precipitation.' Atua, according to Williams's 'Dictionary of the Māori Language' ... is 'God, Demon, supernatural being, ghost.'
    "By these words and others, the regional council is indicating that its draft freshwater plan has been informed by ideas that freshwater is a living being deriving from the gods, that it should be respected as an ancestor, and that the plan weaves together those views and 'western world views' so that the well-being of the water cycle is prioritised, respected and protected. ...

"These absurdities are multiplied throughout today’s New Zealand. I cannot say 'modern' New Zealand because we see here a reversion to the prehistoric. The absurdities bring to mind the title of a collection of Ayn Rand and Peter Schwartz essays: 'Return of the Primitive: the Anti-Industrial Revolution.' ... In his Introduction ... Peter Schwartz noted that:
'Primitive, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, means: "Of or belonging to the first age, period or stage; pertaining to early times…" With respect to human development, primitivism is a pre-rational stage. It is a stage in which man lives in fearful awe of a universe he cannot understand. The primitive man does not grasp the law of causality. He does not comprehend the fact that the world is governed by natural laws and that nature can be ruled by any man who discovers those laws. To a primitive, there is only a mysterious supernatural. Sunshine, darkness, rainfall, drought, the clap of thunder, the hooting of a spotted owl—all are inexplicable, portentous, and sacrosanct to him. To this non-conceptual mentality, man is metaphysically subordinate to nature, which is never to be commanded, only meekly obeyed.'
"This is the world that the Northland Regional Council would return us to. ... that countless councils, other governmental bodies, some political parties and others would return us to ... to which some of our judges and the New Zealand Council of Legal Education would have us return ...

"It has taken centuries for humanity to struggle and claw its way out of a swamp of ignorance and superstition to gain an understanding of the world, of the universe in which we live, and to use that understanding to create better lives for all. Yet, there are those who act as if they wish humanity to reverse course and return to a world of ignorance and superstition, to travel along a pathway to ignorance as I have heard it described. I cannot comprehend how any rational person could honestly desire that to occur."
~ Gary Judd from his post 'Return of the primitive'

Thursday, 8 February 2024

The Coming of the "Principles"


Matiu Rata: "... the most effective NZ
politician of the last half-century?"

As 1975 began, neither Treaty nor Tiriti were part of New Zealand law. By years end, the Treaty's legal status was transformed, and "it's place in the new Zealand polity and the country's history and culture were assured." [1]

This is when the "Treaty Principles" were born. "Treaty" was the English text (and was only ever a draft). "Tiriti" was in missionary Māori, and was the document that was signed. Arguably the actual treaty. Something called the "Treaty Principles" was supposed to moderate between these two allegedly irreconcilable documents, with the priesthood of the Waitangi Tribunal empowered to "interpret" the space between. Under Eddie Durie's stewardship, that space was gently but firmly prised open to reveal an ever-flowing vein of political privilege and alluring economic wealth.

It all began with a Labour Party manifesto. Historian Bain Attwood explains:

What transpired amounts to a case of unintended — and thus unforeseen — consequences.... The Labour Party, led by Norman Kirk, had been returned to power just two months earlier for only the second time in twenty-two years; [Matiu] Rata had become both the Minister of Maori Affairs and the Minister of Lands; ...

The Labour Party had been elected on the basis of a manifesto (in both English and Māori) that included a promise to examine a ‘practical means acknowledging legally what it called ‘the principles set out in the Treaty’. After introducing legislation about Waitangi Day shortly after winning office, it belatedly turned its attention to this commitment, directing its caucus committee on Māori affairs to provide a report on the matter. In undertaking this work the committee largely conceived of its task in terms of this question: whether any legislative action could be legally taken regarding the Treaty? Answering in the affirmative required it to demonstrate that the Treaty was a valid legal agreement and a binding one....

The committee was struck by [a recent academic] argument that whereas the English version had long been regarded as the authoritative version, the Māori version should have primacy because it had been widely circulated and signed by most of the 540 Māori chiefs and it was the one that was first signed (at Waitangi). ... Moreover, it held that ‘the question of versions’ was primarily important only in respect of the first part of the Treaty’s second article, and this was because Ross had noted that the English version was more specific about the kinds of Māori property the Queen had guaranteed to protect than was the Māori text.

[T]he committee was determined to demonstrate that Parliament could give some legal effect to the Treaty. Consequently, it asserted that the central issue was not whether the Treaty was in Māori or English but that it was a binding agreement that had been made by the Crown and the Māori chiefs. This was in keeping with its insistence that the Treaty could become ‘an instrument of mutuality.’... that, as far as Māori were concerned, ‘no amount of legalistic argument’ could detract from the fact that their forebears had entered into a binding agreement with the British in good faith and that the Crown had a responsibility to uphold the Treaty’s principles. Clearly, the committee regarded the Treaty in the same way that Māori and some Pākehā ... had long conceived of it — as a moral agreement rather than a legal contract — and so it emphasised the spirit it believed the Treaty symbolised rather than any strict rights it might be said to contain.
In short, the actual words of the Treaty/Tiriti became less important than the spiritual importance of this binding agreement, this "instrument of mutuality," this beginning of a "relationship" —or of something said to be "akin" to it. 

Observe here that Parliament itself never bothered to define the principles, leaving it open to the Waitangi Tribunal and later the courts to do so. And nor does the Treaty, in either language, state principles. As Gary Judd KC explains
It is an agreement recording an exchange of values, including future obligations. Parliament created the fiction that there are principles, which produced the opportunity for creativity in their formulation. The Ministry of Māori Development’s 2001 summary shows how this can be done. If one is able to search for, “underlying meanings, intention and spirit,” the scope becomes very wide, and open to adoption of subjective viewpoint.
So as the words lost importance in a legalistic sense, at this very same time a new organisation was established, a tribunal, that was empowered to fill that vacuum themselves. Their pronouncements became known as the Treaty Principles, which would encompass some of those more "mystical" interpretations of meaning. This is how it happened:
The committee ... recommended the establishment of a tribunal ‘for the purpose of maintaining, upholding, advising and hearing of any matters related to the treaty to which existing laws offer no redress’. However, once the Cabinet agreed to endorse this proposal, an unexpected question arose, and the way it was answered would, inadvertently, enable the Waitangi Tribunal to do the transformative work that it eventually undertook.... 
[But] the Secretary of the Department of Maori Affairs, J. McEwen, realised that an important question had to be addressed because the committee had recommended that both the English and Māori texts of the Treaty be considered in any legislative enactment. ‘As the two versions differ, it will be necessary to state clearly which version is to be authoritative’, McEwen pointed out to Rata. ‘It can be either the English version or the Maori version, or both, but if the latter alternative is chosen, there will have to be a specific provision which empowers somebody to decide the true meaning of the words. I would suggest that the way around the difficulty would be to make both versions authoritative and expressly empower the Tribunal to decide any issues arising from the differences in wording.’ Consequently, he drafted a clause that stated: ‘In exercising any of its functions under this section the Tribunal shall have regard to the two texts of the Treaty set out in the First Schedule to this Act and, for the purposes of this Act, shall have exclusive authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied in the two texts and to decide issues raised by the differences between them.’  
In time, this clause would see the matter of the two texts become central to the Tribunal’s work and allow it to bestow a degree of authority on the Māori text that McEwen could never have imagined and which he had actually tried to prevent in his drafting. Nor did anyone in government anticipate that McEwen’s adoption of the Labour Party manifesto’s mention of ‘the principles’ of the Treaty would prove similarly vital to the work the Tribunal did.
And lo, 'the principles' were to take on a life of their own.

He might have only read comics, but there's a strong case to be made that the most effective political reformer of the last half century isn't Roger Douglas; it's Mat Rata.

* * * * 

1. Bain Attwood, A Bloody Difficult Subject: Ruth Ross, te Tiriti o Waitangi and the Making of History. 101 
2. ibid, pp 101-3
3. ibid, p. 103


Monday, 15 January 2024

BOOK REVIEW: 'The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi' - CONCLUSION: Rangatiratanga as Liberty


Over the summer break, I made it my project to read and review a book I expect to become increasingly influential in coming years: Ned Fletcher's 2022 book 'The English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi.' You'll be happy to know that today I'm wrapping it all up with my Conclusion.

Over the last week I've posted on the books errors and omissions and the author's tendency to get slippery with his evidence as he heads for home; how he appears to ignore the simple fact that cultural change on the order called for would take time, and to misunderstand both the rights and the protection that the Treaty offers.

And did I say I'm wrapping it all up? That's not quite true. For those still interested, I'll post over at my much-neglected NZ History blog two or three Postscripts offering some supporting evidence and arguments -- on Rangatiratanga as Ownership, on how Protection and Guardianship were discussed at the 1860 Kohimarama Conference, and maybe one or two other morsels.

But there is one piece I'm posting today as a Postscript to this Conclusion since, as you'll see, it follows so neatly from my concluding argument. It's an excerpt from Ewen McQueen's excellent 2020 book 'One Sun in the Sky' that argues the Māori 'New Testament,' "'Te Kawenata Hou' influenced Māori understanding of Te Tiriti; it is worth noting that it ... used the term the term 'rangatiratanga' to convey being free ... "


Conclusion

IF THERE’S ONE BOOK I’VE enjoyed reading, pondering and debating with these last twelve months then it’s this one. I hope you’ve enjoyed the review.

Despite my criticisms above, despite its flaws, despite the errors and omissions, it is a mighty piece of work which I thoroughly recommend. Wrestle with it, debate it with yourself and others, above all make full use of the history therein and his re-casting and piecing together of The Final English Text. That is masterfully done. Enjoy it.

But it is flawed, most especially in its conclusions. Given the book’s obvious weight and stature, and what might be done with those conclusions, it’s important to point this out. That’s why I’ve spent so much time on this.

It could be said that it doesn’t really matter. That the book in fact proposes no major change from the current debate. After all, the book argues that if we rely upon the English text as reconstituted here, then British intervention in 1840 was to establish government only over British settlers, and to otherwise ensure the continuation of inter-tribal government and custom. A plurality of governance in one territorial area.  Whereas the current mainstream interpretation, after decades of debate, is to rely upon the Māori-language version, which is already said to “split the powers of authority into two: kawanatanga (governorship), which was to be ceded to the British, and rangatiratanga which was to be retained by Māori.” [1] There seems little practical difference between the two. 

Law professor emeritus David Williams, one of Fletcher's thesis supervisors:
"The 'principles of the Treaty' were based on the assumption that

the two Treaty texts did not convey the same meaning.... We really
need 
to look at that again, because it's no longer acceptable
 historically speaking 
 to say that the Treaty texts are completely
different 
from each other."
Except as David Williams, one of Fletcher’s thesis supervisors, points out, this present approach still “requires a set of extrapolated principles to resolve the problem of the English and Māori texts saying different things.” [2] Court-written principles that have been much debated ever since – one of them in particular, “partnership,” empowering the recent push towards co-governance. Williams reckons Fletcher’s new interpretation of the English text will take away any grounds for debate at all because it confirms, he says, “that cession of sovereignty as understood in 1840 did not impose English law on Māori. Rather, it assumed that tikanga, as the law in operation for the Māori world, would continue.” [3]

So it is a more radical view. A conclusion that, I’ve argued here, is unsupported.

There were acquisitive eyes on these islands in the 1830s, and the Colonial Office eventually recognised that it might be their role to mediate between them – between those who wanted Māori’s souls for God, and those who wanted some of their land for colonisation. The Colonial Office essentially decided to transfer all responsibility for colonisation to themselves, and to outsource to missionaries the necessary cultural change of Māori while pledging to protect their rights in law. 

That as time progressed this simple policy programme of Christianity and Law began to unravel was due to many things outside the scope of a book review, but was partly due to a breakdown in the understanding of the rights to be protected – and an increasing disrespect for and misunderstanding of the very concept of rights. If they were discussed at all, it was only in a very strict legalistic sense.

So I’ll close here by going back to the simple permissive legal maxim that Fletcher misunderstands, ie., that principle of English law sometimes called the “general power of competence,” or more simply: “Everything which is not forbidden is allowed.” It may seem strange to accuse a lawyer of such obvious acumen of not fully understanding a legal maxim, but that might be the best way to sum up. 

Fletcher argues that the Treaty promises to Māori self-government and protection in law. As he nears his own conclusion, Fletcher falls down repeatedly on his understanding of what exactly the Treaty means by protection, and by what “self-government” would look like if fulfilled. As mentioned above, the permissive legal maxim of “everything not forbidden is allowed” is a guide here.

The problem is exposed in his last few pages, as he brings his argument for a “pluralistic government” to a close – this being, he says, “not inconsistent with” English law [4]. (If he means it is consistent, then why doesn’t he just say that?) In support of being “not inconsistent with” he has us running after a cluster of “textual pointers” that he wants to say something different than they do, before arresting himself to say that the Treaty’s promise of “‘full, exclusive and undisturbed possession’ recognises that Māori society was to be left free to regulate itself.” In his view this would “leave inter-tribal government undisturbed.” [5]

This is puzzling indeed. Not least because the promise to protect in law an individual’s ‘full, exclusive and undisturbed possession’ of property is a claim of property rights -- it is not a never-ending pledge for the continuing existence of an “inter-tribal government” that never existed and never would. [6] Moreover, as Richard Epstein has pointed out, "The whole quid pro quo in theTreaty was the guarantee of property in exchange for sovereignty and protection. If [this] interpretation is, in fact, the correct one, I find it hard to see how the Treaty makes internal sense or why anyone would sign it." [7]

But it’s especially puzzling because, in the context of this legal maxim, all that is meant by self-regulation and undisturbed possession here is that “everything not forbidden is allowed,” under law. That law being for the protection of property rights, and forbidding physical coercion by others. It is not an assertion of pluralistic government: it is a commitment to the protection in law of one’s own moral space – one’s turangawae, a place to stand – a place in which one is free to act by right because one is protected in law from physical coercion by others;

The confusion occurs, I think, because of the Treaty’s (and Fletcher’s) frequent confusion between collective and individual rights – seemingly recognising individual property rights at one moment while promising at the next moment protection for (contradictory) ‘collectivised’ rights – ‘rights’ that still vested tribal land and decision-making over it (and others) in the hands of chiefs. (Why oh why did it take so long to begin breaking this knot by implementing something as simple even as ‘tenancies in common,’ so all individual rights could be seen to be protected.)

And in further part it is blindness to the idea that implementing unfamiliar law on a "new frontier" takes time – especially so with folk unfamiliar with, and sometime even hostile to, the very idea of a “rule of law.” It takes time, a gradual process – and even though the Colonial Office themselves understood this pretty clearly, Fletcher seems unable to see even the plain words in which they so often state them. Instead, he claims that what they promised was a permanent and ongoing state of tribal self-governance. This is not supported even by his own evidence. 

That said, if there is a right to permanent self-government in the Treaty, then it is that of which John Locke spoke: which is the individual right to govern oneself free of let or hindrance by others – this self-governance being the source of all freedom. In libertarian terms, all one requires from a legal authority for this self-governance to function is to be protected in one’s genuine rights, for coercion to be outlawed and to be otherwise left alone by that authority. Thereafter, all human interaction becomes voluntary,

Would that this were the meaning one could draw from either Treaty, or Tiriti. Or from today’s lawmakers.

THE END

DOWNLOAD THE COMPLETE REVIEW HERE [PDF], or head to ...

=> PART ONE, the Introduction to the series
=> PART TWOErrors and Omissions
=> PART THREEGetting Slippery With It
=> PART FIVEGetting Rights Right


POSTSCRIPT 1: Rangatiratanga as Liberty

It might surprise you to know, since so much hangs upon it, that the term “tino rangatiratanga” is “a missionary neologism”—one of many. [8] Its root word is ‘rangatira,’ which was of course an original te reo word meaning ‘chief.’ This new word coined by Williams then stresses the power, authority, and agency of the chief.

Ewen McQueen makes a fascinating argument that while rangatiratanga can mean many things, including ownership [see Postscript 2], there is a sense that it also means liberty – and in the same way referred to above in my conclusion. That sense comes from the New Testament, which is where most Māori would have encountered this new word 

By 1840 here reading “had come to stay.” [9] Before 1830, missionaries were prized most for bringing bullets. [10] But from 1830 on, they were prized more for bringing books. “Between 1835 and 1839 almost everybody, young and old, wanted to read and write their own language. Many self-appointed teachers began village schools [11] and all over the Island Māoris learned to read and write. For a time, their enthusiasm seemed limitless.” [12]

It had already extended into transforming Māori into a written language – as it had to if missionaries were to distribute Bibles. Because the book about which they quickly became most enthusiastic was the New Testament.

“The Māori New Testament, Te Kawenata Hou, had been first printed in full in 1837 [writes McQueen [13]]. It quickly became a highly prized possession among Māori. Tens of thousands of copies were printed, circulated and read. [14] As Claudia Orange acknowledges, many Māori were familiar with biblical texts and the nuances of meaning, which they debated exhaustively…. “Te Kawenata Hou … provided another cue for … Māori understanding of the Treaty.

This missionary neologism “rangatiratanga” was used in several ways by translators. As historian Paul Moon notes, “[t]he relevant portion of the Māori Lord’s Prayer reads: ‘…kia tai mai tou rangatiratanga’—‘…thy kingdom come’.” [15]

But as Ewen McQueen notes, there is one important sense in which it is also used: to convey agency. And most importantly: liberty.

“It is worth noting that [Te Kawenata Hou] also used the term rangatira to convey being free. Likewise rangatiratanga was used to express liberty or freedom. However it was not liberty exercised independently, or in defiance of sovereign authority. It was liberty fostered in submission to, and under the protection of, governing authorities.

“The concept was both spiritual and temporal. Christians submitted to the sovereignty of the Kingship of Jesus Christ. But in doing so they found true freedom. As the Apostle John noted – if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed (tino rangatira). [16] Likewise, in a secular context, we find a Roman captain telling the Apostle Paul of how he had purchased his freedom (rangatiratanga) for a large sum of money. Paul responds that as a citizen under the sovereignty of Rome, he was born free (wanau rangatira mai). [17]

“This Biblical context of rangatiratanga as freedom or liberty throws a new light on understanding this term in the Treaty. Not only are we dealing with a chieftainship over land and resources [see Postscript 2 below], we are dealing with the idea of a political freedom or liberty. However, it is not liberty against the sovereignty of the Crown or independent from its authority. Rather, it is the freedom guaranteed by that sovereignty to every citizen of the British Empire. It is the liberty enjoyed by all citizens of Her Majesty’s realm that allowed them to live as free men and women.

This concept of ‘freedom via submission’ is difficult for modern thinkers to grasp. [In the words I’ve used in the main post above, it means that since it is the ‘rule of law’ that protects your “moral space,” understanding and ‘submitting’ to this rule of law enlarges and secures it] It runs counter to the spirit of the age … As such, some activists today bristle at the suggestion that Māori agreed to come under Crown sovereignty. Instead, the seem to believe the old accusation of the American traders [here] who in 1840 tried to dissuade Māori from th Treaty. According to these traders, signing would mean the country was ‘gone to the Queen,’ and Māori would become ‘taurekareka’ or slaves in their own land. The traders’ insidious message was clear – you can have the Queen’s sovereignty or you can’t have your liberty – but you can’t have both.

“Ironically, the chiefs in 1840 were not so easily deceived. Strongly influenced by the spread of Christianity in the preceding decade perhapos the better understood the concept of ‘freedom in submission.’ As we will see [in the debates accompanying the Treaty signings] they certainly could see the benefits of one overarching authority to establish law and order.

“It was the stability provided by such government that would allow them to work, trade and prospers. In so doing they would enjoy the unqualified exercise of their rangatiratanga – their freedom. It was submission to Crown sovereignty that would truly enable them to live as rangatira – free men.

“This vision of loyal subjects prospering and doing well and enjoying liberty was completely in line with what Māori would have understood from the Bible. The writings of the Apostle Peter in Te Kawenata Hou sum it up very well, and are worth repeating here in full:

“In Māori understanding of Te Tiriti there is no doubt that these words would have been influential.

“First, they confirm that governors (nga kāwanatanga) are sent by the king (te kingi) whose authority is supreme (runga rawa). Once again [18], this confirms the status and source of the governors’ authority. The kāwanatanga they exercise is pre-eminent and sourced in kingitanga. The apostle makes clear that such authority is to be honoured.

Second, this passage illustrated the concept of rangatiratanga as liberty or freedom. Crucially however, it is liberty arising under the authority of the governor. It is not independent of the authority or alongside it in some form of partnership. Rangatiratanga is about living as free people under the authority of the governor, the king’s representative. [Readers will have already noted the connection with Locke’s notion of “individual self-government” discussed above in the Conclusion. – Ed.]

“The importance of this passage in Te Kawenate Hou cannot be over-stated. This is because the two key Treaty concepts of kāwanatanga and rangatiratanga are brought together here. And the relationship between them is addressed with some straightforward pastoral advice. Honour the authority of kings and governors, and enjoy living as free men. It is a simple message with a clear meaning. Its significance would most certainly have been grasped by Māori."

* * * * 

This excerpt from One Sun in the Sky appears here by permission.

You can purchase your copy directly from the publisher: Galatas Press Ltd.






[1] Giselle Byrnes, The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History, Oxford University Press (2004), p. 34

[2] David Williams, ‘The Treaty, in English or Māori, is still our best way forward,’ E-Tangata, Feb 5 2023, https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/david-williams-the-treaty-in-english-or-maori-is-still-our-best-way-forward/

[3] Williams, 2023. Note however that Williams is wrong to say that “tikanga” is law, and to imply that it is the “first law of New Zealand.” As Gary Judd KC is at pains to point out, in commenting on Ellis v R [2022] NZSC 114:

“Tikanga is a collection of beliefs … [t]ikanga does not qualify as law…. [A]nyone who subscribes to tikanga beliefs, and wishes to manifest them, is perfectly entitled to do so, without interference. … 

    “The point is simply this: tikanga is not law because beliefs as such cannot be law. They can only be a purported justification for laws compelling action or forbidding action. … 

    “Beliefs, even if common to the entire population, are not law. However, beliefs may cause people to act in a certain way. Those actions may become customary and may even mature into customary law.

Where tikanga beliefs have been acted on, they may have given rise to customary behaviour and those customs might have matured into a species of customary law applicable for specific purposes, for example for determining who owns Māori land, but the Supreme Court went way beyond that by declaring that tikanga was first law.

    “Calling tikanga something which patently it is not, not only offends reason but undermines the value of what it actually is.” (Gary Judd KC, ‘Tikanga is not law,’Thoughts from the North, 21 July 2023, https://garyjuddkc.substack.com/p/tikanga-is-not-law)

[4] Fletcher, p. 525

[5] Fletcher, p. 527.

[6] We can easily agree that tikanga could continue, circumscribed as earlier described. After all, it is not the job of government to regulate non-coercive customs.

But the only possible thing to to which he could be referring with the idea of a continuing “inter-tribal government” is Busby’s paper creation of the Confederation of United Tribes, which was barely even a legal fiction -- numerically slight, geographically limited, never even keeping its own promise of meeting once a year “in a formal runanga” to enact laws. Beyond the first gathering to sign Busby’s Declaration and select a flag, it never met at all.  

Hobson himself had no illusions here, observing after his visit here in 1837, that despite the Declaration of Independence two years before, there was no organised body, no law-making being done, no justice being dispensed and no sign there ever would be: “nor could a meeting of the chiefs who profess to be heads of the united tribes, take place at any time without danger of bloodshed.” (Fletcher, p. 179)

[7] Epstein continues: "Suppose you believe the Treaty affirms Maori sovereignty.You then have some real problems to confront.You cannot explain the provisions about sale.You must explain how Maori can have total control, and yet at the same time land can clearly be alienated to certain individuals who purchase it from them. That seems to me to be an implicit contradiction. ...
    "I might add that every article in the Treaty will need to be changed if Maori sovereignty is to be regarded as a substantive portion of the Treaty. The provision in Article 3 making Maori equal subjects of the British becomes unintelligible. So does everything about the transfer of property. It may be textually correct that some read Maori sovereignty into the Maori version of the Treaty. But if so, it is probably no treaty at all, for the want of fundamental agreement." (Richard Epstein, 'The Treaty of Waitangi; A Plain Meaning Interpretation,' NZBR, 1999, p. 17-18)

[8] Paul Moon, The Path to the Treaty of Waitangi, David Ling Publishing, (2002) p. 147

[9] C.J, Parr, ‘Māori Literacy 1843-1867,’ The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Sept 1963), p. 211

[10] To be strictly accurate, of course, bullets would not become widely available until later in the century. The products most in favour at this time were gunpowder, ball, and muskets -- books being valued more to make cartridges with their pages than to read.

[11] G.F. Angas, Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zeaaland, London, Smith Elder & Co., 1847, II: pp. 10-11

[12] C.J, Parr, ‘Māori Literacy 1843-1867,’ The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Sept 1963), p. 211

[13] All excerpts in this section hereafter, unless stated otherwise, are from McQueen (2020), pp. 49-56. Footnotes included in excerpts are as referenced therein.

[14] William Williams, Christianity Among the New Zealanders, Seeley, Jackson & Halliday, London (1867), p. 41

[15] Moon (2002), p. 204 n. 87

[16] Te Kawenata Hou, 1837, p. 142, Hoani 8:36

[17] Te Kawenata Hou, 1837, p. 201, Ko Nga Mahi A Nga Apotoro 22:28

[18] See McQeeen pp 45-53, for earlier more detailed discussion of these points, of which this is merely a brief recapitulation.