Somebody Call the Waaaaambulancia

Porfirio Lobo Sosa is apparently unhappy that deposed president Manuel Zelaya, who is writing a book on the coup, is critical of Honduras. Greg puts it best:

I guess [Lobo Sosa's] complaint would go something like this:

Our military overthrew a democratically elected government, then the police killed a bunch of people, a coup government then did its best to bankrupt the country, the Congress faked a resignation letter, everybody lied about being willing to negotiate, the Supreme Court allowed violations of the constitution, and we all made a mockery of both horizontal and vertical accountability to make sure everyone stays poor. So why would Zelaya say bad things about us? As Robert Micheletti said last year, we're all just happy people!

Heh. Indeed.

Around Latin America

-An eventual return to Honduras for exiled and deposed ex-president Manuel Zelaya may have gotten more difficult this past week. Honduran prosecutors are trying to attain a warrant to arrest Zelaya for "fraud, document forgery and abuse of power." No word yet on whether these same prosecutors are going to try to secure warrants against senator-for-life Roberto Micheletti for his own abuses of power.

-Even as we continue to ignore the violence in Mexico (and our role in it), there are daily reminders that it affects the entire border region, not just Juarez.

-Could a call for a "plurinational uprising" from Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador threaten Rafael Correa's administration and ability to remain in office through the end of his term?

-In appalling environmental actions, Argentina's army apparently is burning its garbage at a base in the Antarctic within 200 feet of penguin nesting grounds.

-Although there has been bad blood between the two countries for well over a century, Peru has put that aside in the face of the humanitarian crisis facing Chile in the wake of this week's powerful 8.8-magnitude earthquake by offering construction materials to help its neighbor and occasional rival rebuild.

-Speaking of the Chilean earthquake, it turns out there will not be a single person on the planet who is not affected by the earthquake. The tectonic shift was powerful enough that it shifted the Earth's axis, resulting in a day that was 1.26 microseconds shorter.

-Brazil's indigenous Yanomani population has been devastated by disease and encroachment from outsiders in the recent past, and one scholar has a novel solution: prosecute Senator Jose Sarney, who was president from 1985-1990, with genocide for his role in letting gold mining companies enter into Yanomani territory, bringing with them disease and environmental degradation that have killed the Yanomanis and destroyed much of their homeland.

-On the subject of Brazil, there's also a nice little article up talking about the little-known (outside of Brazil) role of Middle Eastern immigrants in shaping the country's culture and politics over the last 100+ years, and it's well worth checking out.

-Finally, a pair of farewells to important Mexican figures. Writer Carlos Montemayor, whose fictional War in Paradise did much to shed light on the forgotten Mexican "Dirty War" of the 1960s and 1970s, died last week at the age of 62 (and the fact that a fictional work is the foremost work on the "Dirty War" speaks volumes about the absence of scholarship on the subject). And this week, Ana Maria Zapata Portillo, the last surviving daughter of Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata, died at the age of 94.

Around Latin America

-Former Uruguayan president Juan Manuel Bordaberry was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role as president during Uruguay's dictatorship.

-Honduras's Congress may finally be ready to get rid of the gag order that Roberto Micheletti placed on the media last year. Meanwhile, the National Autonomous University of Honduras is under fire for hiring two members of Manuel Zelaya's administration.

-Jose Roberto Arruda, a member of Brazil's right-wing Democratic Party and governor of Brasilia, was arrested this week on charges of corruption and accepting kickbacks on public works. Both that article and this one reasonably point out that the arrest could hurt the right-wing Democrats and PSDB in their efforts to paint the Lula administration as corrupt.

-Brazilian left-wing politician and educator Cristovam Buarque makes a compelling case of how economic slavery continues in Brazil.

-Finally, in Chile, a new commission is being launched to listen to the testimony of victims and families of victims of the Pinochet dictatorship. The commission will hold hearings in order to determine if those who still have not received reparations for their suffering should be rewarded or not. This new commission will be the third, following the Rettig commission of 1991 and the Valech Commission of 2004; the former certified over 3000 victims murdered during Pinochet's 17 years of rule, while the latter certified over 28,000 cases of torture and political imprisonment.

Honduran Coup May Be Over, But Where Is Honduras Headed?

Though we haven't talked about it in awhile, the Honduran political landscape continues to change and head in uncertain directions. Last Tuesday, Porfirio Lobo was inaugurated, bringing an end to the "provisional government" of Roberto Micheletti. One of Lobo's first acts was to allow former legally-elected president Manuel Zelaya leave the Brazilian embassy and head into exile in the Dominican Republic.

The inauguration has led several to suggest that the Honduran coup is officially over, as the country has returned to democratic practices and the provisional government of Micheletti has come to an end. In some ways, I think this is true - the particular lifetime of the coupist government has come to an end, and Honduras has technically returned to electing its leaders, but turnout was questionable at best and the government itself limited freedom of speech during the campaign, factors which are hardly the marks of a "healthy" election.

But that doesn't mean the processes themselves are over. First, it will be interesting to watch what the military does under Lobo. Will it fade into the background in an attempt to get people to forget its role in the illegal removal of Zelaya? Will it continue to play an up-front role in influencing politics in Honduras? Will it remove Lobo if/when he does something that Congress, the Supreme Court, and/or the military don't like? Then, there is the issue of the economy, which is in even worse shape since the coup than before the coup (again, I suspect due in no small part to global opposition to the Micheletti government), and the broader social problems and inequalities haven't disappeared at all. As Boz mentions, if anything, Lobo is facing an even tougher landscape than Micheletti or Zelaya, exactly because on top of those social problems, the economy has only worsened.

And then, of course, there's the political landscape. Just because Zelaya is gone and Micheletti out (though still a senator-for-life) does not mean that the political rifts that the coup and its wake created have gone away. As the last post at the Honduras Coup 2009 blog reminds us, the coming months (and years?) will be really important in seeing what comes of Zelaya's supporters and opposition to the regime. Will it just fade away? Will it become a powerful political movement unto itself? Will it be able to effect any changes in Honduran society or politics via grass-roots mobilizations? Any of these things seems possible, and serve as strong reminders as to why the coup may be technically over, but its effects will be long-lasting politically as well as economically. These are all issues that Lobo will have to face and address, and he may not be able to deal with all of them in ways that satisfy the elites, the masses, or either group. His effort at an allegedly "broad" cabinet may be a start, but as the writers at the new Honduras Culture and Politics blog (former writers of the Honduras Coup 2009 blog) point out, what exactly that "broad" cabinet means is up for interpretation and questioning. And the fact that Zelaya may be in exile now does not mean he won't be a force in politics in Honduras down the road. With popular support for Zelaya still clearly strong, and with Micheletti still in the government, and with the military cleared of any wrongdoing, Lobo has a very fine tightrope to walk indeed. For example, I'm particularly curious about the way the symbol of Lobo actually accompanying Zelaya to the airport may be perceived in Honduras. Certainly, Zelaya's removal was illegal, even if Honduras's Supreme Court isn't going to allow court cases against military members involved to proceed. The fact that Lobo was inaugurated, and then accompanied Zelaya to the airport, could be interpreted in Honduran society in any number of ways: as an informal way to assume the presidency from the last legitimately elected leader of Honduras; as Lobo just trying to defuse the situation from both sides; as Lobo showing questionable allegiances; and various other ways. What the Honduran citizenry does with symbols and events like these will not only be worth watching, but essential in seeing where Honduras goes from here.

At the end of the day, I think you can make a strong argument that the coup itself has "ended." But the processes it unleashed are only beginning, and I agree with others in pointing out that the inauguration does not mean we should quit paying attention to Honduras. It will be interesting to see what directions Lobo, the Honduran elites, and the Honduran citizenry take from here on out.

The Problem of the Honduran Inauguration, and the Stupidity of Claims of Zelaya's "Radicalism"

I'm a little late in getting to this, but RAJ pointed out the lack of a good solution for the impending inauguration of Porfirio Lobo in Honduras at the end of the month. Lobo is saying he should be inaugurated by the head of the legislature, which has happened regularly - so regularly, in fact, that in 2006, we got this now-amazing photograph of Roberto Micheletti giving the presidential sash to....Manuel Zelaya. And while Lobo's solution may seem like a decent idea at first, as RAJ points out, "Lobo still has this difficulty to solve: while he can duck being given the regalia of power by Micheletti, he still has to be deemed to be receiving power from the previous president," who is, of course, Micheletti. It's going to be interesting to see how the inauguration plays out, both in Honduras, and in the world more generally.

And finally, if the photo above isn't amusing enough, RAJ also found this nugget that effectively obliterates any notion that Zelaya was some crazy leftist opposed to the United States (as if this photo wasn't evidence enough that Zelaya was not some Chavez pawn):

PS: The little trip down memory lane to find a photo of the investiture of President Zelaya in 2006 also produced this interesting tidbit:

Thousands of Hondurans filled the National Stadium in Tegucigalpa, with a capacity of some 40,000 persons, to witness the passage of command from the exiting government official, Ricardo Maduro, of the National Party, to Manuel Zelaya, of the Liberal Party, both conservatives.

Pretty fascinating stuff, and makes claims by the likes of DeMint and his ilk even more ridiculous.

Honduras: one bad apple, etc.?

I usually don't wade into the depths of Latin American politics around here, mostly because Trend and Erik do it so much better than I do. So I still don't have a heck of a lot to say on the subject--but I thought I'd share this from my day job.

GRITtv: Will the coup in Honduras create larger problems for Latin America? What will its effects mean for the rest of Latin America, a region trending leftward in recent years? Greg Grandin, Nation contributor, NYU professor, and author of Empire's Workshop and Fordlandia, Roque Planas of Latin American News Dispatch, and Sujatha Fernandes, Queens College professor and author of Cuba Represent! and the upcoming Who Can Stop The Drums: Urban Social Movements in Chavez's Venezuela join us in studio to discuss. We also have updates from inside Honduras from Andres Conteris of Nonviolence International and Democracy Now! and freelance journalist Elyssa Pachico reports from Chile.

Breakdowns in Negotiations Over Zelaya's Status in Honduras? Shocking!

Color me unsurprised:

A plan for the ousted Honduran president, Manuel Zelaya, to leave the country for Mexico ran aground late Wednesday when negotiations over his safe passage fell apart, the leader and the Mexican authorities said.

As the news about Mr. Zelaya’s possible departure spread, along with considerable confusion, his supporters gathered outside the police barricades erected in the streets surrounding the Brazilian Embassy, where he has been a virtual prisoner since September.

In an interview with the Mexican TV network Televisa, Mr. Zelaya said that the de facto government had placed a “denigrating” condition on his departure from Honduras, offering him safe passage out of the embassy only if he would seek political asylum. He added that he has not asked for political asylum.

Wow. Efforts between Micheletti and Zelaya to come to a negotiated conclusion over something ended in no results, miscommunication, and a dogmatic refusal to bend to any type of agreement on the part of Micheletti? This has never happened before!

More seriously, Greg is saying (and the Times article backs this up) that Zelaya isn't opposed to leaving; he just doesn't want it to be as a political asylee. The fact that the Micheletti government has decided to stonewall on a point that means very little to it (it's gone in a few weeks), but so much to Zelaya, is just symbolic of how incompetent and authoritarian the Micheletti regime has been. A refusal to give in to any negotiations that cause you no harm but are beneficial to your opponent while insisting all of your own demands be met is not negotiating. Micheletti pretty much alienated everybody who wasn't a political elite pal of his a long time ago, but his shtick got old months ago. Hopefully, history will remember what a reprehensible, unbending, undemocratic, authoritarian "leader" he was for the six months he served as the head of a government that overthrew a democratically elected president.

Honduran President-Elect Proposes a General Amnesty, and Why It's a Terrible Idea

This seems like a terrible idea:

Honduras' president-elect said Tuesday he wants amnesty for ousted President Manuel Zelaya and for all of those involved in the June 28th coup that deposed him.

"There should be (an amnesty) for all those involved," Porfirio Lobo said in Costa Rica, where he met with Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli in an effort to build support for his presidency and break his nation's isolation.

I understand why Lobo may want to do this. He certainly is walking a tight line between acknowledging it was a coup and not irritating the military so that they do it again.

Still, in the larger picture, this is just a terrible, terrible, terrible idea. The fact that you forgive the military and Micheletti does not only offer the message that future coup-leaders who overthrow democratically-elected leaders can expect to be let off scot-free; it also forgives Micheletti and the military for the gross acts of human rights violations, ranging from censorship to curfews to blatant violence against Hondurans, in the wake of the June 28 coup. If you want to know how well these "general amnesties" work, just ask Brazil, whose military government offered a general amnesty in 1979 that allowed political exiles back in the country and set political prisoners free, but also prevented torturers and murderers in the military from ever being charged in their crimes. As a result, to this day, Brazil has not fully reconciled and confronted the legacy of its dictatorship, and particularly the repressive arm, in ways that Chile and Argentina have. Connected to this, practices of torture and executions by military police against the poor continue to this day in Brazil, with little interest in inquiring as to the institutional origins or continuation of these practices.

Again, Lobo's declaration isn't without its logic, particularly in the short-term. But if a general amnesty in Honduras goes through, letting Micheletti and the coup-leaders off the hook, then Lobo will have established a dangerous precedent for the future, and Honduras may never fully deal with the real causes, events, and legacies of the coup and Micheletti's repressive regime.

Honduras Deal Dead (Again?)

Color me unsurprised:

An accord that would have unblocked the political standoff in Honduras has failed, the deposed president said Friday, a week after it was mediated by the United States.

The deposed president, Manuel Zelaya, whose possible return to power was at the heart of the accord, is still a virtual prisoner in the Brazilian Embassy, where he took refuge six weeks ago after he secretly slipped back into Honduras. He is no closer to resuming his presidency, while the de facto president, Roberto Micheletti, and the people around him are still running the country.

But none of this has happened. Critics said the accord was difficult to enforce because its only source of pressure was an American threat not to recognize the planned election.

This doesn't come as a major shock to me. As my original parenthetical question-mark indicated, I was skeptical that the latest "agreement" would come to fruition, and there had been rumors in the blogosphere over the last two days that the deal was "threatened," "coming unraveled," or "at risk." Still, I wanted to reserve judgement, hoping these rumors would be proven wrong at the 11th hour. However, it would appear to be that that is not the case.

There's little more to say at this point. Micheletti's power-hunger has been clear for a long time. There probably would not have been enough time for Zelaya to be effective even if he'd return, but now it seems even that small window has closed. Even if he is able to finally return to office (and that seems possible, not because of the current situation, but because this has been so up-and-down, with more "agreements" and "breakdowns" than any diplomatic process in recent memory). This has just been a disgrace for Honduras, with plenty of blame to go around, but most of it falling on the military and Micheletti and his cronies. It's too bad that Honduras's leaders couldn't follow the will of the people and maintain the basic structures of democracy that the Constitution and the people called for.

UPDATE: Greg (as usual) perfectly sums up why the pact fell apart, and why the blame falls on Micheletti here: "Apparently now a "unity government" is synonymous with "pro-coup only government," as Roberto Micheletti is putting one together alone."

Trying to Explain the Honduran Crisis and Its Resolution

Many (myself included) have wondered what caused the sudden shift in attitudes between Zelaya and Micheletti that resulted in the agreement in Honduras this week, with Zelaya returning to office (pending the legislature's approval) after months of disagreement and strife. While I've yet to see any of the agents involved in the process coming out to explicitly state what the catalyst may have been, some people are offering explanations:

-This newspaper article suggests Micheletti had only wanted to stall the whole time, and that the possibility of tainted elections was a major factor in his finally agreeing to points which he had previously outright rejected over the previous 4 months. Although it doesn't explicitly say so, the suggestion that Micheletti feared the new government would be "tainted" does indicate one of the suggestions I made last week: that global opposition was pretty important here.

-Another argument that this article seems to be tacitly making is that the opposition among many within the Church played a decent role, too, in that he'd lost support among a major non-political (in the strictest sense of the word) group, too.

-Some Costa Rican sources (perhaps unsurprisingly) feel that it was Arias's efforts to craft an agreement all could accept throughout the summer that was important here, as it laid the groundwork for the current agreement.

-Finally, Greg points us to Raj's argument that it was the Honduran people themselves (and Zelaya to an also-important-but-lesser extent) that forced Micheletti's hand.

Each of these has its particular merits, but I think some are more important than others. While Arias's work is important in the grand scale, little has changed between his proposal in July and the current agreement, so while I think it did help lay the groundwork, I don't really see it as a catalyst. Again, little changed in the plan between July, when Micheletti refused to ever acknowledge it, and this week, when Micheletti suddenly had a change of heart. That's not to say Arias's role was unimportant over the entire process, but in terms of the events of this past week, I think it's pretty clear that the agency on this rests more on Micheletti and Zelaya than Arias.

Likewise, while gaining criticisms from the Church is an important factor, and while the timing is interesting (the Church condemns the human rights abuses under Micheletti just as the agreement is being reached), I think the timing is also coincidental.

I think La Opinion and RAJ get closer - Micheletti definitely wanted to stall as long as he could, and I think the growing opposition to any government elected under his regime played a role. Likewise, I think RAJ is on the right track in saying it was the Honduran people who forced the issue. Still, I don't find any one of these reasons compelling in and of itself, for a simple reason that perhaps seems wishy-washy, but that I think history has proven time and again, and that is:

Things are too complex for it to be any "one" factor.

Put another way, I think all of these factors, and numerous others, played a role. Honduras's economy and image has been hit hard with the global opposition to Micheletti, and while he was willing to weather that for 6 months or so, I think the prospect of the next four-year government also being jaundiced in the eyes of the world made Micheletti "change his mind" somewhat. He managed to achieve what he wanted (preventing any real reforms in Honduras under Zelaya, who will now effectively be a 3-month lame duck), and, perhaps perversely figured getting out now was what would be best for Honduras down the line (in what was perhaps the first time Micheletti was actually concerned with what's best for Honduras during this crisis). I wouldn't be remotely surprised to find out that this is effectively what the U.S. negotiators suggested, and that Micheletti, who's proven he isn't a political idiot (even if he's a repressive, semi-authoritarian, power-hungry man), saw the writing on the wall.

But again, that wasn't all. I absolutely think the Honduran people played a major role. In fact, I'd extend this beyond RAJ's argument. Time may prove me wrong, but I don't think it was just the people in opposition to the coup, or Zelaya, or leaders in the church; as I said on Monday, I'm fairly certain that business leaders may have played a role in this. Greg alludes to the power of informal contacts, and while he doesn't really buy into them in the case of Chile, I'm not convinced they didn't play an important part here. Just as Micheletti may have seen the trouble Honduras would face internationally if the elections happened under his regime, I'm sure business leaders also knew that four years of prejudice against Honduras would really hit them hard. This isn't to say the business leaders were more important than the Honduran people; after all business leaders are Honduran people, too. But I think this all gets at just how complex these processes in general (and this one specifically) are. Numerous groups within and outside of Honduras all had their own reasons for wanting to see this crisis finally come to an end, be it the political elites who feared Zelaya's attempted reforms, the people who stood up against Micheletti's repression, the business elites trying to protect their privileges, the international community standing up for democratic processes, or any other number of voices and opinions, and I think all of their voices played a role in the resolution happening, and happening this week (as opposed to July, September, or next January).

It well may take years for us to really understand the events of these past four-plus months in Honduras, though no doubt many explanations and efforts (including this one) will emerge among political scientists, historians, human rights activists, and others. While some will try to give more credit to one group than another, or explain the shift through just one group or catalyzing factor, I think at the end of the day, the answer to the question "why did the resolution happen when it did, and what caused it?" will be the same as the answer to so many other questions: "Well, it's complicated..."

Agreement Reached in Honduras (?)

There have been so many reports over the months that an agreement between Micheletti and Zelaya was close, only to be wrong, that this almost seems hard to believe. Still, the New York Times and other news agencies are reporting it as if it were a done deal:

A lingering political crisis in Honduras seemed to be nearing an end on Friday after the de facto government agreed to a deal that would allow Manuel Zelaya, the deposed president, to return to office.

The government of Roberto Micheletti, which had refused to let Mr. Zelaya return, signed an agreement with Mr. Zelaya’s negotiators late Thursday that would pave the way for the Honduran Congress to restore the ousted president and allow him to serve out the remaining three months of his term.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton confirmed on Friday that Mr. Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti had approved what she called “an historic agreement.”

The "final details" have to be hammered out still (allegedly today), so I'm still not quite willing to believe this is a done deal. Still, there are not-illegitimate reasons to think this may take place. Micheletti has managed to stall to the point that Zelaya's final 3 months (if he is in fact to return) could be some of the lamest of lame-duck terms. If he wanted to prevent Hondurans from having more say in their government (something towards which Zelaya was moving), then Micheletti's tactics were most likely successful - if Zelaya's government is going to be a "reconciliation and unity" government, as one of the details proposes, I just don't think the previous quasi-populist bluster of Zelaya will be as strong as it was prior to the coup. That's not to say it won't happen at all, but I would be somewhat surprised.

Another particularly interesting point is the fact that this settlement is finally reached after Obama dispatched an envoy to Honduras to try to negotiate an end to this mess. I'm very curious as to why this agreement happened now - are the negotiators just that good? Were there some "suggestions" made that neither Micheletti nor Zelaya (and especially the former) could not refuse? What exactly made these two men come closer to an agreement than they had, and what role did the U.S. negotiators have? (And I suppose it's possible they didn't play a catalyzing role, but I find that highly unlikely).

Of course, if Obama's dispatching of the negotiators was the catalyst for this change, I can already imagine that many (especially on the left) will condemn Obama for not acting sooner. The reasoning will probably go as follows: well, the U.S. refused to get involved, and when it finally did, it was able to restore the democratically elected leadership, so it should have made this move back in July or August or anytime before the end of October.

This criticism will fall short for a few reasons. No doubt, many will ask why, if it just took some negotiators from the U.S. to resolve things, why didn't this happen sooner? But this way of thinking gives too much credit to the U.S. and not enough to other political contingencies and actors. For example, as I alluded to above, just because Micheletti has (apparently) agreed with these negotiators at the end of October does not mean he would have agreed with them in mid-July or late-August. Certainly, the global response against his regime has played a part in all of this; after all, many governments (including the U.S.) were saying they could not recognized elections that were held under a coup-installed government. For a man whose hope was that elections would allow Honduras to return to "normalcy," those were more than empty threats. Additionally, to blame the U.S., and the Obama administration specifically, forgets particularly important aspects of this whole timeline, such as the fact that Zelaya wasn't even in Honduras (and thus didn't have the negotiating power he currently has) until the end of September, when Zelaya surprised the world. At that point, the negotiation process entered a whole new phase, and I don't think it's unfair to say that Honduras had to try to work this out itself (with Zelaya's new, more powerful negotiating position) before actors like the U.S. could get involved. Thirdly, we cannot forget the importance non-political actors may have had in this alleged agreement. Certainly, the Zelaya supporters in the embassy and the demonstrators who had taken to the streets periodically over the last several months had made their voices heard, but they were not the only ones. I can't help but wonder if the country's business leaders may have also had a role in this. After all, they were the first ones to feel the economic pinch of the global condemnation of the Micheletti regime, and they have made efforts before to bring this to an end before. And to be clear, I'm not saying that they had more sway or importance than the thousands who took to the streets, often risking their lives, to protest the coup and make their voices heard. What I am saying is that I suspect that these negotiations were most likely much more complex and part of a much longer process than we could possibly know for certain now. Unless Micheletti or Zelaya (or both) come out and say, "well, we weren't going to do this at all, but then the negotiators convinced us," I don't believe Obama's action was the only one that had any role in this agreement being reached. And even if Micheletti and Zelaya openly say this, I won't necessarily believe them - to do so would be to refuse the power of the Honduran people themselves in this matter.

I still write all of this with a bit of hesitancy; too many times, reports in this vein have emerged, only to break down at the last minute, and there's still a window of opportunity for another breakdown here. Still, this is being reported with more certainty and detail than any other previous "agreement," so this could happen. If it does, it will finally bring an end to what should have been resolved long ago (indeed, what probably never should have happened), and I suspect that it will be through the actions not just of the U.S. negotiators, but of the Honduran people, business leaders, Oscar Arias, the OAS, the European Union, Brazil, global economics, and numerous other factors and agents that make the whole process, from before the coup to the present and beyond, a very complicated series of events.

Honduras's Business Elites Propose New Solution to Presidential Crisis

Well, this is interesting:

Stung by the loss of their American visas and concerned about Honduras’s increasing international isolation, the country’s leading businessmen have put forward their own plan to resolve the political crisis here.

In the plan, which was made public earlier this week, supporters of the coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya three months ago have for the first time suggested his return as president. But at the same time the plan calls for him to face trial on charges that he stole money while in office.

In my first reaction, I can't say I'm terribly sympathetic to their concerns. "What? You overthrew a democratically-elected leader who had annoyed you, but who technically hadn't done anything illegal? And then, when you supported his overthrow and the world condemned it, you lost your business and travel privileges? Oh, that's so sad!"

If anything, I think this response is the first time the U.S. (and much of the rest of the world) has gotten things right when it comes to political turmoil in Latin America. For too many years, decades, generations, business leaders have supported the overthrow of democratically-elected governments, be it Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, Argentina in 1976, or any other number of Latin American dictators. While military governments committed human rights abuses and genocide, the countries' respective business elites got richer, often times even while the income gap between rich and poor grew (as in the case of Brazil, certainly, and elsewhere). For the first time, the U.S. has not condoned such actions; if business leaders want to help undermine democratic processes in their own countries, they will feel the effects of their actions in the way that hurts them the most - by hitting their pocketbooks and their privileges. In some ways, it's almost like the international-economic equivalent of Sherman's march through Georgia - "you want to go ahead and do this? Fine. But we're going to make you feel the effects of what you've done. You aren't exempt from the consequences of your actions any longer."

In terms of the actual plan for a restoration of Zelaya's presidency, I don't think it will actually work. Zelaya's lawyer may be blustering, but he's probably part-right that the presumption of guilt will already be there in any trial against Zelaya. At the same time, it's become increasingly clear that A) Micheletti is in no way going to try to resolve this thing, and B) his continued presidency is a disgrace for civil and human rights in Honduras. Micheletti has certainly eclipsed any "crimes" Zelaya may have committed. So in some ways, a "third path" that involves real change (beyond Micheletti stalling and Zelaya calling for negotiations without any real political platform from which to work) is at least an encouraging sign that somebody will find a solution that both Micheletti and Zelaya can agree to.

And if you want any more evidence that Micheletti's a power-hungry degenerate of the first order, you really don't have to look much further than this:

Mr. Facussé said that Mr. Micheletti agreed to consider his plan after he suggested that Mr. Micheletti step down as leader of the de facto government and be named congressman for life.

Ah, yes - the "congressman/senator-for-life" position, held by such dignitaries as Augusto Pinochet himself. Yet, if Facussé's account is correct, then a lifelong position of power is enough to convince Micheletti to give up the presidency? It's really not too hard to see what's going on here.

Finally, for those who read Portuguese, a Brazilian journalist in the embassy in Tegucigalpa has put up a few blog posts about his experiences from inside the embassy. And even if you can't read Portuguese, the first image he took says plenty about what's going on in Honduras.

Micheletti Blames Brazil for Excessive Honduran Police Violence

Give me a break.

Honduras is accusing Brazil's government of instigating an insurrection within its borders, and gave the Brazilian Embassy 10 days to decide the status of ousted Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelaya, who has taken refuge there.

"Since the clandestine arrival to Honduras by ex-president Zelaya, the Brazil embassy has been used to instigate violence and insurrection against the Honduran people and the constitutional government," the secretary of foreign affairs for Honduras' de facto government said in a statement late Saturday night.

Really? Brazil instigated the violence and insurrection? It should be clear how ridiculous this is. Brazil did not order Honduran troops to illegally remove Zelaya in the first place. Brazil did not order Honduran police to attack Zelaya's supporters. Brazil did not order Honduran police to punch handcuffed women in the face. Brazil did not order police to shoot and kill 18-year-olds who called the police what they in fact are ("golpistas"). Indeed, reports indicate that Brazil only knew about Zelaya an hour before he showed up at the embassy, and Lula's advisors believe Hugo Chavez "schemed" to help get Zelaya to Honduras and to the Brazilian embassy.

The plain and simple fact, as it has become increasingly clear, is that Micheletti is demonstrating the worst characteristics of an authoritarian leader who refuses to let go of his power. He's curtailed freedom of the press; he's established curfews; he continues to simultaneously insist that he's open to "negotiations" while declaring that he will have Zelaya arrested immediately. He has repeatedly sent the military to attack and repress protesters through brutal violence. To lay the blame for this at Brazil's doorstep is more than disingenuous; it's offensive, ridiculous, and absurd. It's yet another painful reminder that Micheletti and his administration are unable to either accept any responsibility for their actions or behave even remotely like adults.

Honduran Police Confront Zelaya's Supporters

It certainly didn't take long for things to get ugly in Honduras:

Honduran police used tear gas Tuesday to disperse supporters of ousted President Manuel Zelaya outside the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa, where Zelaya has sought refuge since secretly returning to the country, TV news reports showed. [...]

One image broadcast on the station showed a policewoman punching a handcuffed woman in the face.

The station also showed video of water cannons being used to scatter Zelaya supporters and the ousted president's backers throwing rocks and other objects at police.

I'm not surprised at the military's quick response here (police and military often being part of the same branch in Latin American countries).

It's looking like Micheletti's trying to do the one thing left in his power, namely, isolate Zelaya inside from his supporters outside, and continue stonewalling. It may work, but Micheletti has successfully thrown away any last remnant of legitimacy or of anything resembling a decent political legacy that he may have had.

If the coup, repeated curfews, censorship, and bombarding the Brazilian embassy with noise in an effort to root out Zelaya didn't assure that, then certainly video footage of police punching in the face a handcuffed woman unable to defend herself will do the trick.

Did Brazil Play a Minor or a Major Role in the Return of Manuel Zelaya?

More news agencies are reporting on Manuel Zelaya's return to Honduras, and there will be many interesting developments over the next few days and perhaps weeks, accompanied by a decent amount of speculation as to what might happen next.

However, one aspect in all of this may go relatively ignored, with little comment on, but it's something I raised in these comments. Specifically, what, if any, role did Brazil play in this?

As we all know, Zelaya is staying at the Brazilian embassy in Honduras, a brilliant move considering that embassy grounds are soverign soil of the country they represent. Thus, while the Honduran military did not mind breaking the law to exile Zelaya back in June, to try to arrest him at the embassy (as Micheletti blustered) would effectively be an act of war, and while Brazil hasn't been involved in an open foreign war since World War II, I know who I'd pick in a Brazilian-Honduran war.

That said, it's clear that Brazil has some role in this whole incident, obviously. There are three alternatives I can come up with (though there may be others I haven't thought of):

1) Brazil had no idea Zelaya was coming back, and when he showed up at the embassy doors, they just decided to let him in. This strikes me as plausible - Brazil, like the rest of the world, has held that the June coup was illegal and that Zelaya, and not Micheletti, is the proper president of Honduras. Zelaya may have gone there just hoping, and if it didn't work out, he could hope to get to another friendly embassy before he was arrested. This does raise the question that, if many embassies would accept him, why go to Brazil first? It may be because Brazil is a big power (bigger than, say, Costa Rica or Italy or most other countries), and he knew it was friendly to his cause. It may also be because, again, the Brazilian embassy allegedly sits next to Micheletti's private home. This would make it the obvious first choice of Zelaya if he wanted to thumb his nose at Micheletti.

2) Zelaya actually tried to go to other embassies for protection before Brazil's, but was turned down. This is possible, too, and could help explain why early reports said that Zelaya was in Honduras, but with no knowledge of where he was staying. There's not much that distinguishes this from the first possibility; still, I'm inclined to believe the first possibility over this one, primarily because Brazil seemed like such a sure bet in terms of friendliness, Honduras' inability to bully Brazil, and Brazil's high standing in the diplomatic community.

3) Brazil knew well in advance, through direct or indirect contact, that Micheletti was coming, and was prepared to accept him should he arrive safely in Tegucigalpa. Whether or not Brazil was active, they would make sure he was taken care of upon his arrival in the embassy. Perhaps they actively wanted to help undermine the Micheletti government, though this strikes me as the most implausible likelihood. Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim (who is in New York, preparing for the UN's meeting on climate change) denied any previous knowledge, and right now, I don't see any reason not to believe him. More importantly, if the Brazilian government was actively trying to undermine a regime, it would mark a major departure from Brazilian foreign relations over the last 7 years. If there's anything one can say about Lula's approach, it has been that he has been the consummate diplomat during his two terms; even politicians in neighboring countries look up to the way in which he conducts foreign relations. To suddenly throw all caution to the wind in any event seems extreme; to do so with the Honduran case in particular pushes the envelope of believability.

4) Brazil knew shortly before or after Zelaya's official departure (from where is still unknown) that he was coming to Honduras, and quickly prepared for his arrival. Again, I just don't see why they would do this; the foreign relations minister insists it's not the case, and again, it would mark a major departure from all that Brazil has stood for in international relations over the last 7 years under Lula.

Ultimately, of these four scenarios, the first one seems most likely to me, though I wouldn't be remotely surprised to learn that it was the second. If it's either three or four, I will be more than surprised, and were it to be either of those scenarios, it would raise all kinds of interesting (and perhaps troubling) questions about the direction Brazilian foreign relations were heading. Still, while not the most commented-upon aspect of Zelaya's return, it does offer some fascinating questions about that return as well as possible insights on the role of Brazil in Latin America, in the defense of democratic processes, and in international relations more generally.

Zelaya Back in Honduras

So, after the coup in June, events in Honduras had pretty much entered into a holding pattern - Micheletti refused to make any major concesssion, Mel Zelaya did a major PR push around the world and continued to get support, but Honduras continued to creep towards their election this year (more than 80 days have passed since the coup, and fewer than 70 remain until the election). It seemed as though things were going to just stall into the elections, with no real resolution to the coup.

Until Mel Zelaya apparently sneaked into Honduras overland and made it to the capital, Tegucigalpa, where he is now at the Brazilian embassy (which, last I checked, was Brazil's sovereign territory, and the Honduran military cannot invade it, though it's not like they haven't knowingly broken the law before).

Think that's interesting? It's even more interesting that apparently, Brazil's embassy is allegedly right next to Micheletti's house.

As both the CSM article and Plan Colombia point out, the question now is, "so....what's next?"

The one thing I'd say is, this makes Micheletti look even more ridiculous. His insistence that his government is legal has always been nothing less than laughable, and the only "authority" he really had was successfully keeping Zelaya out and blustering about "democracy" while stonewalling until the elections. Yet in spite of his continued suggestion that Zelaya could not return and if he did, he'd be arrested, Zelaya managed not only to return, but to get to the capital itself. Next to Micheletti's home. This is just egg all over the face of Micheletti, and now leaves him with virtually nothing. And his bluster now that he's going to have Zelaya arrested (in spite of Zelaya again technically being on Brazilian soil, where Honduras has no jurisdiction, and surrounded by supporters in the compound) makes him look like a five-year-old throwing a temper tantrum. Maybe Micheletti will rebound, but right now, he looks about as foolish as any politician and national leader can look.

Beyond that, it's tough to say what will happen. As Plan Colombia points out, it could very likely lead to a standoff, given Micheletti's intransigence, and that would be bad, as there would most likely be showdowns and violence in the heart of Honduras. Micheletti could relent and just step out of power, but that would be highly uncharacteristic in light of his actions up to this point. He could agree to negotiations, which is what Zelaya is asking; what those negotiations would look like is hard to say, though the failed San Jose accords would probably be a starting point.

Two things are certain: Zelaya is in a better negotiating position (and a better position overall) than he's been since the coup (and even before it); and whatever the outcome, what had previously been a static and frustrating situation in Honduras has suddenly had new life breathed into it, with an end to an illegal government and a return to the democratically elected government a not-unreasonable possibility.

The Honduran Military's Defensive Apperance on Television

More than a month after their coup, the Honduran military finally went on television Tuesday to explain itself.

The five generals at the head of the Honduran armed forces made a rare appearance on national television to explain their role in the ouster in late June of President Manuel Zelaya, and to respond to charges that they acted in defense of the country’s elite.

In language that often veered into confessional, they repeated that they did not act to take sides in the political fight that had polarized the country, but out of obedience to the law. And they said they were confident that history would judge them as patriots for their actions.

The more they spoke, however, the more they showed how concerned they were that their image had been damaged by their actions, and the clearer it became that they continued to play a leading role in Honduran politics, nearly three decades since the end of military rule.

There's a lot to comment on in this story. First, there's the absolutely risible defense that the military offered, claiming the coup that overthrew Zelaya was done to protect not just Honduras, but to save the United States itself! Seriously:

As if taking a page from a cold war playbook, Gen. Miguel Ángel Garcia Padget said the military had disrupted Mr. Chávez’s plans to spread socialism across the region. “Central America was not the objective of this communism disguised as democracy,” he said. “This socialism, communism, Chávismo, we could call it, was headed to the heart of the United States.” [my emphasis]

In spite of continuous whining not just from the fringe sectors of the wingnuts, but from Republican Senators and Congressional Representatives themselves, Chavez and socialism are in no way a "threat" to America, and this seems about as plausible as the belief that the Russians, Chinese, and "Islamo-fascists" are joining forces to take over America via submarines.

Beyond that, though, this television appearance was an interesting play on the part of the military. Many have observed that the Honduran military's support is what will keep a president afloat through this crisis, be it Micheletti's government or the return of Zelaya. Bloggers have generally agreed that the military's strength and support is central to the outcome of this crisis. However, coming on television and trying to defend yourself as an institution with any and every explanation and defense you can hurl and hope will stick ("We were just obeying the constitution!" "We don't want to hurt the poor!" "We're saving the world from Chavez!" "It wasn't a coup - if it were, we would have arrested and killed a lot more people!") isn't exactly the sign of a powerful institution that has the final say. This isn't to say the military isn't important in the way these events have played out and will play out; certainly, the military will be important, for, as they've already demonstrated, they have the power, legitimate or not, to remove a president if they disagree with his actions. Still, in the past, you would see militaries pull this kind of move and not seem nearly as panicked in defending themselves (see: Chile in 1973; Brazil in 1964; Argentina multiple times; El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s; etc.). This television appearance had a far greater defensive attitude than any I remember historically seeing, and I think it indicates that, while the military is indeed still a major actor in these events, its power as an institution is dulled somewhat.

This leads into a second point. While the Cold War analogy in reference to the "save the world from socialism/communism" rhetoric is straight out of the Cold War (and out of more basic "our good vs. their evil" rhetoric since time immemorial), we have to be careful not to stretch that analogy too far. One anonymous, high-ranking member of the Honduran defense ministry commented that “In the end, there is a chance that the civilians will all kiss and make up, and the military is going to be held as the bad guys. [...] These guys are worried. They are worried about going to jail.”

If this were the Cold War, these guys wouldn't be remotely worried about going to jail; they'd be celebrating their acts, flaunting it in front of the world, and rounding up thousands of "subversives." The only way jail would possibly cross their minds is if there was a tendency within the military for a counter-coup to install even more hard-line leaders. They wouldn't be nearly pleading their case on television in an effort to not come off looking like the perpetrators of a crime; they would be defiantly and aggressively stating why they did what was essential for the "good of the nation." This not only shows how tenuous the military's position is in this whole situation (even as it remains a central actor); it shows how much things have changed since the Cold War.

Again, none of this is to say that the Honduran military is an ineffective force in the way events from here on out play out, nor to suggest that the military was clumsily lucky in the coup; it knew what it was doing, and did so efficiently. However, it would be equally wrong to suggest that the military will be the final arbiter of how things work out from this point onward. Whoever ends up leading Honduras will probably need to at least know that he/she has not antagonized the military to the point that it would just repeat with him/her what it did with Zelaya. But the fact that neither Zelaya nor Micheletti is working closely with the military, despite the latter coming to power thanks to the military and the former's return being accepted by the military when the Honduran armed forces accepted the (failed) Arias accords' term, seems to indicate that the military is nowhere near as monolithically-powerful as some would portray it. The recent appearance on television has just served to reinforce the fact that, while the military will continue to be involved either tacitly or explicitly in the politics of Honduras through the rest of this crisis, it is far from the final arbiter on the fate of Honduras.

Progress in Honduras?

After a month in which the Micheletti government showed that it was pretty inept, the titular president of Honduras appears to finally be backing down significantly:

The head of Honduras’s de facto government, Roberto Micheletti, has expressed support for a compromise that would allow the ousted president of his country to return to power, according to officials in the de facto government and diplomats from the region.

That doesn't mean this is a done deal. As both the article and Greg note, there could be other problems in getting other institutions (namely, the Supreme Court and the military) on board with this, and the Supreme Court's need to issue a ruling next week is a bit....odd. Still, the fact that the previously-intractible Micheletti is suddenly backing down indicates his realization (albeit delayed) that he has no standing in the international community and little chance of accomplishing anything in Honduras, that his previous position was fairly indefensible, and that a resolution needs to happen soon.

Honduras Crisis Talks Dead - Now What?

Talks on Honduras have broken down, and Zelaya and Micheletti seem about as far apart as they ever have been. While the term "postponed" provides a sense of optimism, I suspect it's false optimism. Oscar Arias has failed to negotiate an end to the presidential crisis, and the OAS failed before Arias stepped in. The fact that some within Micheletti's negotiating team were willing to make concessions that Micheletti was not indicated earlier that there may be some cracks forming in the pro-coup faction, but those cracks did not result in any concrete agreements, and Micheletti remains as intransigent as ever.

Arias's claim that the OAS now hasto negotiate a deal is odd, since, as Greg also commented, the OAS already tried and failed, and it's pretty unclear why the OAS will suddenly be able to resolve things quickly. Boz maps out how the reports of what the sticking points in the talks remain unclear (whether Zelaya also rejected the 12-point plan on limiting his powers upon his return, or whether it was just Micheletti who refused the plan due to the return of Zelaya). RAJ believes it was Micheletti, and offers some fair criticisms of Arias's approach:

Arias also made the mistake of getting involved in "negotiating" issues that are
strictly internal-- such as including a requirement that the budget passed by
the de facto regime would be left stand for the remainder of Zelaya's
presidency. This was a red herring thrown in by the Micheletti crowd, and adding
it to the plan simply showed them that Arias would include anything they wanted.
And then they held a press conference and used him rhetorically as a prop.

From the non-Honduras standpoint, Arias's reputation for diplomacy seems to have taken a hit a bit in this whole ordeal. Between the strange comment that the OAS can now take up the issue and his insistence on getting involved purely domestic Honduran affairs as part of the negotiation, he seems to be a bit out of touch with how to have tried to solve this crisis and other alternatives. This isn't to suggest he's inept or that the failure is all his (Micheletti and Zelaya no doubt played major roles as well, to put it lightly), but certainly hopes were riding high that he could bring the situation to a resolution, and not just his failure, but some of his approaches as well, certainly have put a dint his reputation.

More important than Arias's reputation, though, is Honduras itself. It seems fairly likely now that Zelaya will at least try a return to Honduras, saying "only God can stop me," though, as Greg pointed out, there is the small question about the Honduran military, too. The EU has already slashed $90 million in aid, and Hillary Clinton has told Micheletti that, if Zelaya is not returned, the U.S. will also impose severe sanctions. That could theoretically change the playing field a bit, but given Micheletti's intransigence, I find this unlikely. This could end up quietly, or it could end up violently; one can hope it's not the latter, but that possibility is looking increasingly likely, as anti- and pro-Zelaya supporters are already planning public demonstrations that could lead to further conflict.

There Are No "Cracks" in Global Opposition to the Honduran Coup; There Are Only Anti-Democracy Republicans in Congress

The New York Times has a story up about the lack of progress in the Honduran talks between Micheletti and Zelaya, which Arias is mediating. It's clear that neither side wants to give an inch, and while things may improve, time is probably on Micheletti's side. The report also suggests that there are "cracks emerging in the group of countries demanding the return of the ousted president." It's evidence of these "cracks?" Congressional Republicans are in favor of the coup, and Hugo Chavez thinks Arias is erring in treating Micheletti as an equal to Zelaya.


So basically, it takes a random quotation from Chavez on diplomacy (an area that isn't exactly Chavez's strength), and Republican support for the coup, to suggest there are "cracks" in the coalition of countries against the coup?


Hardly.


The Times is clearly trying (and failing) to make something out of nothing here. I really don't know why they reported this - the story about the progress (and lack thereof) and obstacles facing Arias's talks was fine, and stood on its own. It didn't need these ridiculous insinuations that Republicans using the Honduran incident for partisan purposes plus a quotation from Chavez (who has nothing to do with the negotiations, and whose quotation is fairly mild by his own standards) to imply that support globally is falling appart. And it's not like this "breaking news" that Republicans are coming out in favor of the coup is sudden. Even before last week's congressional caucus supporting the coup formed, Republicans had been commenting since the coup in June that they supported the coup and were anti-Zelaya due to his leftist allegiances and so-called "authoritarian" tendencies (which is a rather off from the reality of things).


As is often the case, though, the Times authors (liberal media indeed) do not seem to care about such minor points. Instead, the report takes a congressional caucus designed to play the worst kind of partisan politics and to turn back to an obviously-outdated Cold War mentality in order to gain points, and conflates it to a sign of "cracks" emerging in the global opposition to the coup, when nothing of the sort has happened.


And then the Times wonders why subscriptions are down.