Showing posts with label Fiscal Cliff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fiscal Cliff. Show all posts

Thursday, 6 December 2012

Thomas Sowell’s Fiscal ‘Cliff Notes’

The always very quotable Thomas Sowell has some things to say about the follies of fiscal cliffs—and the real problem the “cliff” conceals.

Amid all the political and media hoopla about the "fiscal cliff" crisis, there are a few facts that are worth noting.
    First of all, despite all the melodrama about raising taxes on "the rich," even if that is done it will scarcely make a dent in the government's financial problems. Raising the tax rates on everybody in the top two percent will not get enough additional tax revenue to run the government for 10 days.
    And what will the government do to pay for the other 355 days in the year?

Taxing the rich is all about politics. It has nothing to do with economics. It’s the politics of envy—rolled out by Obama in this depression the same way Franklin Roosevelt rolled out his abuse of “economic royalists” in his.

All the political angst and moral melodrama about getting "the rich" to pay "their fair share" is part of a big charade… Taxing "the rich" will produce a drop in the bucket when compared to the staggering and unprecedented deficits of the Obama administration.
    No previous administration in the entire history of the nation ever finished the year with a trillion dollar deficit. The Obama administration has done so every single year. Yet political and media discussions of the financial crisis have been focused overwhelmingly on how to get more tax revenue to pay for past and future spending.

This is the real problem the phony problem is being used to conceal.

The very catchwords and phrases used by the Obama administration betray how phony this all is. For example, "We are just asking the rich to pay a little more."
    This is an insult to our intelligence. The government doesn't "ask" anybody to pay anything. It orders you to pay the taxes they impose and you can go to prison if you don't.

As we know, much of the money being over-spent has been shovelled out for decades by the entitlement state. In the name of “need, not greed.”  Much of what has been wasted in this last decade was shovelled out in the name of “stimulus,” or "investing in the industries of the future"—“all the fancy substitute words for plain old spending.”

The theory about "stimulus" is that government spending will stimulate private businesses and financial institutions to put more of their money into the economy, speeding up the recovery. But the fact that you call something a "stimulus" does not make it a stimulus.
   
Stimulus spending began during the Bush administration and has continued full blast during the Obama administration. But the end result is that both businesses and financial institutions have had record amounts of their own money sitting idle. The rate of circulation of money slowed down. All this is the opposite of stimulus.
   
What about "investing in the industries of the future"? Does the White House come equipped with a crystal ball? Calling government spending "investment" does not make it investment any more than calling spending "stimulus" makes it stimulate anything.
   
What in the world would lead anyone to think that politicians have some magic way of knowing what the industries of the future are? Thus far the Obama administration has repeatedly "invested" in the bankruptcies of the present, such as Solyndra.
   
Using lofty words to obscure tawdry realities extends beyond the White House. Referring to the Federal Reserve System's creation of hundreds of billions of new dollars out of thin air as "quantitative easing" makes it seem as if this is some soothing and esoteric process, rather than amounting essentially to nothing more than printing more money.
   
Debasing the value of money by creating more of it is nothing new or esoteric. Irresponsible governments have done this, not just for centuries, but for thousands of years.
   
It is a way to take people's wealth from them without having to openly raise taxes.

Hello, Russel Norman?

Wednesday, 5 December 2012

There are much bigger threats than the “fiscal cliff” [corrected]

In 35 days the US Government goes off the so-called “Fiscal Cliff”—tax cuts expire, spending cuts kick in, the debt ceiling is broken, and all hell is (allegedly) loosed on the world.

Maybe.

Marc Faber says no. There are much bigger problems out there, including the enthusiasm of politicians and investors to continue faking reality.

Peter Schiff also says no. There are two much bigger threats to the US economy than the immediate “fiscal cliff,” he says: debt, and Ben Bernanke.

The biggest risk is not that “we go over this phony fiscal cliff,” Schiff said in a recent interview. “It’s [that] the government cancels the spending cuts, cancels the tax hikes,… [and] instead we end up going over the real fiscal cliff further down the road.”
“In fact,” he added, “the real fiscal cliff comes when our creditors want their money back and we don’t have it.”

Monday, 17 September 2012

The End May Be Closer Than You Think

imageGuest post by Douglas French

We hear plenty about fiscal cliffs, the problems in Europe, and out-of-control government budgets every day. But tucked away in our comfortable homes, watching satellite TV and living the dream, these threats to interrupt our good life seem to be only abstractions.

Books about an impending financial collapse are a dime a dozen, and besides, we're already done the collapse thing. Thanks to Ben Bernanke's money geyser, we can all get cash from the corner ATM, and live happily ever after.

Don't bet on it.

The 2008 crash was just the beginning of the end, according to John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper, authors of the readable, yet sobering Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle and How It Changes Everything.

Plenty of financial commentators and prognosticators want to treat this Great Recession as the average garden-variety gully washer. OK, stocks and real estate went down in price, now buy them and watch patiently while they go up. Of course, that boat has been missed in both regards. Stocks have more than doubled and house prices are bouncing.

The authors make the point that the entire world is connected. If you think Greece can collapse without repercussions on this side of the pond, you're wrong. The problem is debt. The Greeks didn't fund their own debt, the European banks did. And when that debt goes bad, so will the European banks. It will be 2008 all over again and then some.

Government debt, corporate debt, personal debt: It's all been piling up for 60 years. This debt must be liquidated. Piling on more debt on top of defaulted debt, recognized or not, will not solve the problem. Central bankers and government bureaucrats haven't figured that out yet, but investors must understand. Their financial lives depend on it. Thankfully, Maudlin and Tepper not only make their case convincingly that more trouble is ahead, but provide advice on what to do to protect yourself.

People make the mistake that the past provides a good indication of what the future will be. Aptly, the authors begin the book with a quotation from Jean Monnet: "People only accept change in necessity and see necessity only in crisis."

This goes especially for politicians, who talk about fixing the debt crisis when we all know nothing will be done until there is a crisis. After all, while they don't always act like it, politicians are human.

It takes a Minsky moment to wake the world up, and there are plenty of those coming. The economist Hyman Minsky did plenty of great work framing the causes and series of events leading up to financial collapses. The overriding Minsky message is that financial stability breeds instability, or as the authors repeat throughout Endgame, "The more things stay the same, the more complacent we get, until Bang!"

What that "bang" will look like is an open question that the authors don't exactly commit to. That's what makes Endgame such interesting reading. Mauldin and Tepper don't try to cram a point of view down the reader's throat. Will we have deflation? Or will it be inflation, or even hyperinflation?

The authors don't pretend to be clairvoyant. They make compelling cases for each possibility. What they believe for sure is that volatility will roil the financial markets going forward. Stocks for the long term -- or anything for the long term, for that matter -- is a prescription for a money-losing disaster.

The bond market will be tested, despite the world's deleveraging. Not even Japan has a homegrown source of bond demand anymore. The day will come again when cash will be dear as countries and corporations compete for funding. This will turn the notion that it is economic strength that forces interest rates on their head. Punk economies will lead to even greater strain on government receipts at the same time more money is needed to service debt.

There are two ways for governments to default: outright repudiation and inflating the debt away with central bank money creation and monetization of the debt. The latter is the modern solution for governments that can print their own currency, such as the United States. Greece doesn't have this luxury. Nor does California.

But how long can the Fed keep buying U.S. Treasuries with impunity? In a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece this spring, former Treasury official Lawrence Goodman wrote,

Last year, the Fed purchased a stunning 61% of the total net Treasury issuance, up from negligible amounts prior to the 2008 financial crisis. This not only creates the false appearance of limitless demand for U.S. debt but also blunts any sense of urgency to reduce supersized budget deficits.

The Fed has taken the place of Japan and China as major buyers of Treasury debt, and in time, the results will be catastrophic.

This information comes after the 2011 publication of Endgame, and I can't help but think the author's chapter on the potential for U.S. hyperinflation might be different, given the latest information concerning Bernanke's bond-buying spree.

imageThe authors devote a chapter to Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's book This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. In addition to quoting liberally from that book, Reinhart and Rogoff sat down for an illuminating interview. For those who look at the Japan experience and believe America has plenty of time to work itself out its problems, the authors of This Time think differently. Even John Mauldin was shocked and scared by what they have to say.

For the most part, Maudlin and Tepper manage to stay away from debates about what should be done to fix the problem. For example, advocates of the Austrian School of economics (like this writer) say get rid of the Fed, let the banks fail and let the system cleanse itself. The authors don't have time for this sort of ivory tower theorizing. "We find that a boring and almost pointless argument."

After all, "The people in control don't buy Austrian economics," they explain. "It makes for nice polemics, but is never going to be policy."

Well, fair enough. Instead, Mauldin and Tepper use 100 pages to lay out what the end of the debt supercycle will look like in various countries and regions around the world. Unfortunately, in this section, they drift into policy suggestions that require more government, rather than less, and their claim that it was the gold standard that lengthened the Great Depression is just not true. It was instead FDR's massive government intervention that kept the economy from correcting and, in turn, reviving.

While the authors' outlook is grim, in broad strokes, they provide investment advice for both the inflation and deflation scenarios. And ever the optimists (at least they keep telling the reader they are optimistic), they end on a high note, reminding us of the many technologic advances that make our world amazing today and speculating that future advances will be just that much more incredible.

Governments cannot print their way out of this mess. The end may be closer than you think. Read Mauldin and Tepper to get ready.

Douglas French is president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and author of Early Speculative Bubbles & Increases in the Supply of Money, the first major empirical study of the relationship between early bubbles and the money supply through the lens of Austrian Economics. It is the only book to solve the most famous bubble in history – Tulip mania.

Thursday, 2 August 2012

Deflation? Don't Count On It...

GUEST POST from Jeff Clark from the Casey Daily Dispatch 

Deflationists and inflationists have been arguing since the crisis hit and stimulus began which outcome will prevail. Each side has data to back up its claims, and the public doesn't see a clear winner. One of those data points is what historically occurs when an overburden of debt finally blows up, an event that's almost certainly dead ahead for us. Deflationists will point to periods in history where deflation resulted. But there's more to the argument, says Jim Puplava of Financial Sense. He emphatically states, "The outcome depends on whether or not the economy is operating under a fiat currency system, because there's never been a deflationary depression when one's been in place."

When I saw this claim, I wanted to hear more, because deflationary forces seem strong at the moment. And which way this goes has direct and significant implications for investments, including gold. Here's my interview with Jim.

Jeff Clark: For those who don't know you, Jim, tell us what you do.

Jim Puplava: Basically I head up three companies. We have our own independent broker-dealer; we have a money management firm; and we have a media company which produces the Financial Sense News Hour online. I head up those three companies and am the CEO.

Jeff: It's been four years since the financial crisis, and we're still debating inflation vs. deflation. I found your claim quite compelling, so tell us what you found in your research.

Jim: Well, why don't we begin with the financial crisis that transpired between 2007 and 2009, something every investor remembers? Now the deflationists would argue that in a crisis as big as that, the resulting downturn in the economy is always deflationary. But if we look at that period, the money supply continued to expand. In my opinion, inflation is associated with monetary policy.

Jeff: We should probably define the terms we're using.

Jim: This is one of the problems we have when talking about deflation. You will often hear, for example, that "housing prices fell by 30%" or the "stock market fell by 40%," supposedly meaning it was deflationary. But that is a specious argument at best, because if we call the crash in real estate and the stock market deflation, then what would the deflationists argue now that housing is starting to turn around? What would they call the S&P going from 666 to 1,373? It's up over 100%... is that deflation?

Let's take the popular definition of inflation - rising prices, which is really a symptom of inflation. During the financial crisis, there were only three months where the CPI was negative. Prior to 2008, the last time you saw a negative CPI was in 1954, when Eisenhower was president! So despite all the claims about deflation, all you would have to do is look at a graph of M1 and M2 and see that the money supply actually expanded during this period.

Investors may not recall that in the middle of the 2007-2009 crisis, Bloomberg sued through the Freedom of Information Act and got access to the Fed's records of exactly what they did. We found out that they either guaranteed, expanded, or backstopped somewhere around $8 to $9 trillion. That can only be done in a fiat money system - something you can't do with a gold-backed system.

Jeff: Like during the Great Depression.

Jim: Even before that. Step back to 1920-1921... If you look at the statistics during that period of time when we were on an actual gold standard, you saw a huge contraction of GDP and in the price of goods. Here are the actual numbers: between the summer of 1920 and 1921, nominal GDP fell by 23.9%; wholesale prices as measured by the PPI dropped by 40.8%; and the CPI fell by 8.3%. It lasted for roughly two years.

I have yet to see anything like this in Japan. I have yet to see anything like this in the United States - despite the credit crisis and all the fallout we've had.

Furthermore, even in the gold standard we had during the '20s and '30s, we had inflation. President Roosevelt devalued the dollar by 60% in March of 1933, and when he re-priced gold from $20 to $35, he stopped deflation dead in its tracks. By the end of the month we were experiencing inflation. We were running single-digit inflation rates the very month he did that in 1933, all the way up to 1937, when FDR and the Federal Reserve reversed course. So as a result of the devaluation we got large doses of inflation.

Jeff: So your point is that even though we had a gold standard during the Great Depression, the government found a way to cause currency dilution, AKA inflation.

Jim: That's right.

Jeff: You brought up Japan; I assume you're using it as an example instead of the smaller countries because it's a major economy?

Jim: Yes, exactly. Even though the US dollar is the world's reserve currency, we have three major currencies where most trade is conducted - the dollar, euro, and Japanese yen. Argentina's economy is insignificant in terms of global GDP, for example, and they're constantly printing money, so a lot of people don't like to refer to small countries like these.

I'd like to address Japan, though, because of its unique situation. And I think a graph will best make the point. The following is Japan's CPI, year over year, going back to 1982. There were brief periods of deflation, about 1% or 2%, and you can see that most of this occurred between 2000 and 2004 and in the credit crisis following 2009 to 2010.

In that period of falling prices, the CPI was only down 1-2%. If we take a look at Japan's monetary base, however, there was only one period where it actually contracted, and that was between 2005 and 2010. But the period that the deflationists like to talk about - 1989 going forward - Japan's monetary base expanded every year. Government spending expanded viscerally.

Jeff: And now their debt is among the highest in the world.

Jim: Japanese debt today is roughly 208% of GDP, one of the highest debt ratios in the developed world. But there's something else that makes Japan unique...

If a government expands its spending in order to rectify weakness in the economy, there are couple ways governments can finance that. They can print money - which is what the Fed has been doing - or they can finance it through the bond market with existing savings. One of the very measures that allows Japan to escape a rather severe deflation compared to what we experienced in the early 1920s following World War I or in the '30s during the Great Depression was the Japanese savings rate. Going back to when the crisis began in Japan, the savings rate was 18%. In other words, Japan has been able to finance its deficits internally. Ninety percent of their debt has been financed and held by domestic savings. If the Fed or US politicians financed government spending with existing savings - in other words, took the savings of Americans and financed the deficit - that would not be inflationary. Inflation comes when we get debt monetization, and fortunately for Japan, they were able t o finance 90% of their debt expansion internally through domestic savings.

The second factor that contributes to what happened to Japan was the carry trade. As a leading export nation, Japan exported a lot of its money to the rest of the world, and it gave rise to the carry trade, in which we were able to borrow in Japan at some of the lowest interest rates in the world. So if Japan instituted capital controls, where the excess reserves of the monetary base were not allowed to leave the country, that money would have been confined within Japan itself, and then you would have had more money chasing fewer goods and services.

Jeff: What about Japan's demographics?

Jim: Yes, this is going to play very heavily on Japan. As their population has aged, the savings rate has declined from 18% to roughly 2%. If we look at total Japanese debt, 67% of that debt is rolling over in the next five years. More alarming is the fact that they have 900 trillion yen in sovereign debt outstanding, and the bulk of that is set to mature in the next two and a half years. And more importantly, the majority of this debt is now starting to be sold. A large percentage of this sovereign debt, as I've pointed out, is owned by Japan's own citizens, and for the first time in nine years, Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund, which is the world's largest pension fund, sold 443.2-billion of Japanese government bonds in its fiscal 2009-2010 year, as rising benefit payouts to pension reserves required a liquidation of debt. This is a major concern in our opinion for Japan, because as the Japan Investment Fund owns 12% of the country's outstanding domestic bonds, they are going to be selling an additional couple of hundred billion over the next two years.

So as Japan goes forward, there are only two things they can do to finance that debt. One, they could go into the world bond market, though they could be subject to bond vigilantes where the interest rate spread could be high; or two, monetize it. Because their debt to GDP ratio is 208% and still rising, the only way they're going to be able to keep interest rates down in that country is to monetize that debt in the same way our Fed is doing it through its monetary base and Operation Twist.

My point here, Jeff, is that the same demographics that will force inflation on Japan are the same demographics that are going to force inflation in the United States.

Jeff: Especially when you look at our unfunded liabilities...

Jim: Precisely. Lawrence Kotlikoff, author of The Clash of Generations and former senior economist on President Bush's Council of Economic Advisors, has a new book out, and he says US government liabilities are growing close to $11 trillion a year. At the end of last year, it stood at $222 trillion. And by the way, these numbers come from the Treasury and CBO [Congressional Budget Office]. These aren't numbers I'm making up, so I rest my case with the deflationists. History has shown deflation can end overnight.

Jeff: So you're saying history shows that when debt blows up in a fiat currency system, inflation has always been the result.

Jim: Exactly. That's the case even in severe downturns. Look at what occurred in Japan between 1989 and 1991... their stock market lost 70% of its value and real estate prices fell 40-50%. Yet you would be hard pressed to find deflation of more than 1% or 2% for brief periods of time.

Jeff: Let me challenge you on a couple points. Some will point to the "lost decade" in Japan as deflationary and say that the government's stimulus efforts didn't work.

Jim: During the Lost Decade of 1990-1999, inflation rates in Japan were 3% to 4%. One of the few times where they allowed the monetary base to shrink significantly was the period between 2005 and 2009, and the result was 1% to 2% deflation.

Jeff: I can hear some deflationists say, "Gee, if the CPI only goes up 3% when debt blows up, I'll take that."

Jim: They'll take that, but if you look at the dire warnings deflationists give, we have seen nothing of that sort in any major economy. Even in our economy, if we look at the credit crisis of 2007-2009, which had its origination here in the US, the monetary base didn't contract - it expanded. What people have to understand is that when money is created, central banks can't control it. And what happens with that money is that it finds an outlet. It has to go somewhere - it can go into housing, it can go into commodities, it can go into stocks. The big warning the deflationists will give is that the world is going to collapse and that we're going to see a repeat of the Great Depression. I would challenge them to prove that, because if we're on a fiat currency, inflation has always been the result.

Jeff: Another challenge: we're in deflation now because the economy is going nowhere, stocks are going nowhere, even commodities are going nowhere...

Jim: This is one chapter in a long book that has to play out. What we've got right now is the private sector deleveraging and the public sector leveraging up, and these two forces are fighting against each other and the result right now is stagflation.

Jeff: How long does this stagflation continue?

Jim: I think this stagflationary economy continues for the next couple years. Martin Armstrong, former head of Princeton Economics, also believes that will be the critical period when the fertilizer hits the fan. Of course a lot can change and accelerate that - the outcome of the November US elections, for example. I've taken a look at the president's budget... According to the CBO, he will expand spending by $700 billion over the next four years, assuming he is re-elected, and that's assuming his economic assumptions are correct. In other words, we can raise taxes by half a trillion dollars and it doesn't impact the economy, even though the CBO and the Fed acknowledge this would subtract 4% from GDP. So there are some wild cards out there that are unpredictable. The results of the November election could favor a postponement, or we could get an acceleration of that time frame.

And let me make a prediction: Right now the world is focused on Europe, and we're seeing all the fallout from that. I think the next crisis jumps from Europe to Japan, and then eventually from Japan to the United States. Right now the US has the "best-looking house in a bad neighborhood." A lot of gold investors have been disappointed with the price of gold or gold stocks, but they have no further to look than what's happened to the dollar. The US has been a big beneficiary of the flight of capital escaping Europe, so we've seen commodity prices go down. This fall in commodity prices has led to a lower CPI, and as a result we're also experiencing lower import prices, so the United States continues to be the beneficiary of the crisis. We will continue to be a beneficiary of this, however, only as long as we maintain some form of credibility in the bond market, the idea being that the US will eventually get its own financial house in order and will bring its deficits under manageable conditions.

Jeff: Are you saying we won't have a negative CPI again?

Jim: I'm saying that if we did, it won't stay there long because we're operating under a fiat currency, giving the government essentially free rein to print as much money as it wants.

Jeff: If you're right, then when the crisis moves to Japan, gold and commodities could still be weak because investors would still go to Treasuries.

Jim: We're in a period of a rising dollar, and that dollar is competing directly against gold. I also think it will depend on whether or not the US gets hit with the fiscal cliff in January and the economy weakens. If that happens, I think the Fed could embark on another massive round of quantitative easing, which would change the picture for the gold market. Right now, though, the Fed doesn't have to do anything.

One of the reasons I think gold investors got disappointed last fall is that the Fed didn't embark on quantitative easing. Instead it announced Operation Twist, which was really not expanding the monetary base, and the result was interest rates came down from 2.5% to 1.5%. So it wasn't necessary for the Fed to do QE. The market was doing the Fed's job for it.

Jeff: Is it your premise that this money finds its way into the economy and leads to inflation, meaning higher prices?

Jim: Absolutely. Our unfunded liabilities are simply too big. I had to laugh when the president gave a speech last week talking about this tax on the wealthy, which was going to generate, according to the CBO, $65 billion in tax revenue. The government is spending $10.4 billion per day, so that revenue would basically run the government for a little over a week.

Jeff: The extent of our unfunded liabilities would imply much higher price inflation, which in turn would lead to much higher gold prices.

Jim: Absolutely. I'm very bullish on gold. I think we're just going through a long consolidation period. Right now gold is competing with falling commodity prices and a rising dollar…

Jeff:  Thanks for sharing your insights.

Jim: You're welcome, Jeff. Thanks for having me.

Jeff Clark is is the editor of BIG GOLD, a Casey Research publication that pinpoints the safest ways to capitalize on the gold bull market.

Wednesday, 16 May 2012

What Isaac Newton Knew About House Prices …That the IMF Should

_Kris_SayceGuest post by KRIS SAYCE, from MONEY MORNING AUSTRALIA

‘Actioni contrariam semper et æqualem esse reactionem: sive corporum duorum actiones in se mutuo semper esse æquales et in partes contrarias dirigi.’
          – Law Three, Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis,
Sir Isaac Newton

Or to non-Latin speakers (including your editor)…

‘To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and in the parts directed to contrary.’

Apparently, this is a new idea to the guys and gals at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But thanks to ‘three decades’ of research, the boffins at the IMF have finally found out what Sir Isaac Newton knew 325 years ago.

That is, every action creates an opposite and equal reaction.

It’s Newton’s Third Law.

OK. Newton’s third law doesn’t directly relate to house prices. And strictly speaking, he’s not saying that what goes up must come down.

Even so, you can easily apply the words from the Third Law to asset price action. And we strongly suggest you pay close attention to them.

Because the latest IMF report (World Economic Growth 2012: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain) reveals the central bankers’ plan to ignore the laws of maths and physics. Instead, they’ve got their own ideas on how things should work.

Only this time, they assure you, things will be different…

We were stunned when we read this statement buried on page 89 of the latest IMF report:

‘Based on an analysis of advanced economies over the past three decades, we find that housing busts and recessions preceded by larger run-ups in household debt tend to be more severe and protracted.’

Really?

They’ve only just figured that out?

It’s taken them ‘three decades’?

Oy vey.

But that statement was nothing. We read on…

‘Based on case studies, we find that government policies can help prevent prolonged contractions in economic activity by addressing the problem of excessive household debt. In particular, bold household debt restructuring programs such as those implemented in the United States in the 1930s and in Iceland today can significantly reduce debt repayment burdens and the number of household defaults and foreclosures. Such policies can therefore help avert self-reinforcing cycles of household defaults, further house price declines, and additional contractions in output.’

Bottom line: it’s not the job of the State and the central banks to prevent asset bubbles. It’s the job of the State and central banks to inflate asset bubbles and then make sure they don’t burst.

How?

By implementing ‘bold household debt restructuring programs…’

You understand that’s shorthand. It means using private savings and taxpayer dollars to bail out those who get over their head in debt.

Of course, as we see it, the State and central banks cause the asset bubbles in the first place. So it’s no wonder there isn’t a peep from the IMF about government and central bank intervention causing price bubbles.

No, in their view the market causes all the problems and so the government must intervene.

Bubbles are good…busts are bad. That’s why they’re so keen to keep the ‘good’ stuff and get rid of the ‘bad’ stuff. Trouble is they ignore the fact that too much of the ‘good’ stuff causes the ‘bad’ stuff.

But the IMF commentary is more than just about house prices. It gives you a sneak peek inside the maniacal mind of central planners.

The Market is Sending Warning Signals

All around you, the market is screaming out. It’s sending warnings left, right and centre that something isn’t right. The message?

That the market needs a natural purge of all that’s bad…bad banks…bad economies…bad governments…bad central banks…

The whole darn lot needs a dose of economic Metamucil so world economies and the free market can start from scratch.

But that won’t happen anytime soon, because, as the IMF notes, it has a different take on things:

‘We also highlight the policy implications. In particular, we explain the circumstances under which government intervention can improve on a purely market-driven outcome.’

This morning Bloomberg News reports:

‘Spain said it would take over Bankia (BKIA) SA and may inject public funds into the banking group with the most Spanish real estate as the government prepares the fourth attempt to overhaul the financial system.’

According to the report, Spain will use 4.5 billion euros of taxpayer dollars to buy a 45% stake in Bankia.

And as the chart below shows, Spain’s biggest bank, Banco Santander, S.A. has fallen 64.2% since reaching a post-bust high in 2009:

Spain's biggest bank, Banco Santander, S.A. has fallen 64.2% since reaching a post-bust high in 2009Click here to enlarge
Source: Google Finance

Meanwhile, in the U.S., JP Morgan Chase & Co. [NYSE: JPM] announced a USD$2 billion loss due to… ‘synthetic credit securities…’

The banks will never learn as long as they know there’s a government and central bank to provide the ultimate backstop.

And finally, Bloomberg News reports the following comments from U.S. Federal Reserve chairman, Dr. Ben S. Bernanke:

‘If no action were to be taken by the fiscal authorities, the size of the fiscal cliff is [so large that there's] absolutely no chance that the Federal Reserve would have any ability whatsoever to offset that effect on the economy.’

In other words – you got it – the government must spend more so the economy keeps growing. And as a result, they delay the necessary bust yet again.

We’re not a fan of former U.K. PM, Margaret Thatcher, but she got one thing right: ‘You can’t buck the market.’

It’s just a shame to see so much taxpayer money wasted in order to refute her—or rather, to save the bacon of politicians, bankers and other vested interests.

Cheers,
Kris.

This post originally appeared at Money Morning Australia on 11 May 2012