Showing posts with label Deflation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Deflation. Show all posts

Friday, 22 March 2024

CNN Is Wrong. "Deflation" Is a Good Thing.

 


This guest post by Soham Patil is for everyone who still thinks that falling prices are a bad thing, and that rising prices are, somehow, good...

CNN Is Wrong. "Deflation" Is a Good Thing.

by Soham Patil

A recent video by CNN states that lower prices are bad for the economy, and that consumers must get used to the newer, higher prices. The video goes so far as to say, “We’re never going to pay 2019 prices again.” The video claims that deflation is responsible for a long list of problems including layoffs, high unemployment, and falling incomes. Americans should simply get used to paying more and more each year, they say, and be happy about it. Except, so-called "deflation" -- falling prices, caused by rising productivity rather than by monetary collapse — is actually good for consumers despite the contentions of inflation-supporting economists.

The conclusion that inflation is a good thing is reached by the mishandling of economic terms. While Austrian economics accepts that "inflation" when used accurately is the expansion of the money supply, mainstream economics contends that inflation is simply an increase in the general price level in an economy however it is caused. This skewed definition allows one to erroneously conclude that inflation causes prosperity by raising profits and incomes through higher consumer prices. The problem with this is that “price inflation” (rising prices) is also often caused by real inflation: i..e, the increase of the money supply. An increase in the money supply comes from the creation of additional units of money. The wealth of savers is diluted by the expansion of the money supply, which leads to the hardships many Americans face.

Further, while the video contends that the pandemic may have caused rising prices, it cannot explain the continual growth of prices even after the effects of the pandemic have subsided. The pandemic is not responsible for the continual trend of increasing prices; the growth of the money supply is.

Figure 1: The M2 in the United States, 1959–2024

While the money supply of US dollars has increased steadily over the past few decades, a significant jump can be seen after 2019 when the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policies caused a great rise in the money supply. This growth, uncompensated by additional production due to the pandemic, caused the price inflation that many now blame solely on the pandemic. The truth is that if the pandemic were the cause of prices rising a significant amount, the absence of the pandemic should account for a proportionally drastic deflationary period afterward. This never occurred, and thus the money supply paints a more honest picture of inflation than any index of a collection of prices ever could.

Rising prices are obviously troublesome for both consumers and producers (everyone faces rising costs). By contrast, deflation (falling prices) is often a good thing. "Deflation" in simple terms simply means that the same unit of money is worth more today than it was yesterday. Consumers thus can buy more today than they could yesterday. Instead of actively being impoverished during conditions of rising prices, during times of gently falling prices consumers would instead be made richer. There are two contrasting ways that we might see falling prices: when productivity increases faster than the money supply (a very good thing), or when the money supply collapses after a failed inflationary boom (almost always a bad thing). Unfortunately, both good and bad are tarred with the same semantic brush.

The reason many economists are quick to champion inflationary booms as somehow creating prosperity is because central banks have previously used expansionary monetary policies to temporarily boost the economy by increasing aggregate demand. Several of these policies, often specifically lowering interest rates, cause a boom-bust cycle. When the money supply is expanded and cheap credit is abundant, firms are able to take on ambitious projects that they may not have been able to previously. Malinvestment results from the unsustainable credit expansion created by extremely low interest rates. There is greater demand for the factors of production, and an increase is seen in conventional metrics of economic growth such as gross domestic product.

During the process of malinvestment, an increase in employment occurs due to the firms having access to cheap and easy credit, allowing for greater business spending. However, when firms lose access to cheap and easy credit due to the central banks having to prioritise cutting inflation, jobs are lost. These job losses are not the fault of the deflation but rather of the malinvestment during the false economic booms. Without malinvestment and inflation, resources would have been invested in more-profitable endeavours, making better use of these resources.

Artificially cheap credit causes a misallocation of resources by skewing price information. Eventually, a bust must follow the boom. In this period, deflation often occurs due to market actors coming to more-realistic valuations of the factors of production. After these realistic valuations come about, consumers are able to pay less for their goods and services . . . at least until the central bank causes the next boom-bust cycle.

In conclusion, it would be wrong to pinpoint deflation as a potential issue for the economy. To do so would be to conflate the cause and effect of how money supply affects an economy. Contrary to CNN’s video, the Federal Reserve throughout its history has not helped the cause of consumers, evidenced by the exponential growth of prices since its foundation.

* * * * 


Soham Patil is a high school senior at Symbiosis International School. He is passionate about Austrian Economics and Philosophy.
 
His post first appeared at the Mises Wire.

Saturday, 22 July 2023

INFLATION: If we misuse the term to mean rising prices then we misunderstand its cause




"Inflation is an increase in the quantity of money and credit. Its chief consequence is soaring prices. Therefore inflation—if we misuse the term to mean the rising prices themselves—is caused solely by printing more money. For this the government’s monetary policies are entirely responsible. (emphasis added)
        ~ Henry Hazlitt, from his essay 'Inflation in One Page'

"Before World War II, when the terms 'inflation' and 'deflation' were used in academic discourse or everyday speech, they generally meant an increase or a decrease in the stock of money, respectively. A general rise in prices was viewed as one of several consequences of inflation of the money supply; likewise, a decline in overall prices was viewed as one consequence of deflation of the money supply. Under the influence of the Keynesian Revolution of the mid-1930s, however, the meanings of these terms began to change radically. By the 1950s, the definition of inflation as a general rise in prices and of deflation as a general fall in prices became firmly entrenched in academic writings and popular speech. (emphasis added)
        ~ Joseph Salerno, from his book Money: Sound and Unsound (p.297)

Hat tip Joshua Mawhorter, from his article 'Taking Back the Meaning of Inflation'

Tuesday, 13 September 2022

"Fundamentally, inflation is fraud."


"Fundamentally, inflation is fraud. The central government or bank printing more money lessens the value of the money already in circulation... An increased supply of money means ultimately that prices denominated in that money will go up. Unless you are the one to receive that new money at its point of entry, and thus keep pace with the inflation, the real value of your money holdings will go down....
    "If inflation is a fraud on the general populace, in that its false promise of improved growth rings hollow time after time, it is more specifically a fraud on [savers and] ordinary working people. When new money is created it enters the economy through the government, financial, and corporate sectors. The distributors and initial recipients of this new money obtain it before prices go up, in fact prices are then driven up by their spending of the new money. Those responsible for the inflation are thus ahead of it....
    "[I]nflation can only ever benefit the elite at the expense of ordinary people. Which is hardly surprising given the revolving door between the federal reserve and the financial sector. The same people who control the power of inflation are the ones who can directly benefit from it.
    "However, inflation is completely unnecessary for a growing and prosperous economy.... A declining general price level takes place as a consequence of true economic growth and wealth generation.... In the late nineteenth century both the UK and America had strict gold standards and declining price levels. This was also the period of greatest relative advancement in economic history, when both countries asserted themselves as truly industrialised economies, and the most powerful nations in the world.
    "Inflation is not necessary for real wealth and real growth.
 [See here, for example. Or, for a lengthier (yet still pleasantly concise) discussion of this subject, see George A. Selgin, Less than Zero: The Case for a Falling Price Level in a Growing Economy]"

~ J.R. McLeod, from his article 'Inflation, the Price Level, and Economic Growth: Everything the Elites Tell You about It Is Wrong'




Thursday, 7 May 2020

Money Pumping Won’t Fix What’s Wrong with the Economic System





Central banks everywhere, including our own, are in the process of "expanding their balance sheets" to "counter the side-effects of lockdowns, to buy exploding government debt, to "stimulate" the economy, to avoid the possibility of a severe recession ... but as Frank Shostak argues in this guest post, both history and sound economics tell us that expanding the money stock to reverse an economic slump undermines the process of wealth generation, and it prolongs the slump. In other words ...

Money Pumping Won’t Fix What’s Wrong with the Economic System

by Frank Shostak

To counter the likely severe side effects of the "lockdowns" on the economy—introduced to prevent the spread of the coronavirus—the U.S Federal Reserve has embarked on massive expansion of its balance sheet. The size of the Fed’s assets jumped to $6.2 trillion in April this year from $3.9 trillion in April last year—an increase of 58.9 percent. [In NZ, the size of the Reserve Bank's assets jumped to $42.3 billion in March this year from $26.0 last year, an increase of 62.7%!]

In response to this pumping, the momentum of the money supply has jumped sharply, with the yearly growth rate climbing to 23.7 percent in the week ending April 13, from 13.1 percent in March and 2.4 percent in April 2019. [In NZ
, the increase to March was 8.3%. The April number is not yet in.]


It seems that the Fed is eager to avoid the possibility of a severe recession, hence the reason for its aggressive stance. By this way of thinking, an increase in the growth rate of the money supply will strengthen the demand for goods, which will in turn strengthen the production of these goods.

Most economists are of the view that during periods of economic difficulties it is the duty of the central bank to pursue aggressive monetary pumping to prevent the economy falling into a severe recessionary black hole. An important influence behind this way of thinking is the work of Milton Friedman.

In his writings, Friedman blamed central bank policies for causing the Great Depression in the 1930s. According to him, the Federal Reserve failed to pump enough reserves into the banking system to prevent a collapse in the money stock. As a result of this failure, Friedman argued, the money stock M1, which stood at $28.264 billion in October 1929, had fallen to $19.039 billion by April 1933—a decline of almost 33 percent. [1]


Friedman held that because of the fall in the money stock, economic activity followed suit. By July 1932, year-on-year industrial production had fallen by over 31 percent. Also, year-on-year the consumer price index (CPI) had plunged: by October 1932, the CPI had fallen by 10.7 percent.



In fact, contrary to Milton Friedman’s view, the fall in the money stock took place regardless of the Fed’s alleged failure to aggressively pump money. The sharp fall in the money stock was in response to the shrinking pool of wealth brought about by the previous loose monetary policies of the central bank.

The Essence of the Pool of Wealth


Essentially, the pool of wealth is the quantity of consumer goods available in an economy to support future production. In the simplest of terms, an individual on an island is able to pick twenty-five apples an hour. With the aid of a picking tool, he is able to raise his output to fifty apples an hour. Making the tool, however, takes time.

During the time he is busy making the tool, the individual will not be able to pick any apples. In order to have the tool the individual must first have enough apples to sustain himself while he is busy making it. His pool of wealth or his means of sustenance for this period is the quantity of apples he has saved for this purpose.

The size of this pool determines whether a more sophisticated tool—a more sophisticated means of production—can be introduced. If this tool requires one year of work to build but the individual has only enough apples saved to sustain him for one month, then the tool will not be built—and the individual will not be able to increase his productivity.

More sophistication is added to the island scenario by the introduction of multiple individuals who trade with each other and use money. The essence, however, remains the same—the size of the pool of wealth (i.e., the stock of consumer goods) puts a brake on the development of more efficient methods of production.

Trouble erupts whenever the banking system makes it appear as if the pool of wealth is larger than it is in reality. When the supply of money expands, this does not enlarge the pool of wealth. This expansion instead sets in motion an exchange of newly-created money for existing goods. It gives rise to the consumption of goods that has not been preceded by the production of these goods. It leads to a decline in the means of sustenance. It is true that the expansion of money supply lifts the demand for goods, but this demand cannot support an expansion in the production of goods without an accompanying expansion in the pool of wealth.

If and for as long as the pool of wealth continues to expand, loose monetary policies give the impression that the expansion of the money supply is the key factor in economic growth.

That this is not the case however becomes apparent as soon as the pool of wealth begins to stagnate or shrink. Once this happens, the economy begins its downward cycle. The most aggressive monetary pumping will not reverse the plunge (for money cannot replace apples).

How Fractional Reserve Banking Leads to the Disappearance of Money


The existence of the central bank and fractional reserve banking permits commercial banks to generate credit that is not backed by the prior creation of real wealth. Once this unbacked credit is generated, it produces the same effect that the expansion of money does: it sets in motion the consumption of goods without the preceding production of these goods.

Whenever the extensive generation of credit out of "thin air" lifts the pace of wealth consumption above the pace of wealth production (as we have described above in relation to central bank monetary pumping) this starts to undermine the pool of wealth. Consequently, the performance of various activities starts to deteriorate and banks’ bad loans start to increase. In response to this, banks curtail the expansion of lending out of “thin air,” setting in motion a decline in the money stock. An example clarifies how this decline emerges:

Let us assume that an individual, Tom, places $1,000 in saving deposit for three months with Bank A. The bank lends the $1,000 to Mark for three months. On the maturity date, Mark repays the bank $1,000 plus interest. After deducting its fees, Bank A returns the original money plus interest to Tom.

In this scenario, Tom has lent his $1,000 for three months, i.e., he has transferred the $1,000 to Mark through the mediation of Bank A. The lending is fully backed, since existent money from Tom to Mark and then back via the mediation of Bank A.

Things are different when Bank A lends money out of “thin air.” For instance, let's say Tom exercises his demand for money by placing $1,000 in demand deposit with Bank A. By placing the money in demand deposit, he retains total claim to the $1,000. This means that the $1,000 is Tom’s exclusive property and no one is allowed to violate this right.

Now, Bank A may decide to take $100 from Tom’s demand deposit without Tom’s agreement and lend it to Mark. As a result, Bank A generates a demand deposit for Mark to the tune of $100. The money stock has now increased by $100. Because of this lending, we now have $1,100 that is only backed by $1,000 proper. In this case the $100 loaned also does not have an original lender, as it was generated out of “thin air” by Bank A.

When Mark repays the borrowed $100 to Bank A on the maturity date, it disappears. The money supply is now back at $1,000. If the bank continues to renew its lending out of thin air, then the stock of money will not decline. Indeed, the more lending out of “thin air” supplied by the bank, the greater the expansion of money supply will be.

The existence of fractional reserve banking (banks creating several claims on a given dollar) coupled with the subsequent unwillingness to renew and expand this lending out of “thin air” is the key factor in money disappearance. There must be a reason, however, why banks do not renew their “thin air” lending, causing this disappearance of money.

What Causes Banks to Curtail Lending?


A key reason is the weakening of the process of wealth generation, which makes it much harder to find quality borrowers. [The result of a declining marginal productivity of debt.] Remember that what weakens this process is the previous expansion in money supply due to the easy monetary policies of the central bank.

Loose monetary policies set in motion an exchange of nothing for something—i.e., consumption that is not supported by the prior production of wealth. This results in the transfer of real wealth from wealth generators to non–wealth generators.

This means that a decline in the money supply (i.e., monetary deflation) emerges because of the prior monetary inflation that diluted the pool of wealth. It follows that a fall in the money supply is really just a symptom. The fall in the money stock comes in response to the damage that the previous monetary inflation caused to the process of wealth formation.

Note that between December 1920 and August 1924, the U.S. Federal Reserve was pursuing a very easy interest rate policy and as a result the yield on the three-month government Treasury bill fell from 5.9 percent in December 1920 to 1.9 percent by August 1924. 
By December 1925 the yield had climbed back to 3.5 percent before declining to 3.1 percent by April 1926. 
Thereafter the yield followed a rising trend, closing at 5.1 by May 1929. (Observe that the average of the yield on the three-month Treasury Bill from September 1924 to October 1929 stood at 3.5 percent—below the average of 3.9 percent from December 1920 to August 1924.)

Coupled with the increase in money supply from January 1927 to October 1929 (the yearly growth rate of M1 money supply shot up from –2.2 percent in January 1927 to almost 8 percent by October 1929), setting in motion an economic boom, and inflicting severe damage on the process of wealth generation, i.e., severely undermined the pool of wealth. 

Note that the yearly growth rate of industrial production by April 1929 stood at 22 percent! Also, note that the previous massive booms had likely damaged the pool of wealth when the yearly growth rate of industrial production had stood at 42 percent in December 1922, and 28 percent in June 1926.

Because of the fall in the money stock from October 1929 to April 1933, various activities that had sprang up on the back of the previous monetary expansion found it hard going.


It is those non–wealth generating activities that ended up having the most difficulties in servicing their debt, since those activities never really generated any real wealth and were, so to speak, riding on the coattails of genuine wealth generators. [As Warren Buffett says, it's only once the tide goes out that you see who has been swimming naked.] After closing at 8.7 percent in November 1929, the yearly growth rate of bank loans had plunged to –20.8 percent by September 1932 (see chart). As a result the money supply (M1) collapsed (see chart).


With the fall in the money out of “thin air,” the support provided to non–wealth generators was arrested. This set in motion the demise of various non–wealth generating activities, which manifested in the economic nightmare that we now label the Great Depression.

Summary and Conclusions


Contrary to the popular view, it was not the Fed’s failure to pump aggressively during the 1930s  that was behind the Great Depression of the 1930s, instead it was the loose monetary policy of the Fed during the 1920s.

Even if the central bank had been successful in preventing the fall in the money stock, if the pool of wealth had been declining this would not have been able to prevent the economic slump.

Contrary to popular thinking, the lifting of the money stock to reverse an economic slump undermines the process of wealth generation and prolongs the slump. Being the medium of exchange, money can only facilitate the flow of goods and services in an economy—it cannot expand the of production of goods and services as such. The key to this expansion is an increase in the pool of real wealth.

______________________________________________________________________________
1.Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free To Choose: A Personal Statement (Melbourne: Macmillan Company of Australia, 1980), pp. 70–90.
Frank Shostak's consulting firm, Applied Austrian School Economics, provides in-depth assessments of financial markets and global economies. His post previously appeared at the Mises Wire.
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Thursday, 1 August 2019

Saturday, 9 December 2017

REPRISE: How the Stock Market and Economy Really Work





As the president and his supporters tout the inflating stock market bubble as a sign of prosperity, reprising this myth-busting guest post by Kel Kelly could not be more timely.
[NB: An MP3 audio file of this article, narrated by Keith Hocker, is available for download.]


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

"A growing economy consists
of prices falling, not rising."


The stock market does not work the way most people think. A commonly-held belief — on Main Street as well as on Wall Street — [and in the White House as well as CNN] is that a stock-market boom is the reflection of a progressing economy: as the economy improves, companies make more money, and their stock value rises in accordance with the increase in their intrinsic value. A major assumption underlying this belief is that consumer confidence and consequent consumer spending are drivers of economic growth.

A stock-market bust, on the other hand, is held to result from a drop in consumer and business confidence and spending — due to either inflation, rising oil prices, or high interest rates, etc., or for no real reason at all — that leads to declining business profits and rising unemployment. Whatever the supposed cause, in the common view a weakening economy results in falling company revenues and lower-than-expected future earnings, resulting in falling intrinsic values and falling stock prices.

This understanding of bull and bear markets, while held by academics, investment professionals, and individual investors alike, is technically correct if viewed superficially but,  because it is based on faulty finance and economic theory, it is substantially misconceived .


imageIn fact, the only real force that ultimately makes the stock market or any market as a whole rise (and, to a large extent, fall) over the longer term is simply changes in the quantity of money and the volume of spending in the economy. Stocks rise when there is inflation of the money supply (i.e., more money in the economy and in the markets). This truth has many consequences that should be considered.

Since stock markets can fall — and fall often — to various degrees for numerous reasons (including a decline in the quantity of money and spending); our focus here will be only on why they are able to rise in a sustained fashion over the longer term.
The Fundamental Source of All Rising Prices
For perspective, let's put stock prices aside for a moment and make sure first to understand how aggregate consumer prices rise. In short, overall prices can rise only if the quantity of money in the economy increases faster than the quantity of goods and services. (In economically retrogressing countries, prices can rise when the supply of goods diminishes while the supply of money remains the same, or even rises.)

When the supply of goods and services rises faster than the supply of money however — as happened during most of the 1800s — the unit price of each good or service falls, since a given supply of money has to buy, or "cover," an increasing supply of goods or services. (See Fig. 1)


image
Fig 1: NZ & British Price Level, 1860-1910

For those lost in the bewildered state of most presidents or modern economists, this may still seem perplexing, but could not be more straightforward mathematically -- George Reisman derives the critical formula for the formation of economy-wide prices:1 In this formula, price (P) is determined by monetary demand (D) divided by supply of goods and services (S):

P=D/S

The formula shows us that it is mathematically impossible for aggregate prices to rise by any means other than (1) increasing monetary demand, or (2) decreasing supply; i.e., by either more money being spent to buy goods, or fewer goods being sold in the economy.

In our developed economy, the supply of goods is not decreasing, or at least not at enough of a pace to raise prices at the usual rate of 3–4 percent per year; instead prices are rising due to more money entering the marketplace.

The same price formula noted above can equally be applied to asset prices — stocks, bonds, commodities, houses, oil, fine art, etc. It also pertains to corporate revenues and profits, for as Fritz Machlup states:
It is impossible for the profits of all or of the majority of enterprises to rise without an increase in the effective monetary circulation (through the creation of new credit or by dis-hoarding).
To return to our focus on the stock market in particular, it should be seen now that the market cannot continually rise on a sustained basis without an increase in money — specifically bank credit — flowing into it.

imageThere are other ways the market could go higher, but their effects are purely temporary.

For example, an increase in net savings involving less money spent on consumer goods and more invested in the stock market (resulting in lower prices of consumer goods) could send stock prices higher, but only by the specific extent of the new savings, assuming all of it is redirected to the stock market.

The same applies to reduced tax rates. These would be temporary effects resulting in a finite and terminal increase in stock prices. Money coming off the "sidelines" could also lift the market, but once all sideline money was inserted into the market, there would be no more funds with which to bid prices higher. The only source of ongoing fuel that could propel the market — any asset market — higher is new and additional bank credit. As Machlup writes,
If it were not for the elasticity of bank credit … [then] a boom in security values could not last for any length of time. In the absence of inflationary credit, the funds available for lending to the public for security purchases would soon be exhausted, since even a large supply is ultimately limited. The supply of funds derived solely from current new savings and current amortisation allowances is fairly inelastic.… Only if the credit organisation of the banks (by means of inflationary credit), or large-scale dishoarding by the public make the supply of loanable funds highly elastic, can a lasting boom develop.… A rise on the securities market cannot last any length of time unless the public is both willing and able to make increased purchases. (Emphasis added.)
The last line in the quote helps to reveal that neither population growth nor consumer sentiment alone can drive stock prices higher. Whatever the population, it is using a finite quantity of money; whatever the sentiment, it must be accompanied by the public's ability to add additional funds to the market in order to drive it higher.4

Understanding that the flow of recently-created money is the driving force of rising asset markets has numerous implications. The rest of this article addresses some of these implications.
The Link between the Economy and the Stock Market
The primary link between the stock market and the economy — in the aggregate — is that an increase in money and credit pushes up both GDP and the stock market simultaneously.

A progressing economy is one in which more goods are being produced over time. What represents real wealth is not money per se [not even crypto-money], but real "stuff." The more cars, refrigerators, food, clothes, medicines, and hammocks we have, the better off our lives. We saw above that if more goods are produced at a faster rate than money then prices will fall. With a constant supply of money, wages would remain the same in money terms while prices fell, because the supply of goods would increase while the supply of workers would not—meaning higher real wages. But even when prices rise due to money being created faster than goods, prices still fall in real terms, because wages rise faster than prices. In either scenario, if productivity and output are increasing, goods get cheaper in real terms.

This is what rising prosperity looks like.

Obviously, then, a growing economy consists of prices falling, not rising. No matter how many goods are produced, if the quantity of money remains constant then the only money that can be spent in an economy is the particular amount of money existing in it (and velocity, or the number of times each dollar is spent, could not change very much if the money supply remained unchanged).


image
This alone reveals that GDP does not necessarily tell us much about the number of actual goods and services being produced; it only tells us that if (even real) GDP is rising, the money supply must be increasing, since a rise in GDP is mathematically possible only if the money price of individual goods produced is increasing to some degree.5 Otherwise, with a constant supply of money and spending, the total amount of money companies earn — the total selling prices of all goods produced — and thus GDP itself would all necessarily remain constant year after year.

"Consider that if our rate of inflation were high enough, used cars would rise in price just like new cars, only at a slower rate."

The same concept would apply to the stock market: if there were a constant amount of money in the economy, the sum total of all shares of all stocks taken together (or a stock index) could not increase. Plus, if company profits, in the aggregate, were not increasing, there would be no aggregate increase in earnings per share to be imputed into stock prices.
image
In an economy where the quantity of money was static, the levels of stock indexes, year by year, would stay approximately even, or even drift slightly lower6 — depending on the rate of increase in the number of new shares issued. And, overall, businesses (in the aggregate) would be selling a greater volume of goods at lower prices, and total revenues would remain the same. In the same way, businesses, overall, would purchase more goods at lower prices each year, keeping the spread between costs and revenues about the same, which would keep aggregate profits about the same.

Under these circumstances, ‘capital gains’ from speculation (the profiting from the buying low and selling high of assets) could be made only by stock picking — by investing in companies that are expanding market share, bringing to market new products, etc., thus truly gaining proportionately more revenues and profits at the expense of those companies that are less innovative and efficient.

The stock prices of the gaining companies would rise while others fell. Since the average stock would not actually increase in value, most of the gains made by investors from stocks would be in the form of dividend payments. By contrast, in our world today, most stocks — good and bad ones — rise during inflationary bull markets and decline during bear markets. The good companies simply rise faster than the bad.

Similarly, housing prices under static money would actually fall slowly — unless their value was significantly increased by renovations and remodelling. Older houses would sell for much less than newer houses. To put this in perspective, consider that if our rate of inflation were high enough, used cars would rise in price just like new cars, only at a slower rate — but just about everything would increase in price, as it does in countries with hyperinflation. The amount by which a home "increases in value" over 30 years really just represents the amount of purchasing power that the dollars we hold have lost: while the dollars lost purchasing power, the house — and other assets more limited in supply growth — kept its purchasing power.

Since we have seen that neither the stock market nor GDP can rise on a sustained basis without more money pushing them higher, we can now clearly understand that an improving economy neither consists of an increasing GDP nor does it cause the overall stock market to rise.

This is not to say that a link does not exist between the money that particular companies earn and their value on the stock exchange in our inflationary world today, but that the parameters of that link — valuation relationships such as earnings ratios and stock-market capitalisation as a percent of GDP — are rather flexible, and as we will see below, change over time. Money sometimes flows more into stocks and at other times more into the underlying companies, changing the balance of the valuation relationships.
Forced Investing
As we have seen, the whole concept of rising asset prices and stock investments constantly increasing in value is an economic illusion. What we are really seeing is our currency being devalued by the addition of new currency issued by the central bank. The prices of stocks, houses, gold, etc., do not really rise; they merely do better at keeping their value than do paper bills and digital checking accounts, since their supply is not increasing as fast as are paper bills and digital checking accounts.
"An improving economy neither consists of an increasing GDP nor does it cause the overall stock market to rise."

image
The fact that we have to save so much for the future is, in fact, an outrage. Were no money printed by the government and the banks, things would get cheaper through time, and we would not need much money for retirement, because it would cost much less to live each day then than it does now. But we are forced to invest in today's government-manipulated inflation-creation world in order to try to keep our purchasing power constant.

To the extent that some of us even come close to succeeding, we are still pushed further behind by having our "gains" taxed.
The whole system of inflation is solely for the purpose of theft and wealth redistribution. In a world absent of government printing presses and wealth taxes, the armies of investment advisors, pension-fund administrators, estate planners, lawyers, and accountants associated with helping us plan for the future would mostly not exist. These people would instead be employed in other industries producing goods and services that would truly increase our standards of living.
The Fundamentals are Not the Fundamentals
image
If it is, then, primarily newly-printed money flowing into and pushing up the prices of stocks and other assets, what real importance do the so-called fundamentals — revenues, earnings, cash flow, etc. — have? In the case of the fundamentals, too, it is newly printed money from the central bank, for the most part, that impacts these variables in the aggregate: the financial fundamentals are determined to a large degree by economic changes.

For example, revenues and, particularly, profits, rise and fall with the ebb and flow of money and spending that arises from central-bank credit creation. When the government creates new money and inserts it into the economy, the new money increases sales revenues of companies before it increases their costs; when sales revenues rise faster than costs, profit margins increase.

Specifically, how this comes about is that new money, created electronically by the government and loaned out through banks, is spent by borrowing companies.7 Their expenditures show up as new and additional sales revenues for businesses. But much of the corresponding costs associated with the new revenues lags behind in time because of technical accounting procedures, such as the spreading of asset costs across the useful life of the asset (depreciation) and the postponing of recognition of inventory costs until the product is sold (cost of goods sold). These practices delay the recognition of costs on the profit-and-loss statements (i.e., income statements).

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Since these costs are recognised on companies' income statements months or years after they are actually incurred, their monetary value is diminished by inflation by the time they are recognised. For example, if a company recognises $1 million in costs for equipment purchased in 1999, that $1 million is worth less today than in 1999; but on the income statement the corresponding revenues recognised today are in today's purchasing power. Therefore, there is an equivalently greater amount of revenues spent today for the same items than there was ten years ago (since it takes more money to buy the same good, due to the devaluation of the currency).

"With more money being created through time, the amount of revenues is always greater than the amount of costs, simply because most costs are incurred when there is less money existing."

Another way of looking at it is that, with more money being created through time, the amount of revenues is always greater than the amount of costs, since most costs are incurred when there is less money existing. Thus, because of inflation, the total monetary value of business costs in a given time frame is smaller than the total monetary value of the corresponding business revenues. Were there no inflation, costs would more closely equal revenues, even if their recognition were delayed.

In summary, credit expansion increases the spreads between revenue and costs, increasing profit margins. The tremendous amount of money created since 2008 is what is responsible for the fantastic profits companies had been reporting (even though the amount of money loaned out was small, relative to the increase in the monetary base).
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Since business sales revenues increase before business costs, with every round of new money printed, business profit margins stay widened; they also increase in line with an increased rate of inflation. This is one reason why countries with high rates of inflation have such high rates of profit.8

During bad economic times, when the government has quit printing money at a high rate, profits shrink, and during times of deflation, sales revenues fall faster than do costs.

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It is also new money flowing into industry from the central bank that is the primary cause behind positive changes in leading economic indicators such as industrial production, consumer durables spending, and retail sales. As new money is created, these variables rise based on the new monetary demand, not because of resumed real economic growth.

A final example of new money affecting the fundamentals is interest rates. It is said that when interest rates fall, the common method of discounting future expected cash flows with market interest rates means that the stock market should rise, since future earnings should be valued more highly. This is true both logically and mathematically. But, in the aggregate, if there is no more money with which to bid up stock prices, it is difficult for prices to rise, unless the interest rate declined due to an increase in savings rates.

In reality, the help needed to lift the market comes from the fact that when interest rates are lowered, it is by way of the central bank creating new money that hits the loanable-funds markets. This increases the supply of loanable funds and thus lowers rates. It is this new money being inserted into the market that then helps propel it higher.

(I would personally argue that most of the discounting of future values [PV calculations] demonstrated in finance textbooks and undertaken on Wall Street are misconceived as well. In a world of a constant money supply and falling prices, the future monetary value of the income of the average company would be about the same as the present value. Future values would hardly need to be discounted for time preference [and mathematically, it would not make sense], since lower consumer prices in the future would address this. Though investment analysts believe they should discount future values, I believe that they should not. What they should instead be discounting is earnings inflation and asset inflation, each of which grows at different paces.)9
Asset Inflation versus Consumer Price Inflation
imageNewly-printed money can affect asset prices more than consumer prices. Most people think that the Federal Reserve and other central banks have done a good job of preventing inflation over the last twenty-plus years. The reality is that it has created a tremendous amount of money, but that the money has disproportionately flowed into financial markets instead of into the real economy, where it would have otherwise created drastically more price inflation.

There are two main reasons for this channelling of money into financial assets. The first is changes in the financial system in the mid and late 1980s, when an explosive growth of domestic credit channels outside of traditional bank lending opened up in the financial markets. The second is changes in the US trade deficit in the late 1980s, wherein it became larger, and export receipts received by foreigners were increasingly recycled by foreign central banks into US asset markets.10 As financial economist Peter Warburton states,
a diversification of the credit process has shifted the centre of gravity away from conventional bank lending. The ascendancy of financial markets and the proliferation of domestic credit channels outside the [traditional] monetary system have greatly diminished the linkages between … credit expansion and price inflation in the large western economies. The impressive reduction of inflation is a dangerous illusion; it has been obtained largely by substituting one set of serious problems for another.
And, as bond-fund guru Bill Gross said,
what now appears to be confirmed as a housing bubble, was substantially inflated by nearly $1 trillion of annual reserve flowing back into US Treasury and mortgage markets at subsidised yields.… This foreign repatriation produced artificially low yields.… There is likely near unanimity that it is now responsible for pumping nearly $800 billion of cash flow into our bond and equity markets annually.
This insight into the explanation for a lack of price inflation in recent decades should also show that the massive amount of reserves the Fed created in 2008 and 2009 — in response to the recession — might not lead to quite the wild consumer-price inflation everyone expects when it eventually leaves the banking system but instead to wild asset price inflation.
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One effect of the new money flowing disproportionately into asset prices is that the Fed cannot "grow the economy" as much as it used to, since more of the new money created in the banking system flows into asset prices rather than into GDP. Since it is commonly thought that creating money is necessary for a growing economy, and since it is believed that the Fed creates real demand (instead of only monetary demand), the Fed pumps more and more money into the economy in order to "grow it."

That also means that more money — relative to the size of the economy — "leaks" out into asset prices than used to be the case. The result is not only exploding asset prices in the United States, such as the NASDAQ and housing-market bubbles but also in other countries throughout the world, as new money makes its way into asset markets of foreign countries.13

A second effect of more new money being channelled into asset prices is, as hinted above, that it results in the traditional range of stock valuations moving to a higher level. For example, the ratio of stock prices to stock earnings (P/E ratio) now averages about 20, whereas it used to average 10–15. It now bottoms out at a level of 12–16 instead of the historical 5. A similar elevated state applies to Tobin's Q, a measure of the market value of a company's stock relative to its book value. But the change in relative flow of new money to asset prices in recent years is perhaps best seen in the chart below, which shows the stunning increase in total stock-market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (figure 2).

Figure 2: The Size of the Stock Market Relative to GDP Source: Thechartstore.com

The changes in these valuation indicators I have shown above reveal that the fundamental links between company earnings and their stock-market valuation can be altered merely by money flows originating from the central bank.
Can Government Spending Revive the Stock Market and the Economy?
So, can government spending revive the stock market and the economy then? The answer is: yes and no. Government spending does not restore any real demand, only nominal monetary demand. Monetary demand is completely unrelated to the real economy, i.e., to real production, the creation of goods and services, the rise in real wages, and the ability to consume real things — as opposed to a calculated GDP number.

Government spending harms the economy and forestalls its healing. The thought that stimulus spending, i.e., taking money from the productive sector (a de-accumulation of capital) and using it to consume existing consumer goods or using it to direct capital goods toward unprofitable uses (consuming existing capital), could in turn create new net real wealth — real goods and services — is preposterous.
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What is most needed during recessions is for the economy to be allowed to get worse — for it to flush out the excesses and reset itself on firm footing. Recession is a process of recovery from earlier gross misallocations. Broken economies suffer from a misallocation of resources consequent upon prior government interventions, and can therefore be healed only by allowing the economy's natural balance to be restored. Falling prices and lack of government and consumer spending are part of this process.

Given that government spending cannot help the real economy, can it help the specific indicator called GDP? Yes it can. Since GDP is mostly a measure of inflation, if banks are willing to lend and borrowers are willing to borrow, then the newly created money that the government is spending will make its way through the economy. As banks lend the new money once they receive it, the money multiplier will kick in and the money supply will increase, which will raise GDP.

"What is most needed during recessions is for the economy to be allowed to get worse — for it to flush out the excesses and reset itself on firm footing."

As for the idea that government spending helps the stock market, the analysis is a bit more complicated. Government spending per se cannot help the stock market, since little, if any, of the money spent will find its way into financial markets. But the creation of money that occurs when the central bank (indirectly) purchases new government debt can certainly raise the stock market. If new money created by the central bank is loaned out through banks, much of it will end up in the stock market and other financial markets, pushing prices higher.
Summary
The most important economic and financial indicator in today's inflationary world is money supply. Trying to anticipate stock-market and GDP movements by analysing traditional economic and financial indicators can lead to incorrect forecasts. To rely on these "fundamentals" today is to largely ignore the specific economic forces that most significantly affect those same fundamentals — most notably the changes in the money supply. Therefore, the best insight into future stock prices and GDP growth is gained by following monetary indicators.



Kel Kelly is the Head of Economic and Commodity Research at an international energy and agribusiness firm and the author of The Case for Legalizing Capitalism. Kel holds a degree in economics from the University of Tennessee, an MBA from the University of Hartford, and an MS in economics from Florida State University. He lives in Atlanta.
A version of this 2010 article first appeared at the Mises Daily


NOTES 
1.See G. Reisman, Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (1996), p.897, for a fuller demonstration. Most of the insights in this paper are derived from the high-level principles laid out by Reisman. For additional related insights on this topic, see Reisman, "The Stock Market, Profits, and Credit Expansion," "The Anatomy of Deflation," and "Monetary Reform."
2.F. Machlup, The Stock Market, Credit, and Capital Formation (1940), p. 90. 3.Ibid., pp. 92, 78. 4.For a holistic view in simple mathematical terms of how the price of all items in an economy may or may not rise, depending on the quantity of money, see K. Kelly, The Case for Legalizing Capitalism (2010), pp 132–133. 5.Price increases are supposedly adjusted for, but "deflators" don't fully deflate. Proof of this is the very fact that even though rising prices have allegedly been accounted for by a price deflator, prices still rise (real GDP still increases). Without an increase in the quantity of money, such a rise would be mathematically impossible. 6.To gain an understanding of earning interest (dividends in this case) while prices fall, see Thorsten Polleit's "Free Money Against 'Inflation Bias'."
7.Most funds are borrowed from banks for the purpose of business investment; only a small amount is borrowed for the purpose of consumption. Even borrowing for long-term consumer consumption, such as for housing or automobiles, is a minority of total borrowing from banks. 8.The other main reason for this, if the country is poor, is the fact that there is a lack of capital: the more capital, the lower the rate of profit will be, and vice versa (though it can never go to zero). 9.Any reader who is interested in exploring and poking holes in this theory with me should feel free to contact me to discuss. 10.This recycling is what Mises's friend, the French economist Jacques Reuff, called "a childish game in which, after each round, winners return their marbles to the losers" (as cited by Richard Duncan, The Dollar Crisis (2003), p. 23). 11.P. Warburton, Debt and Delusion: Central Bank Follies that Threaten Economic Disaster (2005), p. 35. 12.[12] William H. Gross, "100 Bottles of Beer on the Wall."
13.It's not actually American dollars (both paper bills and bank accounts) that make their way around the world, as most dollars must remain in the United States. But for most dollars received by foreign exporters, foreign central banks create additional local currency in order to maintain exchange rates. This new foreign currency — along with more whose creation stems from "coordinated" monetary policies between countries — pushes up asset prices in foreign countries in unison with domestic US asset prices.

Tuesday, 9 August 2016

Will the bubble pop even if central banks never raise rates?

 

Last night at Liberty on the Rocks we were talking about the mechanism of collapse -- what might happen were ZIRP and NIRP to continue for ever, were QE to continue to infinity and interest rates never again touching oxygenated air? Is a collapse imminent in that case, or should we expect just a slow and gentle decline into penury as our seed corn is quietly and ineveitable consumed.

The economic system is keeping its head above water, just, but like historian Scott Powell we put this down to what he calls “The Hank Rearden Effect”—the tremendous ability of entrepreneurs, industrialists and inventors to continue producing, in the face of expanding efforts to slow them down –“masking a fundamental decline that now entails a fall.”

It’s the biggest unexamined issue of our age, says Jeff Deist of the Mises Insitute: “Can central banks engineer prosperity, and if so how long?”

Bubbles almost everywhere, and deflationary pressures bubbling under everywhere else. But all bubbles pop – all it takes is a pin. What will be this bubble’s murder weapon, we wonder? Brendan Brown has some suggestions.


balloons_0There is no ready-made answer in Austrian Business Cycle Theory to the multi-trillion dollar question now looming over the global economy and markets. Is the present virulent asset price inflation disease likely to enter any time soon its final phase of bust and recession? Will this happen even though the American Federal Reserve Bank has flip-flopped on even token steps toward policy normalisation, leading other central banks like the Bank of Japan, ECB, and Bank of England to pursue experiments with negative interest rates and novel forms of mega-balance sheet expansion?

Rate Hikes Usually Come Before Crises

In the small sample-size we have of modern business cycles, especially those featuring severe asset-price inflation like this one, there is no unambiguous example of transition into the crash and recession phase without a prior significant tightening of monetary conditions. The closest is the 1937 crash and subsequent Roosevelt recession. (But the Federal Reserve Bank’s attempt then to normalise monetary conditions via three hikes in reserve requirements through late 1936 and early 1937 — barely three years on from when the monetary base started to explode under the influence of huge gold inflows from Europe — blurs any lessons which might be drawn.)

By contrast, today’s Fed is now past its sixth anniversary of massive monetary-base expansion, and even wilder monetary experimentation has been occurring abroad. (We’re looking at you, Japan – and all you apostles of NIRP) The Yellen Fed has now flip-flopped in its stated programme of “rate lift-off” on any sign that the S&P 500 might be seriously retreating from present highs. Implicitly, today’s monetary experimenters appear to assume that they can at will exercise a series of “Greenspan (or Yellen) puts” to prevent any serious pull-back in market prices until an economic miracle emerges that will justify in fundamental terms the presently inflated asset-prices. 

Many investors around the globe — suffering from interest income famine — are inclined to give the Federal Reserve the benefit of the doubt. Few other choices seem available. Asset-price inflation is characterized by the transitory flourishing of speculative stories unchecked by normal rational scepticism which has been numbed by yield desperation. The “success” of The Grand Monetary Experiment has become the biggest speculative story of all.

ABCT2Strangely, the believers in that story, at least for now, can find superficial solace in early Austrian business-cycle theory. This describes how monetary disequilibrium characterised by market interest rates suppressed well below the (unknown) natural level generates a speculative boom. Eventually a rise of interest rates and tightening credit conditions bring a general bust. So long as interest rates remain around zero, speculators might assume they are safe.

According to the early Austrian cycle theorists, the rise in rates comes about endogenously as households react to the “forced saving” which they unwittingly undertook during the early boom phase (when over-production of capital goods occurs relative to consumer goods). This Austrian narrative explained the great boom in the mid-late 1920s, and the subsequent bust. But it does not apply so well to the present.

Much current “Austrian school” analysis focuses on the irrational behavior in financial markets induced by monetary disequilibrium and the related bouts of malinvestment. In common with the older analysis, the role of “over-lending” is a crucial dynamic of the cycle, albeit that irrationality in non-bank credit markets now tops the list of concerns (in contrast to previous emphasis on banks and fractional-reserve issues). Possible human behaviours in response to the virulent asset-price inflation disease are just too varied for model-based prediction to be successful.

This Time Could Be Different

The sample size of previous asset price inflations is too small to justify forecasts about whether the end phase is likely to be presaged by a tightening of monetary conditions. This time could well be different. A particular attribute of the present asset price inflation disease is the extent to which people are aware of the condition. Many investors looking at the array of high asset prices realise that many of these are far above fundamental value, yet desperation for yield defeats cool rationality.

ABCT3When we normalise US corporate earnings for the effect of “financial arbitrage,” “abnormally cheap interest costs,” and “accounting gymnastics,” we find price-earnings ratios today which are not far removed from the “irrationally exuberant” stock market peaks of 1929 and 2000. Given that these peaks occurred in eras of rapid productivity growth and prosperity amidst reasonable expectations that the miracle conditions could continue for at least several years more, the gap to “fundamental” value is most likely even larger than then. 

In today’s slow growth economy, business decision-makers are understandably cautious. And so ultimately are their shareholders. Long-range projects which potentially pay off in the next recession (which could be very severe due to the extent of prior speculative fever) are widely eschewed, meaning that there is no overall investment boom in the advanced economies – and this despite the insanely cheap cost of capital. Indeed, US business investment has been falling now for three quarters.

We're Living Through a Fragile Boom Period

Bouts of highly leveraged speculative economic activity do take place. and these can burst without any US-led monetary tightening under the influence of glut and related profits disappointment. The highly leveraged investor in shale oil or in emerging market industries hoped to earn mega-riches within a few years, thanks in large part to the fantastically low cost of debt, even if understandably dubious about the possibility of selling out his equity position before the downturn. Leverage brings forward the potential realisation of speculative profit.

ABCT4Equity investors in general realise that there are these big areas of highly leveraged overinvestment and malinvestment, and that the next recession may well originate from there. Now, many question the sustainability of commercial real estate booms whether in the US or in the emerging market world — alongside several residential hotspots. Overbuilding, rental declines, and vacancies are the catalysts to bust without any rise in rates.

And yes, the possibility of speculative boom and bust exists in some areas of economic activity where high leverage is absent. That occurs where there has been the hyped up speculative narrative alongside booming carry-trade activity — in this case from lower yielding liquid assets into higher yielding illiquid assets — with the income famine-crazed participants underestimating the risks. Unicorns in Silicon Valley, and more generally venture capital funds, may fit this description. These often have highly leveraged twins in private equity.

Historically, monetary tightening has been a fatal blow to these carry-trade booms that thrive in the early and middle phases of asset price inflation. There can be a long lag however between the blow and the bust, which might occur well beyond the tightening having given way to super-ease.   It is possible that any today’s carry-trade booms will burst — whether in credit, illiquidity, or ultimately equity and real estate – even without any further tightening episode beyond those very slight Federal Reserve manoeuvres of 2013–15. What looks like risk-free profits cannot remain that way forever, and bailouts can only postpone the inevitable.

Future historians might blame the bust on those manoeuvres. At least we present-day commentators who might disagree can write, like Josephus, that we saw these events with our own eyes.


Brendan BrownBrendan Brown is the Head of Economic Research at Mitsubishi UFJ Securities International. He is also an associated scholar of the Mises Institute, and author of Euro Crash: How Asset Price Inflation Destroys the Wealth of Nations and The Global Curse of the Federal Reserve: Manifesto for a Second Monetarist Revolution.
This post first appeared at the Mises Daily.

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Monday, 8 August 2016

Deflation Is Always Good for the Economy

 

Fearful at what they say is falling inflation, scuttlebutt suggests the central planners at New Zealand’s central bank will be issuing decrees this week that interest rates should all be lowered. But rather than fearing falling price-inflation we should realise that falling prices and even outright price deflation are actually good for the economic system --and for everyone in it; in a healthy economic system, it’s the way we enjoy rising productivity.
The thing to fear is not deflation, says Frank Shostak in this guest post,but all the policies aimed at countering it.


deflate happyFor most experts, deflation, which they define as a general decline in prices of goods and services, is bad news since it generates expectations for a further decline in prices.

As a result, they hold that consumers postpone their buying of goods at present since they expect to buy these goods at lower prices in the future. This weakens the overall flow of spending and in turn weakens the economy.

Hence, such commentators hold that policies that counter deflation will also counter the slump. If deflation leads to an economic slump then policies that reverse deflation should be good for the economy, they say.

Reversing deflation would imply introducing policies that support general increases in the prices of goods, i.e., inflation. This means that inflation could actually be an agent of economic growth. And according to today’s mainstream experts, a little bit of inflation can actually be a good thing. Mainstream thinkers are of the view that inflation of 2% is helpful to economic growth, but that inflation of 10% could be bad news. (Indeed the central bank’s inflation target is 2%.)

At a rate of inflation of 10%, it is likely they say that consumers are going to form rising inflation expectations. And this is bad.

According to popular thinking however, in response to a high rate of inflation consumers will speed up their expenditure on goods at present, which should boost economic growth. (Spending being the way these people measure economic growth.)

So why then is a rate of inflation of 10% or higher regarded by these same experts as a bad thing?

Clearly there is a problem with the popular definitions of inflation and deflation.

Inflation is Not Essentially a Rise in Prices

Inflation is not about general increases in prices as such, but about the increase in the money supply. [Currently around 6-8% pa in NZ – Ed.] As a rule the increase in money supply sets in motion general increases in prices. This, however, need not always be the case.

deflation2The price of a good is the amount of money asked per unit of it. For a constant amount of money and an expanding quantity of goods, prices will actually fall. This is what increasing wealth looks like.

Prices will also fall when the rate of increase in the supply of goods exceeds the rate of increase in the money supply. For instance, if the money supply increases by 5% and the quantity of goods increases by 10%, prices will fall by 5%, ceteris paribus.

A fall in prices in this example cannot conceal the fact that we have an inflation of 5% here on account of the increase in the money supply. (Inflation not being about general increases in prices as such, but about that 5% increase in the money supply that the increase in goods helped conceal.)

Rising Prices Aren't the Problem with Inflation 

The reason inflation is bad news is not because of increases in prices as such. It is because of the damage inflation inflicts to the wealth-formation process. Here is why.

The chief role of money is to fulfill the role of the medium of exchange. Money enables us to exchange something we have for something we want. Before an exchange can take place, an individual must have something useful that he can exchange for money. Once he secures the money, he can then exchange it for a good or goods he wants. Note that by means of money we have here an exchange of something for something.

But now consider a situation in which money is created out of "thin air" — this is precisely what the counterfeiter does. This type of money sets the platform for an exchange of nothing for something. The counterfeiter exchanges the printed money for goods without producing anything useful.

The counterfeiter takes from the pool of real goods without making any contribution to the pool.

deflation1The economic effect of money that was created out of thin air is exactly the same as that of counterfeit money — it impoverishes wealth generators.

The money created out of thin air diverts real wealth toward the holders of new money. As a result, less real wealth is left to fund wealth-generating activities.

This in turn leads to a weakening in economic growth. Remember only wealth generating activities can generate wealth and hence grow an economy.

Note that as a result of the increase in the money supply what we have here is more money per unit of goods, and thus, higher prices. What matters, however, is not price rises as such but the increase in the money supply that sets in motion the exchange of nothing for something or "the counterfeit effect."

The exchange of nothing for something, as we have seen, weakens the process of real wealth formation.Therefore, anything that promotes increases in the money supply can only make things much worse. So while inflation is more accurately an increase in the money supply, deflation is a decrease in the money supply.

We have seen that increases in the money supply, i.e., inflation gives rise to various non-productive activities, which we can also call "bubble activities." 

Easy-Money Policies Divert Resources to Non-Productive Activities 

Because these activities cannot stand on their own feet (they require the diversion of wealth from wealth generators) the increase in bubble activities on account of increases in the money supply weakens wealth generators' ability to generate wealth.

Hence, loose monetary policies aimed at countering a fall in prices (i.e., allegedly fighting deflation), do nothing more than provide support for non-productive activities. Such policies can produce the illusion of success only as long as there are enough wealth generators to fund non-productive activities.

deflation3For instance, in a company of 10 departments, 8 departments are making profits and the other 2 losses. A responsible CEO will shutdown or restructure the 2 departments that make losses. Failing to do so will divert funding from wealth generators toward loss-making departments, thus weakening the foundation of the entire company. Without the removal, or restructuring, of the loss-making departments there is the risk that the entire company could eventually go belly up.

From this simple example we can deduce that once the percentage of wealth-generating activities falls sharply there will not be enough wealth to support an expansion in economic activity. The economy then falls into a prolonged slump. Under these conditions, the more the central bank tries to fix the symptoms, the worse things become.

Once, however, non-productive activities are allowed to go belly-up, and the sources of the increase in the money supply are sealed off, one can expect a genuine, real-wealth expansion to ensue. With the expansion of real wealth for a constant stock of money, we will have a fall in prices. Note whether prices fall on account of the liquidation of non-productive activities or on account of real-wealth expansion, it is always good news. In the first case, it indicates that more funding is now available for wealth generation, while in the second case, it indicates that more wealth is actually being generated.

The major threat to the economy then is not deflation but policies aimed at countering it.

 


shostak_Frank2013Frank Shostak is an Associated Scholar of the Mises Institute. His consulting firm, Applied Austrian School Economics, provides in-depth assessments and reports of financial markets and global economies. He received his bachelor's degree from Hebrew University, master's degree from Witwatersrand University and PhD from Rands Afrikaanse University, and has taught at the University of Pretoria and the Graduate Business School at Witwatersrand University.
A version of this post first appeared at the Mises Daily.
[Image source: Luke McGuff www.flickr.com/photos/holyoutlaw/]

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