Showing posts with label Exchange Rates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Exchange Rates. Show all posts

Wednesday, 29 June 2016

Don’t believe the Brexit prophecies of economic doom

 

There are plenty of reasons to reject the consensus that Brexit will be costly to the UK’s economy, says Isaac Tabner.


The shock and horror at the Brexit vote has been loud and vociferous. Some seem to be revelling in the uncertainty that the referendum result has provoked. The pound falling in value, a downturn in markets – it lends credence to the establishment’s claims before the referendum that a Leave vote would lead to economic Armageddon.

Clip1But there are plenty of reasons to reject the consensus that Brexit itself will be costly to the UK’s economy. Even though markets appear stormy in the immediate aftermath of the vote, the financial market reaction to date has more characteristics of a seasonal storm than of a major catastrophe.

We were told that the consensus of economic experts were overwhelmingly opposed to a Brexit. Lauded institutions – from the IMF, OECD to the Treasury and London School of Economics – produced damning forecasts that ranged from economic hardship to total disaster if the UK leaves the EU. Yet 52% percent of the British electorate clearly rejected their warnings.

Something that my professional experience has taught me is that when an “accepted consensus” is presented as overwhelming, it is a good time to consider the opposite. Prime examples of this are the millennium bug, the internet stock frenzy, the housing bubble, Britain exiting the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and Britain not joining the euro. In each of these examples, the overwhelming establishment consensus of the time turned out to be wrong. I believe Brexit is a similar situation.

Downright Dangerous

The economic models used to predict the harsh consequences of a Brexit are the tools of my profession’s trade. Used properly, they can help us to better understand how systems work. In the wrong hands they are always downright dangerous. The collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and the mispricing of mortgage-backed securities leading up to the 2008 financial crisis are just two of many examples of harmful consequences arising from the abuse of such models.

The output of these often highly sophisticated models depends entirely upon the competence and integrity of the user. With miniscule adjustment, they can be tweaked to support or contradict more or less any argument that you want.

The barrage of dire economic forecasts that were delivered before the referendum were flawed for two main reasons. First, they failed to acknowledge the risks of remaining in the EU. And second, the independence of the forecasters is open to question.

Let’s start with the supposed independence of the forecasting institutions. While economists should in theory strive to be independent and objective, Luigi Zingales from the University of Chicago provides a compelling argument that, in reality, economists are just as susceptible to the influence of the institutions paying for their services as in other industries such as financial regulators.

Peer Pressure

Another challenge faced by economists is presented by the nature of the subject matter. Economics is a social science which, at its heart, is about the psychology of human social interactions. Many models try to resolve the difficulties that human subjectivity causes by imposing assumptions of formal rationality on their models. But what is and is not rational is subjective. In further recognition of this difficulty the sub-discipline of behavioural economics has evolved.

When you put the current level of volatility in context of other shocks, market conditions are not as bad as they might seem.

Herding is a concept that has been used to rationalise financial market bubbles and various other behaviour. It describes situations in which it seems rational for individuals to follow the perceived consensus. Anyone who has found themselves in a position where the majority of their company has a radically different view to their own will have experienced the difficulty of standing out from the crowd.

In 2005-06, various people (including myself) presented the view that UK house prices would crash. While some audiences were sympathetic, the majority view at the time was both hostile and derisory. Challenging the received wisdom exposes you to feelings of isolation.

Received wisdom among academia has been that the EU is a force for good that should be defended at all costs. Respected colleagues are incredulous that anyone with their education and professional insights could think otherwise and remain part of the academic “in” crowd. In such an environment, it is very difficult to challenge this orthodoxy.

I – and the bulk of the UK population – might have been convinced by the pro-Remain economists if they had been a little more honest about the limitations of their models, and the risks of remaining inside the EU.

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Market Reactions

Despite reports of markets crashing following the Brexit result, when you put the current level of volatility in the context of a wider time period (above) and of other shocks, market conditions are not as bad as they might seem. The FTSE 100 is still higher than it was barely two weeks ago and the more UK-focused FTSE 250 is currently higher than it was in late 2014. This is the kind of volatility that markets see two or three times a year.

The volatility index for the US S&P, known as the VIX or the “fear gauge”, is what is widely used to measure how uncertain global financial market participants are about the outlook for stocks. When the Brexit result was first announced, the VIX moved sharply, but has since settled in the mid-20s. To put this in context, the all-time average is 20.7, the all-time closing low is 8.5 and the all-time closing high on Black Monday in 1987 was 150. More recently during the financial crisis, it reached a closing high of 87.2 in November 2008.

VIX volatility chart. CBOE

Other financial indicators also moved rapidly as the referendum results came through. On the face of it, the Japanese market suffered a severe shock falling almost 8%. However, the 8% fall in the Japanese stock market is almost exactly matched by an 8% gain of the Japanese yen relative to the pound. Therefore, the net effect for UK-based investors in Japanese equities is close to zero.

The fall in the value of the pound following the Brexit result is also not as bad as it may first appear, not when seen in a wider context. The size of the fall was exacerbated especially by the previous day’s assumption that Remain would win, by the scare-mongering that was put about by the Remain team before the vote – and by the six-month high the pound hit in the week before the vote…

Brexit

There is also precedent for a dramatic fall – after the ERM crisis – which proved beneficial for many British exporting companies and arguably helped sustain the economic recovery of the 1990s.

A lower pound benefits companies that add most of the value to their products inside the UK, and companies that sell their produce on international markets. This includes exporters like pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, drinks company Diageo and technology company ARM – all of which saw stock price gains on the morning after the vote. Companies that rely on imports or who add little value within the UK will be hardest hit in the short term as they adapt to the exchange-rate volatility.

There will undoubtedly be winners and losers from the UK’s decision to leave the EU. [Winners and losers who would not be so in a system of fixed-exchange rates* – Ed.] But indexes for volatility are already lower than they were in February this year, suggesting that (unlike those who comment upon it) these markets are not abnormally worried about the outlook, and UK government borrowing costs are at an all time low. This is further reason to reject the pre-referendum consensus that Brexit would bring economic doom.


Isaac Tabner is a Senior Lecturer in Finance at the University of Stirling.
This post previously appeared at FEE, where it was reprinted from The Conversation.


* F.A. Hayek: “[F]lexible exchange rates preclude an efficient allocation of resources on an international level, as they immediately hinder and distort real flows of consumption and investment. Moreover, they make it inevitable that the necessary real downward adjustments in costs take place…in a chaotic environment of competitive devaluations, credit expansion, and inflation…
    “I do not believe we shall regain a system of international stability without returning to a system of fixed exchange rates, which imposes on the national central banks the restraint essential for successfully resisting the pressure of the advocates of inflation in their countries — usually including ministers of finance.”

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Tuesday, 30 September 2014

(Bonus) quotes of the day: On currency depreciation

“The so-called improved competitiveness resulting from currency
depreciation in fact amounts to economic impoverishment. The
"improved competitiveness" means that the citizens of a country are
now getting fewer real imports for a given amount of real exports.
While the country is getting rich in terms of foreign currency, it is
getting poor in terms of real wealth — i.e., in terms of the goods and
services required for maintaining people's lives and well-being.”
- Frank Shostak, ‘Will Currency Devaluation Fix the Eurozone?

“[F]lexible exchange rates preclude an efficient allocation of resources
on an international level, as they immediately hinder and distort real
flows of consumption and investment. Moreover, they make it inevitable t
hat the necessary real downward adjustments in costs take place…in a chaotic environment of competitive devaluations, credit expansion, and inflation…
    “I do not believe we shall regain a system of international stability without
returning to a system of fixed exchange rates, which imposes on the national
central banks the restraint essential for successfully resisting the pressure of the
advocates of inflation in their countries — usually including ministers of finance.”

- F.A. Hayek, quoted in ‘An Austrian Defense of the Euro’ by Jesus Huerta de Soto
-

Tuesday, 21 May 2013

Oliver Hartwich, the Euro, and the “dangerous naivety” of floating exchange rates

We’re famous!

I’m very happy to see that a debate on the Euro crisis hosted by our Auckland University Economics Group earlier in the month has now slipped into Australia’s wide read Business Spectator.

Oliver Hartwich from the NZ Initiative talked to our Group a few weeks back on The Never-Ending Euro Crisis - the Anatomy of an Economic Policy Disaster, in which he

covered the history and pre-history of European monetary union, Europe’s fiscal and monetary problems, the eurozone’s governance issues and their political implications.
    But in the ensuing discussion, one of the economics professors, a renowned Austrian School theorist, asked two questions that were both unbelievably simple and incredibly sharp. The first: “So what does this euro crisis really have to do with money?” And the second: “Why have you not talked much about markets in your presentation?”
    At first, I was a little startled by these two questions. After all, when you give a whole lecture on the failings of a monetary union, surely this must have something do with money, right? And secondly, didn’t the euro crisis play itself out in the markets? Isn’t that where all the drama of these past years happened? How could I not have talked about markets?
    After the initial shock, I managed to give a reasonable answer to both his questions. However, I have been thinking about them for the past few days. And the more I do, the more it seems to me that they are not only valid questions: they also provide the answers to many of Europe’s current problems.

He’s right. They do. But because he’s left himself in the intellectual straitjacket of thinking that floating exchange rates would be the only way out, he doesn’t see that answer. 

How do economies adjust?

You see, Oliver insists

without the euro currency many of the problems we now observe would have never developed… trade imbalances between European nations probably would have corrected themselves through adjustments in the exchange rate. This is how such tensions had always been overcome when Europe still had many national currencies, and it certainly would have provided temporary relief…

Temporary relief only, because as he identifies, the real crisis “is really the crisis of the countries’ respective economies” :

These are economies that are in desperate need of economic reforms. Their problems have little to do with monetary union as such; the union merely brought their problems to light. Without the escape route of flexible exchange rates, their deep-seated problems could no longer be glossed over.

Note the first and last sentence: “These are economies that are in desperate need of economic reforms… Without the escape route of flexible exchange rates, their deep-seated problems could no longer be glossed over.”

imageNow, remove the intellectual straitjacket, and see what happens: The problem of the single currency zone with economies in desperate need of reforms suddenly becomes the solution. If no other escape route is offered them (and herein lies the present problem) the discipline provided by the single currency encourages the reform in those economies that is so desperately needed, and gives the public a reason to demand it.

Maybe the Euro is not so bad after all

The leading Austrian theorist in Spain, Jesus Huerta De Soto makes this point in “An Austrian defence of the Euro”:

The introduction of the euro in 1999 and its culmination beginning in 2002 meant …  the different member states of the monetary union completely relinquished and lost their monetary autonomy, that is, the possibility of manipulating their local currency by placing it at the service of the political needs of the moment. In this sense, at least with respect to the countries in the eurozone, the euro began to act and continues to act very much like the gold standard did in its day.

Simply put, the “fixed exchange rates” of a Bretton Woods system, of a gold standard, or of a single Eurozone currency—in which systems, trade imbalances are corrected through adjustments in prices and interest rates—all impose monetary discipline on a government, whereas the monetary nationalism of floating exchange rates allows printing press money to let rip.

Because Hartwich still seems to contemplate the crisis through the intellectual cracked lens of floating exchange rates however, he doesn’t see this.  He still sees floating exchange rates as the only way to make the markets correct the issue.

imageBut the big Euro problem really is a lack of market process—as our Auckland Austrian theorist above seemed to be suggesting. And the fly in the ointment here is really the central bank.  The main thing lacking in the present arrangement of the Euro currency unit—in which a central bank imposes interest rates across a whole continent—is any mechanism whereby price signals are able to work their magic.  Because if the central bank got out of the way and stopped dictating interest rates across the whole zone, there is a benevolent mechanism present in the system of (essentially) fixed exchange rates that would re-emerge: encouraging investors to withdraw marginal quantities of their money from relatively overheated areas (where prices are higher and interest rates too low), and delivering it to areas shorter of investment capital (where prices are lower, and interest rates paid to investors are higher).

And then instead of acting as a doomsday machine, the main thing that’s destroying the setup presently (the monetary transfer system) would instead become the mechanism encouraging each economy’s reform.

Fixed  versus floating exchange rates

Since this issue, of fixed versus floating exchange rates, is so little canvassed these days it’s worth making it a final postscript—in the hope, perhaps, that you too might rethink the issue.

It was Hayek who in his 1937 book Monetary Nationalism and International Stability argued

flexible exchange rates preclude an efficient allocation of resources on an international level, as they immediately hinder and distort real flows of consumption and investment. Moreover, they make it inevitable that the necessary real downward adjustments in costs take place …  in a chaotic environment of competitive devaluations, credit expansion, and inflation

Which almost exactly describes the modern world of endless currency wars, where desperate economic problems are able to be put off for tomorrow by the printing press—with all the destruction that creates.  De Soto quotes Hayek from 1975, where he summarises his argument

imageIt is, I believe, undeniable that the demand for flexible rates of exchange originated wholly from countries such as Great Britain, some of whose economists wanted a wider margin for inflationary expansion (called "full employment policy"). They later received support, unfortunately, from other economists[4] who were not inspired by the desire for inflation, but who seem to have overlooked the strongest argument in favor of fixed rates of exchange, that they constitute the practically irreplaceable curb we need to compel the politicians, and the monetary authorities responsible to them, to maintain a stable currency. (emphasis added)

To clarify his argument yet further, Hayek adds,

The maintenance of the value of money and the avoidance of inflation constantly demand from the politician highly unpopular measures. Only by showing that government is compelled to take these measures can the politician justify them to people adversely affected. So long as the preservation of the external value of the national currency is regarded as an indisputable necessity, as it is with fixed exchange rates, politicians can resist the constant demands for cheaper credits, for avoidance of a rise in interest rates, for more expenditure on "public works," and so on. With fixed exchange rates, a fall in the foreign value of the currency, or an outflow of gold or foreign exchange reserves acts as a signal requiring prompt government action.[5] With flexible exchange rates, the effect of an increase in the quantity of money on the internal price level is much too slow to be generally apparent or to be charged to those ultimately responsible for it. Moreover, the inflation of prices is usually preceded by a welcome increase in employment; it may therefore even be welcomed because its harmful effects are not visible until later.

Hayek concludes,

I do not believe we shall regain a system of international stability without returning to a system of fixed exchange rates, which imposes on the national central banks the restraint essential for successfully resisting the pressure of the advocates of inflation in their countries — usually including ministers of finance.

In which Keynes and Friedman see eye to eye

Perhaps I could point out too, as Ludwig Von Mises did, that floating exchange rates were much loved by Keynes…

Stability of foreign exchange rates was in [big-spending governments’] eyes a mischief, not a blessing. Such is the essence of the monetary teachings of Lord Keynes. The Keynesian School passionately advocates instability of foreign exchange rates.

Much loved they were too by Milton Friedman, who in this area as in so much else shakes hands with John Maynard Keynes. 

imageDavid Stockman, who in his recent book recounting the destruction of western capitalism by its supposed defenders, gives Milton Friedman the punch in his gut he deserves for his role in fulfilling the floating Keynesian dream, nailing him and US President Richard Nixon who between them put the final nail in the gold standard and instituted the modern world of floating exchange rates.

It was Friedman who first urged the removal of the Bretton Woods gold standard restraints on central bank money printing, and then added insult to injury by giving conservative sanction to perpetual open market purchases of government debt by the Fed.  Friedman’s monetarism thereby institutionalized a regime which allowed politicians to chronically spend without taxing…
    Nixonian cynicism and Professor Milton Friedman’s alluring but dangerously naive doctrines of floating exchange rates and the quantity theory of money picked up where Franklin Roosevelt left off. Notwithstanding Friedman’s aura of intellectual respectability, Nixon's crass political manoeuvres amounted to a primitive economic nationalism that harkened back to the worst of the disaster that Franklin Roosevelt had first sown in the 1930s…
image    [B]y unshackling the Fed from the constraints of fixed exchange rates and the redemption of dollar liabilities for gold, Friedman’s monetary doctrine actually handed politicians a stupendous new prize.  It rendered trivial by comparison the ills owing to garden variety insults to the free market, such as rent control or the regulation of interstate trucking…
    The very idea that the FOMC would function as faithful monetary eunuchs, keeping their eyes on the M1 guage and deftly adjusting the dial in either direction upon any deviation from the 3 percent target, was sheer fantasy…

He gave more reasons for his disgust in a 2011 speech amounting to another punch to Friedman’s solar plexus.

“That the demise of the gold standard should have been as destructive as it was of monetary probity can hardly be gainsaid.  Under the ancient regime of fixed exchange rates and currency convertibility, fiscal deficits without tears were simply not sustainable – no matter what errant economic doctrines lawmakers got into their heads. Back then, the machinery of honest money could be relied upon to trump bad policy.  Thus, if  budget deficits were monetized by the central bank, this weakened the currency and caused a damaging external drain on the monetary reserves; and if deficits were financed out of savings, interest rates were pushed up – thereby crowding out private domestic investment.”

and

image“During the four decades since [Richard Nixon closed off the last monetary tie to gold], the rules of the game have been profoundly altered.  Specifically, under Professor Friedman’s contraption of floating paper money, foreigners may accumulate dollar claims or exchange them for other paper monies. But there can never be a drain on US monetary reserves because dollar claims are not convertible. This infernal regime of fiat dollars, therefore, has had numerous lamentable consequences but among the worst is that it has facilitated open-ended monetization of US government debt.”

and

“So at the end of the day, American lawmakers have been freed of the classic monetary constraints.  There is no monetary squeeze and there is no reserve asset drain.  The Fed always supplies enough reserves to the banking system to fund any and all private credit demand at policy rates that are invariably low. The notion of  fiscal ’crowding out’ thus belongs to the museum of monetary history.”

and

“In fact, the United States is clocking a 10-percent-of-GDP-deficit for the third year running because this latest budgetary fling is just another episode in the epochal collapse of US financial discipline that began 40 years ago at Camp David.”

I think Messrs Stockman and De Soto might have a point.

Don’t you?

Monday, 25 June 2012

I’ve changed my mind about the Euro

imageShould the southern Europeans and Ireland withdraw from the European Monetary Union and go back to their drachmas and punts? Should Germany and the northern Europeans quit paying the southerners’ bills and coalesce around either a new mark or a revival of the thaler, the currency of the late Holy Roman Empire and old Hanseatic League?

Until the weekend, I thought reviving the mark or the thaler was the best approach. But I read an article over the weekend that changed my mind.  I think.

By Spanish economist Jesus Huerta de Soto, author of the excellent book  Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles  , the article is called “An Austrian Defense of the Euro.” Something I hadn’t thought was possible.

De Soto argues, first of all, that all good Austrians should be in favour of fixed, not floating, exchange rates.  This might come as a shock. He argues however that the fiscal discipline required by fixed exchange rates is at least something like the fiscal discipline required by the classical gold standard, which puts a check on governmental plans for easy money.  He quotes Hayek from 1975:

It is, I believe, undeniable that the demand for flexible rates of exchange originated wholly from countries such as Great Britain, some of whose economists wanted a wider margin for inflationary expansion (called "full employment policy"). They later received support, unfortunately, from other economists[4] who were not inspired by the desire for inflation, but who seem to have overlooked the strongest argument in favour of fixed rates of exchange, that they constitute the practically irreplaceable curb we need to compel the politicians, and the monetary authorities responsible to them, to maintain a stable currency
I do not believe we shall regain a system of international stability without returning to a system of fixed exchange rates, which imposes on the national central banks the restraint essential for successfully resisting the pressure of the advocates of inflation in their countries — usually including ministers of finance.

So supporters of fiscal discipline should be in favour of fixed exchange rates-on the understanding that the self-correcting mechanisms for within this system are similar to those of the classical gold standard, and the resulting restraints on government therefrom are a feature, not a bug.

And as he points out, the EuroZone is nothing if not a a zone within exchange rates are fixed—the consequence now being that those economies and those governments who displayed insufficient rectitude are now seeing their fiscal chickens come home to roost.

This, he argues is not a bad thing. It’s not even a good thing. It is, he says, a great thing.  Because, like a mirror, the discipline of the EuroZone reflects back to players the consequences of their own actions.

The arrival of the Great Recession of 2008 has even further revealed to everyone the disciplinary nature of the euro: for the first time, the countries of the monetary union have had to face a deep economic recession without monetary-policy autonomy. Up until the adoption of the euro, when a crisis hit, governments and central banks invariably acted in the same way: they injected all the necessary liquidity, allowed the local currency to float downward and depreciated it, and indefinitely postponed the painful structural reforms that where needed and that involve economic liberalization, deregulation, increased flexibility in prices and markets (especially the labour market), a reduction in public spending, and the withdrawal and dismantling of union power and the welfare state. With the euro, despite all the errors, weaknesses, and concessions we will discuss later, this type of irresponsible behaviour and forward escape has no longer been possible.

For instance, in Spain, in just one year, two consecutive governments have been forced to take a series of measures that, though still quite insufficient, up to now would have been labelled as politically impossible and utopian, even by the most optimistic observers:

  1. article 135 of the Spanish Constitution has been amended to include the anti-Keynesian principle of budget stability and equilibrium for the central government, the autonomous communities, and the municipalities;

  2. all of the projects that imply increases in public spending, vote purchasing, and subsidies, projects on which politicians regularly based their action and popularity, have been suddenly suspended;

  3. the salaries of all public servants have been reduced by 5 percent and then frozen, while their work schedule has been expanded;

  4. social-security pensions have been frozen de facto;

  5. the standard retirement age has been raised across the board from 65 to 67;

  6. the total budgeted public expenditure has decreased by over 15 percent; and

  7. significant liberalization has occurred in the labor market, business hours, and in general, the tangle of economic regulation.[7]

Furthermore, what has happened in Spain is also taking place in Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and even in countries which, like Greece, until now represented the paradigm of social laxity, the lack of budget rigor, and political demagoguery.[8] What is more, the political leaders of these five countries, now no longer able to manipulate monetary policy to keep citizens in the dark about the true cost of their policies, have been summarily thrown out of their respective governments. And states that, like Belgium and especially France and Holland, until now have appeared unaffected by the drive to reform are also starting to be forced to reconsider the very grounds for the volume of their public spending and for the structure of their bloated welfare state. This is all undeniably due to the new monetary framework introduced with the euro, and thus it should be viewed with excited and hopeful rejoicing by all champions of the free-enterprise economy and the limitation of government powers.

There is more, much more, and all of it worth thinking through—especially the motivations of those who both oppose and support the  present set-up, and its collapse: on one side the Europeans who purposely set up a system in which more profligate countries got to use the money and the credit rating of Germany—and on this side too those Americans who realised that as long as it was set up that way the Euro would never take over Reserve Currency status from the US dollar.

And opposing the Euro are the Keynesians who complain about the Euro’s straitjacket, not allowing within the EuroZone to push monetary stimulus at a time (like now) of economic crisis.

As Margaret Thatcher famously pointed out, one primary problem with socialism is you eventually run out of other people’s money. De Soto argues the European Monetary Union makes the running out crystal clear, and requires honest means by which to repair the situation—and as such advocates of freedom and sound money should support it.

It’s worth thinking about: “An Austrian Defense of the Euro.”